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The goal of this dissertation is to investigate links between susceptibility to
misinformation on the misinformation effect paradigm and individual differences in
visual and verbal source monitoring ability. Results from four studies are reported. The
first three studies assess links between individual differences in perceptual
misinformation endorsement levels and visualization (Word-As-Picture) as well as
verbalization (Picture-As-Word) errors on the memory test of a source monitoring task in
which a set of objects were initially presented either as pictures or words during study. In
Study 1, this picture-word source monitoring task and a misinformation effect paradigm,
with a True/False test format, was administered to a sample of 87 participants. In Study 2,
the same picture-word source monitoring task and the misinformation effect paradigm,
this time with a two-alternative forced-choice test format, was administered to a sample
of 177 participants. In Study 3, electroencephalographic (EEG) data was recorded during
the testing phases of a picture-word source monitoring task and a misinformation effect
paradigm administered to a sample of 19 participants. Across all three studies,
verbalization (Picture-As-Word) errors was more strongly linked with misinformation
susceptibility than visualization errors (Word-As-Picture). Building on these results,
Study 4 assessed the misinformation susceptibility related predictive value of individual
differences in visual and verbal processing during the event and narrative study stages of

the misinformation effect paradigm. In Study 4, EEG data was recorded during the during
the event and narrative study phases of a misinformation effect paradigm administered to
a sample of 30 participants. The primary findings from Study 4 indicate that during the
event and narrative encoding stages in the misinformation effect, activity in neural
regions associated with semantic and verbal processing is more strongly related to
misinformation susceptibility relative to activity areas related to visual processing and
encoding. Collectively, these results indicate that verbalization based processes may play
a stronger role in misinformation susceptibility relative to visualization related
processing. Drawing on this observation, an integrative framework highlighting the role
of modality related features in a source monitoring perspective of the misinformation
effect is proposed.
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1
THE ROLE OF VISUAL AND VERBAL PROCESSES IN FALSE MEMORY
SUSCEPTIBILITY ON THE MISINFORMATION EFFECT
1.1

General Introduction
One of the key approaches in developing an understanding of complex systems is

to study their points of failure. The study of human memory has a long tradition of
utilizing this method to shed light on the processes underlying memory encoding, storage,
and retrieval. Within this domain, the extensive amount of work focusing on the
distortion of event (i.e., episodic) memory through external influences has led to
significant advances in our understanding of the processes underlying human cognition.
Indeed, some of the earliest work demonstrating that external suggestions have the
potential to distort memory (e.g., Bernheim, 1884) even slightly predates the classic
memory investigations of Ebbinghaus (1885), one of the first systematic investigators of
human memory.
Modern research on memory distortion, however, primarily draws on pioneering
work on the nature of human memory by Bartlett (1932). Today, Bartlett’s (1932) work is
acknowledged as being one of the first research efforts to shed light on how human
memory is often, if not always, driven by reconstructive processes; though Bartlett
himself was not always unequivocal on this views on such matters (see Ost & Costall,
2002). In the most frequently cited case study from Bartlett (1932)’s qualitative work,
British participants were asked to reproduce foreign folk tales – the most famous being a
Canadian folktale called the War of the Ghosts – told to them first after a 15-minute delay
and then repeatedly over a somewhat unsystematic manner over a period after periods of
weeks, months or years. The primary finding from this being that the participants not
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only became less accurate over time but also showed systematic distortions in their
recollections, often integrating cultural elements from the time period into their reports
(Bartlett, 1932).
Bartlett’s qualitative investigations helped to lay the foundation for the field of
memory distortion, developing the framework for future quantitative research. This
transition to quantitative methods began in the 1970s when, drawing on anecdotal
evidence from legal practitioners on the potential biasing impact of suggestive
questioning techniques on eyewitness accuracy ("Rules of Evidence for United State
Courts and Magistrates," 1973) and research on the impact of question wording on
participant responses (Harris, 1973), Loftus and Palmer (1974) conducted an
investigation into the memory distorting impact of suggestive questioning. Loftus and
Palmer (1974)’s work showed that manipulation of the action verb used in a question
involving the speed of the collision of two cars in a film could increase the levels of
obtained crash speed estimates as well as boost endorsements of the presence of nonexistent broken glass in the film.
Building on these findings, Loftus et al. (1978) went on to show, in a series of
four experiments, that inserting presuppositions into questions (e.g. implying the
presence of non-existent stop sign) could lead to an increase in subsequent endorsements
of the presupposed information (e.g. endorsing the presence of a stop sign). These
findings led to a significant increase in the amount of research conducted on the memory
distortive influences of misleading postevent misinformation (e.g. Bekerian & Bowers,
1983; Christiaansen et al., 1983; Hertel, 1982; Weinberg et al., 1983), with the
phenomena often being referred to as the misinformation effect. Research on the
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misinformation effect continues to be an active area of study with findings showing the
effect in participants across a wide developmental range, for a wide variety of events and
delivery methods as well as with different methods of misinformation presentation and
memory assessment methods.
The most common form of the misinformation effect paradigm in modern
psychological research proceeds as follows. Individuals view a visually presented event
(i.e., the original event), receive verbal misleading post-event information (i.e.,
misinformation), and are subsequently tested on event details from the original event
(Loftus, 1975). As a result of exposure to misinformation, participants often falsely report
misleading information as having been part of the original event. These misinformation
based endorsements are often accompanied by perceptual recollection reports of having
seen the verbally presented misinformation (Belli et al., 1994; Mitchell & Zaragoza,
1996) comparable with, although perhaps less detailed than that of, true event memories
(Schooler et al., 1986).

1.2

Theoretical Models of the Misinformation Effect
Naturally, there has long been significant interest in deconstructing the processes

underlying false memory endorsements in the misinformation effect paradigm. This
interest is largely driven by the potential contributions an understanding of the processes
underlying the misinformation effect would make to models of episodic memory.
Motivated by this potential, Wright (1995), Loftus and Hoffman (1989) and Belli (1989)
identify three theoretical accounts of the misinformation effect. The first is the
“destructive updating” hypothesis in which the original event memory traces are actively
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impacted by exposure to post-event misinformation. The destructive memory trace
alteration stance was one of the first theoretical proposals for the misinformation effect
(Loftus, 1977, 1979; Loftus & Loftus, 1980; Loftus & Palmer, 1974) and comes in two
forms. The strong variant argues that the original memory trace is permanently erased by
the misinformation while the weaker variant argues that it is instead eroded or altered.
Both variants of the updating hypothesis have been articulated by Loftus in different
publications (e.g., see Loftus & Loftus, 1980 for an endorsement of the strong position)
though, for the most part, it is the weaker variant (i.e., memory impairment) that Loftus
most often endorses (Loftus, 1977, 1979; Loftus & Palmer, 1974).
The second proposed theoretical account is the misinformation acceptance
hypothesis (Belli, 1989). This perspective argues that the misinformed participants often
fail to encode the original event detail. As a result, they may often end up endorsing
misinformation due to remembering it from the post-event information and not having a
reason to doubt that source. This hypothesis was primarily driven by research using the
modified test procedure, a two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) test in which the impact
of misinformation on the access to the memory trace for event details subjected to
misinformation is assessed by testing memory for these items via presenting the original
and a foil detail without the misinformed detail as response options (McCloskey &
Zaragoza, 1985; Zaragoza et al., 1987). Results from investigations utilizing this form of
testing initially presented evidence that lent support for the misinformation acceptance
hypothesis by demonstrating little to no evidence of impairment for original event
memory details subjected to misinformation (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; Zaragoza et
al., 1987).
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The third theoretical position on the misinformation effect is the coexistence
hypothesis (Belli, 1989; Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay & Johnson, 1987) in which both
the original event and misleading information are proposed to co-exist in memory with
the post-event misinformation benefiting from being studied more recently (Morton et al.,
1985). In line with its name, the coexistence hypothesis can readily coexist alongside the
misinformation acceptance hypothesis and the weaker (but not the strong) variant of the
“destructive updating” hypothesis.
Apart from the strong “destructive updating” variant of the memory impairment
hypothesis, the current body of research on the misinformation effect provides support
for all three perspectives to some degree. There is certainly evidence that at least some
false memory endorsements are driven by misinformation acceptance (Belli, 1989; van
Bergen et al., 2010; Zajac et al., 2016). In support of misinformation acceptance, factors
such as the level of trust participants have in their memories (van Bergen et al., 2010) and
the perceived reliability of the misinformation source (Zajac et al., 2016) have both been
shown to influence misinformation susceptibility. However, early work by Belli (1989)
shows that misinformation acceptance alone cannot fully account for the impairment
related impact of misinformation on event memory performance. Belli (1989)’s
observations on this point are supported by numerous other researchers (Belli et al., 1992;
Eakin et al., 2003; Schooler et al., 1988; Schreiber & Sergent, 1998), including a metaanalysis of 44 studies by Payne et al. (1994) which shows a small but significant memory
impairment effect in misinformation effect experiments utilizing the modified test
procedure. Thus while misinformation acceptance likely plays some role in
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misinformation susceptibility, there is also evidence to support the role of memory
impairment in the misinformation effect paradigm.
In addition to this body of evidence, the fact that task-related manipulations can
shift responses towards event versus misinformation driven endorsements alone also
provides strong evidence for the coexistence hypothesis, likely with event and
misinformation based memory traces varying in encoding form and strength. The
coexistence position is further strengthened by research showing that (1) priming event
items via tasks involving word-primes related to them reduces misinformation
susceptibility (Gordon & Shapiro, 2012) and (2) second guesses for misinformation
endorsed items are more likely than chance to endorse event items (Wright et al., 1996).
While few studies administer the misinformation effect paradigm with designs able to
assess changes in formed memory traces for misinformation and event-based memories
over time (i.e., event and narrative study phases are presented concurrently with the
retention interval between both study phases and test being systematically varied), there
is evidence from work by Frost and Weaver (1997) which suggests that participants draw
more heavily on misinformation based memory traces over time; though the factors (i.e.,
encoding modality, study presentation order, etc.) driving this shift have yet to be
systematically explored. Collectively, these findings converge on the idea that, over the
timescale of a typical misinformation study, memory traces for both the original event
and misinformation details can coexist in memory. Furthermore, while still an active area
of research, modern perspectives on the neural processes underlying human memory
(Johnson et al., 2009; Kitamura et al., 2017; Mitchell & Johnson, 2009) lend additional
support to the coexistence perspective.
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1.3

The Source Monitoring Framework and the Misinformation Effect
Given the evidence in support for the simultaneous existence of multiple,

potential contradicting, memory traces, the next key theoretical issue requiring resolution
is the problem of how these memory traces are retrieved, evaluated and subsequently
endorsed or rejected. One of the most influential theoretical efforts in providing a
foundation for assessing these questions has been the Source Monitoring Framework
(SMF). The SMF builds on early theoretical work on Reality Monitoring related
processes involved in making distinctions between the real and the imagined (Johnson &
Raye, 1981; Johnson et al., 1977). This framework has been extended by proposing that
the processes involved in Reality Monitoring are part of a more general set of
mechanisms involved in forming attributions regarding the origin of mental experiences
led to the development of the SMF (Johnson, 1988; Johnson et al., 1993; Mitchell &
Johnson, 2000).
The SMF is grounded in Johnson (1983)’s multiple-entry modular (MEM) model
of memory. In the MEM model, memory traces are proposed to arise as byproducts of the
operation of numerous perceptual and reflective processes during everyday experience.
Subsequently, during memory retrieval, the MEM model proposes that a subset of those
perceptual and reflective processes engaged during encoding are re-evoked by retrieval
cues and evaluated alongside factors such as situational expectations (e.g., being on the
witness stand might increase criterion thresholds) and general knowledge (e.g., a memory
of flying on a motorcycle is likely to be dismissed as being improbable).
The SMF focuses on this evaluative stage of memory processing. The framework
proposes that memories are made up of a range of features including perceptual details,
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semantic information, traces of cognitive operations, emotions and temporal details
(Mitchell & Johnson, 2009). When a specific memory is cued or retrieved, a subset of the
features that made up that particular experience is activated, alongside other situational
elements such as expectations, emotional state, and task orientation (Johnson et al.,
1996). Over time, the interconnections between these features are likely to weaken which
may cause access to some aspects of specific memories to be lost, resulting in the
degradation, but not the complete destruction, of the original memory trace (Belli et al.,
1992; Johnson et al., 2009).
Central to the tenets of the SMF is the idea that the origin of remembered
information is not simply tagged to our memories. Instead, the process of source
attribution is the product of a complex set of heuristic and strategic decision processes
made based on an individual’s assumptions regarding average differences in the features
that characterize various sources and various situational factors (Gallo et al., 2006;
Mitchell & Johnson, 2009). Depending on the circumstances, this attribution process is
largely considered to involve varying degrees of both controlled and automatic processes
(Johnson et al., 1993; Marsh et al., 1997).
Instances where these monitoring processes break down have long intrigued
memory researchers who have linked source monitoring failures to a whole range of
phenomena including everyday memory lapses (Brandt et al., 2014), eyewitness
identification and testimony (Behrman & Richards, 2005; Memon et al., 2010),
hallucinations (Larøi et al., 2004) and unconscious plagiarism (Landau & Marsh, 1997).
Source monitoring paradigms have been created to investigate how we differentiate
between picture and word memories (Rosburg et al., 2011a; Smith et al., 2015), internally
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generated vs. heard words (Etcheverry et al., 2012; Leding, 2012; McKague et al., 2012;
Simons et al., 2006), performed vs. imagined actions (Hornstein & Mulligan, 2004;
Leynes & Kakadia, 2013; Lindner & Davidson, 2014; Lindner et al., 2010; Manzi &
Nigro, 2008), human source characteristics (Bayen et al., 2000; Leynes et al., 2013;
Sugimori & Tanno, 2010) the source of presentation fonts (Kuhlmann & Touron, 2012)
and spatial locations subserves. There is also evidence to suggest that they may even play
a key role in our understanding of the controversy regarding “recovered memories” of
childhood sexual abuse (Belli & Loftus, 1994; Geraerts et al., 2009; McNally et al.,
2005).
Of particular interest to the present dissertation, the SMF has also been frequently
proposed as a theoretical model to account for how participants make memory related
decisions on the misinformation effect paradigm (Dodhia & Metcalfe, 1999; Hekkanen &
McEvoy, 2002; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989a; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). From the
perspective of the SMF, the misinformation effect can be naturally framed as a source
monitoring problem. First, participants encode a visually presented event forming
memory traces of the visually presented details. The participants then encode a verbally
presented narrative, forming memory traces of the verbally presented details. Finally,
with variations depending on the testing format employed, participants are asked to
evaluate the veracity of presented statements or select the appropriate event item in
response to questioning. During the testing stage, formed memory traces and their
associated features are activated to varying degrees, providing information for sourcemonitoring judgments to be made regarding both an item’s accuracy and encoding source
(i.e., during the visual event versus verbal narrative study stages).
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To tap into this source attribution process, source monitoring focused assessments
of the misinformation effect frequently utilize a source-monitoring test in which
participants are asked to identify the source (i.e., the witnessed event, the post-event
narrative, both or neither (indicating a guess)) of the responses they endorsed. A
significant amount of research using this procedure has shown that misled participants
will frequently attribute their endorsement of misinformed details to events they
remember seeing during the event (Belli et al., 1994; Chambers & Zaragoza, 2001;
Drivdahl & Zaragoza, 2001; Frost et al., 2002; Hekkanen & McEvoy, 2002; Lindsay,
1990; Mitchell & Zaragoza, 1996, 2001; Zaragoza & Mitchell, 1996).
This framing of the misinformation effect in the language of source monitoring
highlights an intriguing point. Specifically, not only do the presentation of the event and
post-event information occur at different time points, but they are also typically presented
in different modalities. While the original event is typically presented visually, the
misinformation narrative is almost always presented in a verbal narrative. Thus, it is
likely that misinformation susceptibility may be at least partly driven by modality related
source confusions (i.e., source monitoring errors associated with the misattribution of
information from one modality to another). Given that visual and verbal modalities are
the two information sources typically involved in the misinformation effect, researchers
have focused on the relative roles of visualization and verbalization in misinformation
susceptibility.
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1.4

The Role of Visualization in the Misinformation Effect
Visualization has long been considered to play a key role in false-memory

endorsements on the misinformation effect. This belief is likely driven by the strong
evidence for the role of visualization in the formation of false autobiographical
memories. Much of this belief has its roots in the “memory wars” of the 1990s (Crews,
1996). During this period there was a significant increase in cases in which individuals
began to report having recovered memories of traumatic events from their childhood
(Ritter, 1991). This period was characterized by a debate in which on one side were
individuals who believed traumatic memories could be repressed and subsequently
recovered (Blume, 1990; Freyd, 1994). On the other side were those who questioned the
existence of the repressed memory phenomena and the reliability of the recovery of
memories through therapy (Goldstein, 1997; Holmes, 1995; Loftus, 1993).
Of key relevance to the current discussion, this debate highlighted the potential
memory distorting impact of guided visualization and other imagery based techniques
(Ceci & Bruck, 1995; Goldstein, 1997; Lindsay & Read, 1994). In line with the evidence
supporting that this was occurring in real-world cases at the time (Loftus, 1998; Roe &
Schwartz, 1996), research work shown guided visualization is associated with increased
susceptibility towards the implantation of false childhood memories (Herndon et al.,
2014; Hyman & Pentland, 1996) as well as stronger shifts in the level of confidence in
poorly recalled childhood memories (Paddock et al., 2000).
Likely motivated by this body of work, belief in the idea that mental imagery
plays a key role in driving misinformation susceptibility has a long history in the field of
memory research (Belli & Loftus, 1996; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). The primary source of
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experimental evidence for this hypothesis draws on research on the impact of perceptual
elaboration on false memory. In these investigations, participants are visually presented
with an event, are presented with verbal misinformation and asked to generate perceptual
details involving specific items in the event or suggested items that were not present
(Drivdahl & Zaragoza, 2001; Lane & Zaragoza, 2007). The general idea behind these
manipulations is that they implicitly encourage the generation of visualization details of
the verbally suggested events, potentially leading to increased levels of sourcemonitoring related difficulty. The general finding in these paradigms is that generating
perceptual details for items leads to increased levels of misinformation endorsement
relative to simply reading those details (Drivdahl & Zaragoza, 2001; Lane & Zaragoza,
2007).
While these results are intriguing in and of themselves, it is difficult to ascertain
the degree to which they lend support to the role of visualization in the misinformation
effect. As stated in the discussion section of these investigations, the generation of
perceptual details impacts other cognitive processes in addition to visualization. These
include deeper processing levels (Drivdahl & Zaragoza, 2001) and the engagement in
more cognitive operations (Lane & Zaragoza, 2007). Of particular interest to the focus of
this dissertation, encouraging the articulated generation of details may also lead to a
stronger semantic and verbal traces of the presented misinformation. In support of this
view, research (discussed more extensively in the next section) has shown abstract nonvisual conceptual elaboration is a stronger driver of misinformation than visual
elaboration (Zaragoza et al., 2011). On the whole, experimental support for the role of
visualization on the misinformation effect is generally inconclusive.
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There is, however, non-experimental research focused on shedding light on the
role of visualization on the misinformation effect. The most direct source of evidence on
this link comes from research involving the Vividness of Visual Imagery
Questionnaire (VVIQ) (Marks, 1973). The VVIQ is a 16-item measure of individual
differences in visual imagery which builds on the Betts Questionnaire upon Mental
Imagery (Sheehan, 1967). The VVIQ verbally instructs participants to visually image
specific details of specific visual scenes and record the vividness of the imagery on a
five-point scale. As a measure of visual imagery, the VVIQ has been widely used in
hundreds of studies to investigate the role of visualization strength across a wide range of
domains (see McKelvie, 1995 for a review).
Given the widespread belief in the link between visualization strength and
misinformation susceptibility, it is surprising that only a few studies have shown even
weakly positive associations between the VVIQ and misinformation susceptibility. The
first study in the area was conducted by Tousignant (1984) who sought to assess the link
between sixteen different cognitive and personality variables and misinformation
susceptibility. Tousignant (1984) found a moderate (r = .22, p = .06) correlation between
VVIQ scores and misinformation susceptibility. While this is intriguing, it is important to
note that given the 52 derived correlations in this investigation, if this effect was
subjected to p-value control procedures (i.e., Bonferroni or Holms corrected), there
would be a significant risk of the highlighted effect being a Type-1 error.
Also, somewhat paradoxically, Tousignant (1984) found a positive correlation (r
= .23, p < .05) between preferences for a visual style of processing, as measured by the
visualizer-verbalizer questionnaire (Richardson, 1977), and reduced misinformation
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susceptibility as indexed by higher rates of correct item recognition on misled items. The
VVQ is a self-administered 15-item questionnaire which assesses individual differences
in the tendency to use mental visualization strategies versus verbalization processing
strategies (Richardson, 1977; Spoltore & Smock, 1983; Stevens et al., 1986; Warren &
Good, 1979). Higher scores on the inventory are indicative of a preference for
verbalization over visualization. Thus the findings of Tousignant (1984) show that both a
preference against using visualization (measured via the VVQ) as well as stronger levels
of visualization vividness (measured via the VIVQ) are associated with increased
misinformation susceptibility. Tousignant (1984) also showed the VVQ and VVIQ to be
uncorrelated (r = .11) suggesting that these two constructs are largely independent and
potentially draw on different underlying cognitive processes. Given these mixed, and
slightly contradictory findings, Schooler and Loftus (1993) indicated a need for
additional work to shed light on this issue.
The investigation which came closest to addressing this was conducted by Tomes
and Katz (1997). Tomes and Katz (1997) were interested in assessing the individual
difference factors predictive of habitual misinformation susceptibility or the tendency to
endorse misinformation repeatedly across which utilized multiple misinformation eventstudy-test cycles. While Tomes and Katz (1997) did not link scores on the VVIQ and
VVQ with misinformation susceptibility directly, they did correlate these measures with
habitual misinformation susceptibility (i.e., the tendency to endorse misinformation in
multiple events). In their results, the VVIQ showed a weak relationship (r = .15) to
habitual susceptibility while the VVQ showed a nonsignificant one (r = -.04). Notably,
however, akin to Tousignant (1984), no p-value control procedures were applied for the
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dozen relationships investigated in Tomes and Katz (1997). Also in contrast to the
significant link between habitual misinformation susceptibility and the VVIQ, Tomes and
Katz (1997) found a negative relationship between two measures of mental imagery
rotation ability from the Educational Testing Service Kit (Ekstrom et al., 1954) which
they did not interpret. It is unclear if these opposite correlations reflect mixed findings or
if the ETS results reflect content contamination from other variables such as IQ which
has been shown to be negatively associated with misinformation susceptibility (Bi et al.,
2010).
Notably, in a follow-up investigation of habitual susceptibility to misinformation,
in contrast to Tomes and Katz (1997), Cann and Katz (2005) found a non-significant
correlation between the VVIQ and habitual misinformation susceptibility. One key
difference between Tomes and Katz (1997) and Cann and Katz (2005) is the presence of
a source monitoring test in the latter that was absent in the former. It is tempting to
speculate on how increased source monitoring stringency could potentially shift the link
between visualization vividness and misinformation susceptibility. However, given that
the links between habitual susceptibility and the VVIQ in Tomes and Katz (1997) and
Cann and Katz (2005) are weak (r <= .15), coupled with unclear links between the
understudied construct of habitual susceptibility and typical susceptibility on the
misinformation paradigm, it is hard to draw strong conclusions on this point.
Finally, one of the main studies cited in support for the role of visualization in the
misinformation effect, Dobson and Markham (1993), directly sought to link the VVIQ
with misinformation susceptibility. Dobson and Markham (1993) found that participants
with VVIQ scores above their sample’s median score did not exhibit overall higher levels
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of misinformation endorsement (as measured by selection of misinformed items over
control ones) but were less accurate (28% versus 39%) in correctly attributing peripheral
additive misinformation to being only present in the narrative. It is, however, important to
note that task instructions in Dobson and Markham (1993) encouraged visualization with
participants being given an unrestricted amount of time to rate each narrative sentence on
a 5-point scale based on the clarity of its verbal description of the visually presented 4.5minute film. It is also interesting to note that high imagers in Dobson and Markham
(1993) showed a trend towards being less accurate in attributing event items accurately to
the event only (89% versus 97%, p = .13), which is intriguing given the limited sample
size (n = 60) and the likelihood of a performance ceiling. Memory for the narrative was
also unusually high (85%), even higher than event recollection levels (65%), with
unusually high misinformation endorsement levels (58%).
On the whole, Dobson and Markham (1993)’s findings suggest that under
conditions in which narrative materials are studied more extensively than the visual event
under visualization-encouraging conditions, individuals with higher levels of selfreported visualization vividness on the VVIQ are more likely to misattribute additive
misinformation being visually presented. While these findings are intriguing, it is
important to note that the administration conditions of misinformation in Dobson and
Markham (1993) differ considerably from standard misinformation presentations in most
investigations of the misinformation effect. Thus the extent to which these findings carry
over to typical assessments of the misinformation effect is unclear.
An additional reason to be cautious on this point comes from the fact that in
contrast to the VVIQ-misinformation susceptibility links observed by Tousignant (1984),
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Tomes and Katz (1997) and Dobson and Markham (1993), other investigators have often
failed to find significant links between the VVIQ and misinformation susceptibility.
(Cann & Katz, 2005; Desjarlais & Bernstein, 2012; Greening, 2002; Nichols, 2014;
Pérez-Mata & Diges, 2007). The first of these studies is the previously mentioned
investigation by Cann and Katz (2005), who found a non-significant negative correlation
between the VVIQ and habitual misinformation susceptibility. The second sole published
null result comes from Pérez-Mata and Diges (2007), who after failing to find a link
between the two with a remember-know-guess judgment type misinformation task,
disregarded the variable in all subsequent analyses.
Apart from these published studies, it is also likely that a file-drawer effect is
concealing the true number of null findings in this area. Evidence in support of this
comes from an assessment of unpublished research in this area by the author which
uncovered three unpublished doctoral dissertations and one conference poster, all of
which failed to find a significant link between the VVIQ and misinformation
susceptibility. The first unpublished dissertation comes from Greening (2002), who
looked at the relationship between the VVIQ and misinformation susceptibility across
four independent studies, finding no correlation between the two measures in three
investigations and a negative correlation between the two in one. The second unpublished
dissertation by Nichols (2014) was a large (N = 373) investigation of links between the
VVIQ, working memory and the misinformation effect which showed effectively no
relationship (r =.06) between the VVIQ and misinformation susceptibility. The sole
dissertation on the topic which found a significant correlation between the VVIQ and
misinformation susceptibility was conducted by (Hegerty, 2015), who only found a weak
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direct association (r = .16) which was not significant after p-value control and/or after
accounting factors such as working memory and test delay. Finally, an unpublished
conference poster by Desjarlais and Bernstein (2012) failed to find a significant link
between the VVIQ and misinformation susceptibility (r = .05) in a large (N = 151)
sample assessment of both factors.
Thus, on the whole, the bulk of research in this area indicates that the VVIQ is not
a strong predictor of misinformation susceptibility under standard misinformation study
and test conditions. Even disregarding the preponderance of null findings and considering
only positive results, the link between the VVIQ and misinformation susceptibility is
weak at best, which is surprising given the strength of belief in the driving role of
visualization in misinformation susceptibility. It is important to note, however, a key
point in considering the role of VVIQ in the context of visual source monitoring. The
VVIQ aims to assess individual differences in visualization vividness as opposed to
measuring differences in visual source monitoring or preferences in utilizing visual
imagery as an encoding strategy, the two aspects of visualization based cognition most
likely to be linked to misinformation susceptibility. Thus, it is important to consider the
possibility that the VVIQ may not be effective in tapping into individual differences in
visual source monitoring.
In support of this point, several researchers have failed to find a link between
VVIQ scores and visual source monitoring performance on measures such as the PictureWord source monitoring task (Rosburg et al., 2011a, 2011b) and other reality monitoring
paradigms (Slusher & Anderson, 1987). The Picture-Word source monitoring task, in
particular, is a widely used measure of source monitoring in which participants study a
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list of objects presented either as words or pictures/words+pictures (DeCarlo, 2003;
Dobbins & Wagner, 2005; Hoffman, 1997; Johansson et al., 2002; Kensinger & Schacter,
2006; Stephan-Otto et al., 2017). The absence of a link between the VVIQ and this
measure suggests that perhaps the VVIQ may not be a good measure of individual
differences in visual memory monitoring. It is, however, important to note that prior
investigations linking the VVIQ to performance on the Picture-Word source monitoring
task utilize fairly small samples between 26 and 32 cases (Rosburg et al., 2011a, 2011b),
leaving open the possibility that the two measures are weakly linked.
These findings indicate that (1) there is a need for a large sample investigation of
the link between the VVIQ and visual source monitoring and (2) the best way to assess
the role of visualization-based cognition in the misinformation effect might be to directly
link misinformation susceptibility with empirically derived measures of individual
differences in visual source monitoring (e.g., the Picture-Word source task).
In addition to not being associated with visual-source monitoring, the VVIQ is
also uncorrelated with measures aiming to assess individual differences in preferences in
utilizing visual imagery as an encoding technique. One of the most frequently utilized
measures in this regard is the Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (VVQ, Richardson,
1977), a measure of individual differences in the inclination to rely on visual versus
verbal mental representation preferences (Richardson, 1977; Spoltore & Smock, 1983;
Stevens et al., 1986; Warren & Good, 1979). As previously discussed, Tousignant (1984),
administered the VVIQ and VVQ together and showed these measures to be differentially
correlated with misinformation susceptibility and uncorrelated with each other. Of
particular interest, higher scores on the VVQ (indicative of a preference for verbalization-

20
based processing strategies over visual ones) were positively associated with
misinformation suggestibility. This observation sets the stage for considering the role of
verbalization in the misinformation effect.

1.5

The Role of Verbalization in the Misinformation Effect

1.5.1 Verbalization and Misinformation in Children
The discussion of the role of verbal-based processes in the misinformation effect
has primarily focused on the dynamics of misinformation susceptibility in young
children. Hyman et al. (1995), Hyman and Kleinknecht (1996) and Eisen, Quas, et al.
(2002) have all emphasized the importance of narrative construction in false memory
formation in this population. From this perspective, in addition to visualization,
individual differences in the strength of narrative construction are proposed to play an
important role in false memory formation. In other words, the formation of stronger and
richer narratives is believed to be one of the key factors underlying misinformation
susceptibility, at least among young children.
The first source of evidence in support of the role of verbal processing in the
misinformation effect comes from developmental research involving young children.
Roebers and Schneider (2005) examined the suggestibility of 4-year olds across multiple
studies and were surprised to repeatedly observe a positive correlation between stronger
language/verbal skills and misinformation susceptibility. Roebers and Schneider (2005)
concluded that it was likely that having better language skills led to stronger encoding of
the verbally presented misinformation, which in turn led to higher levels of
misinformation endorsement. While it is tempting to note that stronger language skills are
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associated with higher intelligence, a trait associated with reduced misinformation
susceptibility (Bi et al., 2010), recent research on the link between cognitive functioning
and false memory suggestibility in children did not find a significant link between the
two in this population (Caprin et al., 2016)
Roebers and Schneider (2005) findings are consistent with prior work by Lee
(2004). Lee (2004) administered a standard misinformation paradigm with a source
monitoring test to a mixed sample of children (mean age = 8.5 years) and adolescents
(mean age = 16.3 years) in an investigation of the interrelationships between age and
various neuropsychological and social cognitive measures. These measures were
comprised of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (a measure of task set shifting), the
California Verbal Learning test (a measure of non-associative verbal memory), a
backward digit span task (a measure of working memory) and the Verbal Paired
Associates scale (a measure of episodic verbal association memory). The only significant
association noted between these measures and misinformation susceptibility was a
positive correlation between suggestibility levels and the Verbal Paired Associates scale.
This result suggests that individual differences in the ability to form verbal associations
in memory in young populations may be positively related to misinformation
susceptibility. While intriguing, this finding should be taken with caution given its
moderate strength (r = .26) and the fact that it would not have been significant after
appropriate p-value control procedures.
Additional work on the link between verbal abilities and suggestibility in young
children comes from two experiments from Kulkofsky and Klemfuss (2008). These
studies show that while the quality of narratives generated about a specific event is
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negatively associated with subsequent misinformation suggestibility on that event,
general narrative ability as measured by the quality of narratives generated on non-event
related memories was positively associated with suggestibility. These findings suggest
that while detailed specific event memories may be resistant to suggestion, general
faculty at creating event narratives is associated with increased suggestibility.
Unfortunately, as Kulkofsky and Klemfuss (2008) did not measure both types of
narrative ability in the same target sample, the relative contributions of these two aspects
of narrative generation remain unknown. Nonetheless, these results lend support to the
idea that individual differences in processes associated with the generation of rich verbal
narrative traces may be associated with increased misinformation susceptibility.

1.5.2 Verbalization and Misinformation in Adults: Experimental Work
Apart from these investigations in developmentally young populations, there has
been fairly recent experimental work on the misinformation effect that lends support to
the idea that non-visual verbal-based processes play a key role in driving misinformation
susceptibility. For instance, Zaragoza et al. (2011) found that encouraging abstract, nonvisual, conceptual reflection on presented misinformation can elevate misinformation
susceptibility. Specifically, Zaragoza et al. (2011) found that reflecting on non-perceptual
aspects (i.e., the meaning and implications) of event items presented in a misinformation
narrative led to even greater levels of misinformation susceptibility than the visualization
based perceptual elaboration methods discussed in the previous section. Of particular
interest, these conceptually elaborated false memories were given perceptual source
attributions, suggesting non-verbal narrative-focused processes not only play a role in
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driving misinformation endorsements but can also lead to perceptual source
misattributions of misinformation content.
Additional evidence for the idea that misinformation-based memories have a nonvisual narrative base comes from Schooler et al. (1986). In this investigation of the
qualities of false memories, Schooler et al. (1986) found that relative to true memories,
verbal descriptions of misinformed memories were on average longer; contained more
references to cognitive operations; more frequently referenced conceptual information
such as event item functions, and contained fewer sensory details. These findings lend
additional support to the idea that false memories may be drawing more heavily on
verbal, narrative-focused, processes as opposed to visualization based ones.
A final study which needs to be discussed when considering experimental links
between verbalization and the misinformation effect comes from research on
misinformation effect narrative reading speed by Tousignant et al. (1986). In two separate
studies, Tousignant et al. (1986) found that participants who (1) naturally read more
slowly or (2) who were instructed to read more slowly, were both more likely to detect
discrepancies on the misinformation effect and were less susceptible to misinformation.
To interpret these findings, it is important to distinguish between natural and instructed
reading speed.
From this perspective, results regarding natural reading rate differences suggest
that participants who either (1) read more slowly naturally or (2) detected discrepancies
in the narrative and subsequently slowed down, were less susceptible to misinformation.
Slower readers may have encoded the narrative less effectively or, given the possibility
that they were less adept with verbal processing than fast readers, may have been less
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likely to draw on their memory for the verbally presented material. It is also possible that
discrepancy detection induces a slowdown in reading speed, causing participants to
scrutinize the material more carefully. The difficulty in disentangling natural reading
speed from induced changes in discrepancy detection makes it difficult to draw firm
conclusions on this point. It is possible that both factors contribute to the observed
findings in Tousignant et al. (1986). It would be interesting to model possible changes in
reading rates over time from pre to post-discrepancy presentation to shed some light on
this issue.
With regard to the instructed reading condition, it is clear that being instructed to
read a narrative slowly results in reduced misinformation susceptibility driven by
increased discrepancy detection. Tousignant et al. (1986)’s findings are fairly clear in that
regard. It is, however, difficult to disentangle preferences for verbal representations and
discrepancy detection under these conditions. This difficulty is elevated by the fact that
despite the cover instructions indicating that the purpose of the reading task was to
evaluate writing style, being instructed to read slowly is largely equivalent to being
instructed to read carefully. Reading in this manner would result in both a strongly
encoded verbal trace for the narrative information while simultaneously boosting levels
of discrepancy detection. Given the use of a single-critical item, it is impossible to
disentangle the relative contribution of these two factors. Indeed, in their discussion of
these results, Tousignant et al. (1986) explicitly state their belief that the link between the
amount of attention allocated to the misinformation narrative and misinformation
susceptibility is curvilinear. Specifically, Tousignant et al. (1986) argue that the highest
level of misinformation susceptibility would be noted when sufficient attention towards
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encoding the misinformation is allocated, but not so much that the discrepancies are
detected.
This detailed consideration of Tousignant et al. (1986) raises several important
points regarding the assessment of the link between individual differences in the strength
of, or preference for, verbal representations and misinformation susceptibility. First, the
presentation of visual event and misinformation narrative items should be standardized to
be at a fixed rate to control the amount of time participants allocate to each event. This
control would also ensure an equal amount of time for discrepancy detection and
encoding across participants. Second, a sufficient number of critical items must be
presented to ensure a sufficiently robust measurement of misinformation susceptibility.
Indeed, the second point has become standard practice in current research involving the
misinformation effect, all of which utilize paradigms with multiple pieces of
misinformation. Intriguingly, this methodological shift may be driving a shift in what the
misinformation effect is measuring. It is likely that performance on single-item
misinformation effect paradigms draws more heavily on discrepancy detection related
processes while multi-item misinformation effect paradigms more strongly reflect source
monitoring related factors. To the best of my knowledge, this possibility has however not
yet been assessed, leaving it as an interesting question for future research.

1.5.3 Verbalization and Misinformation in Adults: Non-experimental Work
Apart from the experimental work discussed in the previous section, the link
between verbal abilities and misinformation susceptibility in adult populations using
correlational approaches has not been extensively explored. One of the few studies on
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this topic was a large-sample investigation of the role of cognitive factors in the
misinformation effect which failed to find a link between verbal intelligence and
misinformation susceptibility (Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin, He, Chen, Li, Xue, et al., 2010). It
is important to note, however, that verbal intelligence is a broad construct which lacks the
specificity to draw strong conclusions regarding the role of verbalization processes in the
misinformation effect. This point is especially important to consider given research
findings which show a negative relationship between intelligence quotient (IQ) levels, a
measure to which verbal intelligence strongly contributes to, in adults and misinformation
susceptibility (Gudjonsson, 1983; Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin, He, Chen, Li, Xue, et al.,
2010).
Another non-experimental line of research which has potential to shed light on the
link between verbal processing and the misinformation effect comes from work involving
the Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (VVQ, Richardson, 1977), the previously
discussed measure of individual differences in the inclination to rely on verbal versus
visual codes (i.e. linguistic or imagery based representations) in everyday cognition. As
mentioned earlier, a positive link between the VVQ and misinformation susceptibility
was noted by Tousignant (1984). This result, referred to by Schooler and Loftus (1993) as
“paradoxical”, makes sense if verbal processes play a stronger role in misinformation
susceptibility than previously suspected.
Possibly due to the absence of a theoretical model of the misinformation paradigm
which emphasizes the role of verbalization, this intriguing potential link between the
VVQ and the misinformation effect has not received significant attention. This gap is
unfortunate given neuroimaging work by Kraemer et al. (2009) which shows that
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verbalization ratings on the scale are significantly correlated with activity in regions
associated with phonological processing (supramarginal gyrus: Deschamps et al., 2014;
Paulesu et al., 1993) during picture processing. These findings not only provide validity
support for the VVQ but also present a potential mechanism for how the encoding of
visual materials can be driven by non-visual encoding processes. In conjunction with the
previously discussed findings of Zaragoza et al. (2011), Kraemer et al. (2009)’s results
support the idea that attributions to a visual source can potentially be driven by nonvisual processing.
Additional indirect support for the role of verbalization in the misinformation
effect utilizing the VVQ comes from Tomes and Katz (1997) who found a preference for
verbal representation to be associated with a poorer confidence-accuracy relationship on
misinformation item responses and Nori et al. (2014) who found that a preference for
verbal representation to be associated with reduced recollection of accurate event
memory details during cognitive interviewing. On the whole, however, measures of
verbalization tendencies such as the VVQ are rarely present in investigations of
individual differences in misinformation susceptibility as compared to measures of
visualization preferences and ability which continue to be used despite repeated null
findings (e.g. Cann & Katz, 2005; Desjarlais & Bernstein, 2012; Greening, 2002).

1.6

Neuroimaging of Visual\Verbal Processes in the Misinformation Effect
To shed further light on the level of support for the respective roles of

verbalization and visualization in the misinformation effect, this section discusses the
neuroimaging-based sources of evidence involving both modalities. The advent of
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neuroimaging-based methods over the past few decades has equipped researchers with
valuable tools by which to shed light on previously inaccessible aspects of human
cognition. With these methods in hand, three investigations have sought to shed light on
the neural processes underlying the misinformation effect: Okado and Stark (2005), Stark
et al. (2010) and Baym and Gonsalves (2010). Both Okado and Stark (2005) and Baym
and Gonsalves (2010) focused on assessing encoding-related activity on the paradigm
while Stark et al. (2010) focused on the retrieval stage. These investigations have the
potential to provide valuable information on the relative roles of visualization and
verbalization in the misinformation effect. If visualization plays a dominant role, one
would expect to see misinformation susceptibility to be associated with the level of
activity in neural regions associated with visualization such as in the low level visual
areas V1 and V2 (Cui et al., 2007; Naselaris et al., 2015) or high level visual areas
associated with place and scene imagery and processing as the parahippocampal place
area or transverse occipital sulcus (Aguirre et al., 1998; Cichy et al., 2012; Epstein &
Kanwisher, 1998; Hasson et al., 2003; O'Craven & Kanwisher, 2000). On the other hand,
if non-visual verbalization processes play stronger role, one might expect to see
activation in areas associated with verbal processing such as the supramarginal gyrus
(Deschamps et al., 2014; Paulesu et al., 1993), superior temporal (Buchsbaum et al.,
2001; Chan et al., 2014; Leff et al., 2009; Moseley et al., 2014) and left inferior frontal
regions (Keller et al., 2009; Newman et al., 2003; Novick et al., 2009).
The first investigation providing information on these hypotheses comes from the
first fMRI study of the misinformation effect by Okado and Stark (2005). Specifically,
Okado and Stark (2005) investigated encoding activity during both the original event and
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misinformation phases using a slightly unorthodox paradigm in which both the event and
misinformation were presented visually. Okado and Stark (2005) found that activity in
the same neural regions (the left hippocampus tail and the perirhinal cortex) was
associated with the encoding of both true event memories and false misinformation-based
details. Critically, however, no differences in activity in visualization related regions
between misinformation endorsements and rejections during encoding were noted in
Okado and Stark (2005). Their results suggest that the strength of visualization-based
processing of misinformation content during encoding was not strongly associated with
subsequent misinformation endorsement.
It is possible that visualization focused differences in the encoding of information
leading to misinformation endorsements versus rejections in Okado and Stark (2005)
were absent due to the fact that misinformation in Okado and Stark (2005)’s design was
presented visually. This visual presentation could have reduced the need for and, and thus
the role of, visualization in misinformation susceptibility. However, work by Baym and
Gonsalves (2010) indicates that this variation in procedure does not account for the
observed absence of visualization associated activity. Using a more traditional verbally
presented misinformation narrative, Baym and Gonsalves (2010) to their surprise, failed
to find evidence to support their prediction that, relative to rejected misinformation
details, the encoding of misinformation details later endorsed as true memories would be
associated with greater levels of neural activation in regions associated with visual
imagery. Instead, they found evidence of increased activity in BA45, a neural region
associated with semantic processing (Keller et al., 2009; Newman et al., 2003; Novick et
al., 2009), verbal retrieval (Heim et al., 2009) and the cognitive control of memory
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(Badre & Wagner, 2007a), during the encoding of visual events on which participants
were subsequently susceptible to misinformation. Baym & Gonsalves also found
directional evidence of activity in this region being significantly higher in both true and
false memories relative to foil endorsements. In summary, in line with the findings of
Okado and Stark (2005), Baym and Gonsalves (2010) did not find differences in neural
activity associated with visualization between endorsed misinformation versus rejected
misinformation and instead found more evidence for the role of non-visual processes.
Considering Okado & Stark (2005) and Baym and Gonsalves (2010) in isolation
does not rule out the possibility that the influence of visualization on the misinformation
effect presents itself during the testing stage. To address this issue, Stark et al. (2010)
investigated neural activity during the retrieval stage of the misinformation effect after
participants were exposed to verbal misinformation presented auditorily. While true
memories were associated with activity in visual regions (BA 17 & 18: see Fulford et al.,
2017), misinformation-based false memories were associated with activity in regions
associated more strongly with auditory and language processing (BA22 & 42: see
Buchsbaum et al., 2001; Chan et al., 2014; Leff et al., 2009; Moseley et al., 2014). In
summary, prior neuroimaging based investigations into the misinformation effect have
consistently failed to find evidence of neural activity associated with visualization in false
memory encoding or endorsements. Instead, these studies have generally found more
evidence for the role of semantic and verbal processes.
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1.7

Summary of Visual\Verbal Processing in the Misinformation Effect
Taken as a whole, the evidence for the role of visualization in the misinformation

effect is surprisingly tenuous. On typical administrations of the misinformation effect
paradigm, there is limited evidence to support the idea that visualization is the primary
driver behind the formation of false misinformation-based memories and endorsements.
In some sense, these findings may not be overly surprising. From the perspective of the
source monitoring framework, the misinformation effect paradigm can be conceptualized
as source monitoring problem involving temporal and modality related differences.
Typically, the original event is presented first, typically in a visual form (though some
variants of the task involve auditory information) whereas the misinformation is
presented second in verbal form, either in writing or auditorily. It is possible that instead
of being primarily driven by visualization based source confusions, misinformation
susceptibility may instead be most strongly related to an overreliance on verbal,
narrative-focused, representations.

1.8

Dissertation Goals
The collective evidence for the role of verbal process in the misinformation effect

raises an intriguing proposal. If participants focus on forming verbal narratives of the
event during its visual presentation, this preference for narrative representation could set
the stage for heightened levels of source confusion. This difficulty would arise from the
elevated challenge of differentiating between similar as opposed to dissimilar source
modalities (Henkel et al., 2000; Johnson et al., 1993; Thierry & Pipe, 2009). A similar
effect could also arise if misinformation susceptibility is associated with a preference for
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the verbal representation in the misinformation effect during the retrieval stage. Indeed, it
is possible that both effects underlie the misinformation effect, with the focus on forming
verbal narratives during event presentation being linked with preferential reliance on the
verbally presented misinformation narrative.
This dissertation aims to assess the evidence for these intriguing possibilities
using a multimethod approach. The overall goal of this dissertation is to investigate the
links between the misinformation effect and visualization\verbalization source
monitoring related processes. The structure of this dissertation proceeds as follows. First,
two behavioral studies (Studies 1 and 2) are presented in which links between
misinformation susceptibility and individual differences in visual and verbal source
monitoring misattribution errors are assessed. The first of these studies utilizes a
true\false memory test while the second utilizes the 2AFC test. Study 3 presents an eventrelated potential (ERP) focused investigation in which neural components of recollective
strength from a picture-word source monitoring task and the misinformation effect are
linked. Specifically, links between the recollective strength of misinformation
endorsements and verbal as well as visual source memory endorsements are assessed in
Study 3. Finally, Study 4 presents a source frequency based investigation of encoding
activity on the misinformation effect paradigm. The aim of Study 4 is to assess the
relative level of evidence for the role of visual versus verbal processes in driving
encoding differences linked with higher levels of misinformation susceptibility. Finally,
the collective implications and future directions of these studies are discussed. The
specific aims of this study are listed below.
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Specific Aim 1: To contrast differences in the strength of the association between
misinformation susceptibility and basic visual as well as verbal source monitoring errors.
Specific Aim 2: To test the robustness and replicability of detected relationships between
misinformation susceptibility and basic visual as well as verbal source monitoring errors.
Specific Aim 3: To investigate potential links between neural activity associated with
recollective processing in misinformation endorsements and basic visual as well as verbal
source monitoring errors.
Specific Aim 4: To investigate potential links between neural activity associated with
event and narrative encoding on the misinformation effect and misinformation
susceptibility.
Study 1: Introduction

2

Study 1 aims to meet Specific Aim 1 (i.e., to contrast differences in the strength of
the association between misinformation susceptibility and basic visual as well as verbal
source monitoring errors). Thus the goal of Study 1 is to assess the behavioral links
between individual differences in misinformation susceptibility and visualization as well
as verbalization based source monitoring misattribution errors. To achieve this aim, a
misinformation effect task and a picture-word source monitoring paradigm were
administered to a sample of undergraduate research participants.
In the misinformation effect task, participants viewed several visually presented
events followed by a narrative containing misinformation. During the testing phase, to
obtain as measures of memory strength for the original and misleading information which
were as independent as possible, a true/false test format with a source monitoring
component was administered. In this test, participants were presented with a statement
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that either accurately described the original event (assessment of original memory
strength) or inaccurately described the event but accurately described the misinformation.
After rating each statement, participants were then asked to indicate if they made their
response based on something they remember from the event (“seen”), the text (“read”),
both the event and text (“both”) or if they were guessing (“neither”). The primary
measure of interest in Study 1 is misinformation statements given perceptual
endorsements (i.e., “seen” or “seen and read”). By using a true/false test primarily
targeting recognition of misleading event information, this investigation sought to obtain
as clean a measurement of perceptual misinformation endorsement as possible. The use
of a true/false test provides a measurement minimally impacted by the intentional cueing
of the original event item trace, which is more likely to occur using the 2AFC testing
format (which is utilized in Study 2).
The source monitoring task used was a picture-word source monitoring task
(DeCarlo, 2003; Dobbins & Wagner, 2005; Hoffman, 1997; Johansson et al., 2002;
Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Rosburg et al., 2013; Rosburg et al., 2011a, 2011b;
Stephan-Otto et al., 2017) in which participants were presented with a set of pictures and
words under specific task instructions (see methods section for full details). After the
study phase, participants were tested for their memory for items using an old-presentedas-picture, old-presented-as-word or new source monitoring test. The primary measures
of interest in this specific task were individual differences in the number of errors
attributing verbally presented items as having been presented as pictures (i.e., Word-AsPicture visualization errors) as well as differences in the number of attributions of
visually presented items as having been presented as words (i.e., Picture-As-Word
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verbalization errors). Drawing on the limited evidence for the role of visualization on the
misinformation effect and stronger evidence for the role of verbalization, the primary
hypothesis of Study 1 was that Picture-As-Word error rates would be more strongly
predictive of misinformation susceptibility than Word-As-Picture errors. In addition to
these primary goals, two inventories were administered in this investigation, the Marlow
Social Desirability Questionnaire, and the Dissociative Experiences Questionnaire.
The Dissociative Experiences Questionnaire (DES) assesses individual
differences in the tendency to experience dissociative experiences (e.g., mind wandering
while driving, not recognizing oneself in the mirror) in everyday life. Links between the
DES and misinformation susceptibility are frequently investigated in many studies of the
misinformation effect. Much of this interest is driven by the previously discussed
“memory wars” debate on the role of suggestive therapy on real-world false memory
formation (Ceci & Bruck, 1995; Goldstein, 1997; Lindsay & Read, 1994). Dissociative
tendencies have shown strong links to hypnotizability, and thus many researchers have
sought to link this measure to misinformation susceptibility. Findings on this have
however been mixed with some researchers showing significant links (Hekkanen &
McEvoy, 2002; Merckelbach et al., 2000) and others finding no significant associations
(Drivdahl & Zaragoza, 2001; Eisen, Morgan, et al., 2002; Monds et al., 2013; Otgaar et
al., 2017; Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin, He, Chen, Li, Moyzis, et al., 2010).
The goals of administering the DES in this study is to (1) assess the direct link
between this measure and misinformation susceptibility in this investigation’s specific
target population and (2) assess the measure’s potential moderating role with regard to
the link between misinformation susceptibility and visualization as well as verbalization
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source monitoring errors. There are theoretical reasons to suspect that even if a link
between misinformation susceptibility and visualization may not be present in typical
populations, such a link may be present among individuals with high levels of
dissociative tendencies (Danielle & Robert, 2015; Platt et al., 1998).
The Marlow Social Desirability Questionnaire (MC-SDS) assesses individual
differences in participant concerns regarding presenting themselves in socially acceptable
terms and securing social approval. Research has repeatedly shown that social influence
can play a role in in-lab false memory endorsement (Gabbert et al., 2003; Meade &
Roediger, 2002; Roediger et al., 2001). Despite this body of work, the possibility of a
direct link between social desirability and false memory susceptibility on the
misinformation effect has yet to be assessed. While research on false memory
implantation of autobiographical memory has not shown a link to social desirability
(Hyman & Billings, 1998), work with the misinformation effect in children using
interrogative suggestion techniques suggests that there might be a weak association
between these variables (Lee, 2004). Given the need for additional filler questionnaires
and the relatively low cost of exploring this link, the MC-SDS Questionnaire was
administered in this study.

2.1

Methods

2.1.1 Participants
Eighty-seven participants (59 female, mean age=19.33, SD =1.59, range 18-25)
participated in this study, a sample size selected for providing sufficient power to detect
medium effect sizes of ρ ≥ .30. All participants were recruited from the UNL Psychology
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Department subject pool via an online research participation platform (SONA). The
University’s IRB approved all procedures with participants providing informed consent
and receiving 1.5 hours of research credit for their participation.

2.1.2 Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants completed a brief demographics
measure. They then completed the misinformation study phase followed by the pictureword study phase. These study phases were followed by approximately 15-minutes of
filler tasks including a short form version of the Marlow Social Desirability
Questionnaire) and a rating task in which participants were presented with scene-object
pairings (e.g., kitchen-knife) and asked to rate how typical those pairings were. None of
these items were critical details in either the picture-word or misinformation task. After
completing these tasks, participants completed the misinformation narrative phase
followed by the picture-word test phase, the Dissociative Experiences Questionnaire and,
finally, the misinformation test phase.

2.1.3 Materials
Demographics measure: This measure contained two items. The first asked participants
to enter their age in years by typing it in while the second asked them to indicate their
self-identified gender.
Marlow Social Desirability Questionnaire Short Form: The original MC-SDS (King &
Bruner, 2000) is a 33-item self-report questionnaire that aims to assess individual
differences in participant concerns regarding presenting themselves in socially acceptable
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terms and securing social approval. The 13-item short form version used in this study was
developed by Reynolds (1982) drawing on prior work by (Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972).
Reynolds (1982) found this short-form version to be very highly correlated with the full
MC-SDS (r = .93), demonstrating a similar level of cross-scale validity with other
measures of social desirability such as the Edwards Social Desirability Scale (Edwards &
Walker, 1961) (full MC-SDS: r = .47, short form : r = .41) . Unfortunately, scores on this
scale did not exhibit a good level of internal consistency in Study 1’s sample (α= .24).
Dissociative Experiences Questionnaire: The DES (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) is a 28
item self-report inventory (with no reverse coding) utilizing an 11-point frequency
anchored response scale ranging from 0% to 100% in increasing 10% increments. Items
on the scale are designed to tap into dissociative tendencies (i.e. deviations from the
normal integrated sense of conscious experience) with statements such as “Some people
have the experience of finding themselves in a place and having no idea how they got
there” and “Some people have the experience of drinking a car and suddenly realizing
that they don’t remember what has happened during all or part of the trip”. Scores on this
scale exhibited high levels of internal consistency in this study (α = 0.89)
Picture-word source monitoring task: This task consisted of a single study and test phase.
During the study phase, 62 commonplace objects were presented to the participant, one at
a time in random order. All images used were obtained from the Bank of Standardized
stimuli (BOSS) database (Brodeur et al., 2010; Brodeur et al., 2014), a normative set of
images publically accessible at https://sites.google.com/site/bosstimuli/. A list of the
names of all objects used in this task is presented in Appendix A.
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Each object was presented to the participant either as a picture or as a word with
presentation type being counterbalanced across two counterbalanced conditions. While
each object as being presented, participants were asked to write down two possible uses
for the object on a piece of paper. Each object was presented onscreen for 8 seconds each
after which the object was removed from the screen and replaced with the word “Stop”.
This word remained on screen for 2 seconds before being replaced with a fixation sign
for 1 second followed by the next object in the sequence. During the test phase, the
names of 77 objects (31 previously presented as pictures, 31 as words, 15 that were never
presented) were read out to them one at a time. After the name of an object has been read
out, participants were asked to indicate whether that object was presented during the
study phase as a picture (“Picture”), as a word (“Word”) or whether it was not presented
at all (“New”). No time limit was imposed for this decision.
Misinformation effect task: This task had three phases, event study, misinformation
exposure and test. In the study phase, participants viewed two events sequentially, each
depicted in a series of 50 digital color slides (from Okado & Stark, 2005). These distinct
events depicted (1) a man breaking into a car and (2) a woman’s wallet being stolen. The
presentation order of the events was randomized across participants. Each slide was
presented for 3500 ms with a 500 ms blank screen between slides.
During the misinformation exposure phase, participants studied two narratives
(Narratives 1 and 2 in Appendix B) with each purportedly redescribing one of the
previously presented events. Participants were explicitly told that their memory for these
events would be tested at a later point in the study. Each narrative consisted of 50
sentences, one for each event slide. In an attempt to equalize the amount of study time
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between the verbal and visual study stages as well as standardize the amount of overall
reading time, each sentence was presented for 3500 ms with a 500 ms blank screen
between sentences. Details from 24 slides (12 from each event) were selected for testing,
12 of these details were described inaccurately as the misinformation condition whereas
the other 12 were mentioned consistently in the narrative as the control condition. The
use of consistent control items is a type of control utilized in a considerable number of
misinformation effect studies (e.g. Calvillo, 2014; Wang et al., 2014; Zhu et al., 2013;
Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin, He, Chen, Li, Moyzis, et al., 2010) and was utilized here in
anticipation of Study 3.
Assignment of event item details to misinformation/control status was not
counterbalanced in Study 1. In other words, which specific event item details were
assigned to the misled versus control conditions were fixed for all participants. This
design choice was made in anticipation of the need to develop a version of the
misinformation effect task with a sufficiently high number of misled details for the
neuroimaging investigation presented in Study 3. However, the type of misinformation
presented regarding the misled details was varied between participants with two different
versions of each event were used in this experiment with participants being randomly
assigned to view one of the two. As shown in Table 1, the misinformation provided for
each version was in agreement with what was presented in the other variant. For example,
if in version A, cocaine was present in the trunk with the misinformation stating it was
marijuana, in version B, marijuana was present in the trunk, with the misinformation
stating it was cocaine.
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Table 1: Study 1 Counterbalancing Strategy
Event Version Viewed

Misinformation Version Read

Set

A

B

1

(Target uses a hanger to open a door)

(“He used a card to open the door”)

Set

B

A

2

(Target uses a card to open a door)

(“He used a hanger to open the door”)

During the testing phase, participants were tested on all 12 verbally misled details
as well as 12 control event details which were shown in the event and mentioned
consistently in the narrative. A True/False test format with a source monitoring
assessment was used where the critical sentences were presented on screen one at a time
with buttons labeled “True” and “False” underneath them for participants to select via
mouse click. After making their selection, participants were asked to indicate whether
that response had been made based on something they remembered seeing (“Seen”),
reading (“Read”), both seeing or reading (“Both Seen & Read”) or whether they had
simply been guessing (“Neither”).

2.2

Results

2.2.1 Misinformation Task: Behavioral Data
Test performance is presented in Tables 2 through 5. Tables 2 and 3 show the
breakdown of mean frequencies for event and misled items as a function of endorsement
(“true”) versus rejection (“false”) and subsequent source judgment. Tables 4 and 5
presents the same breakdown for these items as a proportion of the total number of items
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presented in each condition, which was 12. “Seen” and “Seen & Read” responses (i.e.,
perceptual attributions), was the critical response category focused on in subsequent
analyses.

Table 2: Study 1 Control Event Item Response Frequencies and Standard Deviations
Source Response
Response

Seen

Seen &

Perceptual

Read

Attribution

Read

Guess

True

2.08 (2.04)

6.69 (2.62)

8.77 (1.88)

.90 (1.12)

.11 (.39)

False

1.11 (1.22)

.46 (.84)

1.57 (1.46)

.14 (.44)

.48 (.87)

Table 3: Study 1 Misled Item Response Frequencies and Standard Deviations
Response

Seen

Seen &

Perceptual

Read

Attribution

Read

Guess

True

.46 (.76)

1.70 (1.48)

2.16 (1.61)

2.72 (3.20)

.08 (.31)

False

4.89 (3.85)

.67 (1.00)

5.55 (3.83)

.77 (2.05)

.71 (1.11)

Table 4: Study 1 Control Event Item Response Proportions and Standard Deviations
Source Response
Response

Seen

Seen &

Perceptual

Read

Attribution

Read

Guess

True

.17 (.17)

.56 (.22)

.73 (.16)

.07 (.09)

.01 (.03)

False

.09 (.10)

.04 (.07)

.13 (.12)

.01 (.03)

.04 (.07)
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Table 5: Study 1 Misled Item Response Proportions and Standard Deviations
Response

Seen

Seen &

Perceptual

Read

Attribution

Read

Guess

True

.04 (.06)

.14 (.12)

.18 (.13)

.22 (.27)

.01 (.03)

False

.41 (.32)

.05 (.08)

.46 (.32)

.06 (.17)

.06 (.09)

Pairwise t-tests indicated that participants made more control event item
endorsements than misled item endorsements with perceptual attributions (t(86) = 7.405,
p < .001), and a greater number of perceptual based misled item rejections than misled
item endorsements (t(86) = 5.012, p < .001). Participants were also more likely to
perceptually endorse misled items than perceptually reject control items (t(86) = 2.494, p
= .015). None of the response frequencies in the critical response categories of interest
differed significantly based on which version of the misinformation participants received
(all p’s > .35). Intercorrelations between the primary variables of interest are presented in
Table 6. The full correlation matrix between all responses is presented in Appendix C.
Note that correlations within the misinformation and control item groups are not
independent as an endorsed control or misinformation item cannot also be rejected.
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Table 6: Study 1 Correlations between Misinformation Test Responses with Perceptual
Attributions
Perceptual Misled

Perceptual Misled Item

Item Endorsements

Rejections

-.23*

.08

-

-.43**

Perceptual Event Item
Endorsements
Perceptual Misled Item
Endorsements

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

2.2.2 Picture-Word Behavioral Data
Response frequencies and proportions on the Picture-Word test task are presented
in Tables 7 and 8, respectively. Pairwise t-tests indicated that participants were more
likely to correctly attribute items shown as words as being presented as words relative to
misattributing them as having been presented as pictures (MD = 24.40, SD = 6.12, t(86) =
37.16, p < .001) or unpresented items (MD = 25.39, SD = 5.05, t(86) = 46.88, p < .001).
Participants were also more likely to correctly attribute items shown as pictures as being
presented as pictures relative to misattributing them as having been presented as words
(MD = 27.57, SD = 4.49, t(86) = 57.29, p < .001) or unpresented items (MD = 27.31, SD
= 4.48, t(86) = 56.75, p < .001. Participants also more frequently correctly categorized
unpresented items as “new” relative to misattributing them as being presented as pictures
(MD = 12.59, SD = 2.94, t(86) = 39.94, p < .001) or items presented as words (MD =
11.65, SD = 3.84, t(86) = 28.29, p < .001). Finally, participants were more likely to
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misattribute new items as being presented as words as opposed to pictures (MD = .93, SD
= 1.61, t(86) = 5.39, p < .001).

Table 7: Study 1 Picture Word Task Response Frequencies and Standard Deviations
Response
Shown As

Picture

Word

New

Picture

28.63 (3.00)

1.06 (1.65)

1.32 (1.81)

Word

2.53 (2.77)

26.93 (3.60)

1.54 (1.92)

.49 (.93)

1.43 (1.70)

13.08 (2.21)

Not-Shown

Table 8: Study 1 Picture Word Task Response Proportions and Standard Deviations
Response
Shown As

Picture

Word

New

Picture

.92 (.09)

.03 (.05)

.04 (.06)

Word

.08 (.09)

.87 (.12)

.05 (.06)

Not-Shown

.03 (.06)

.09 (.11)

.87 (.14)

2.2.3 Picture-Word & Misinformation Effect Links
Linear random intercept models with robust standard errors (Huber, 1967), an
estimation procedure resistant to violations of heteroscedasticity, were used to model the
relationship between misinformation susceptibility (DV1) and control item endorsements
(DV2) and “Picture-As-Word” (IV1) as well as “Word-As-Picture” (IV2) source
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monitoring errors. These relationships were modeled in two separate models with the
Picture-As-Word and Word-As-Picture errors being entered simultaneously as predictor
variables. All reported beta values can be interpreted as indicating the estimated average
increase in the number of misinformation endorsements for every one additional source
monitoring task error. A Bonferroni correction procedure was applied to each model,
keeping the family-wise type-1 error rate of each separate model at p = .05.
The results of these analyses showed that Word-As-Picture errors had a
marginally negative relationship with misinformation susceptibility as seen in the
perceptual endorsement of misled items (B = -.12, SE = .06, F(1,84) = 3.68, p = .057),
while Picture-As-Word errors had a significantly positive one (B = .32, SE = .13, F(1,84)
= 5.81, p = .018). Word-As-Picture errors were not significantly related to control item
perceptual endorsement levels (B = -.04 SE = .07, F(1,84) = .33, p = .565) while PictureAs-Word errors were significantly negatively related to this performance variable (B =
-.36, SE = .18, F(1,84) = 4.12, p = .045). In summary, higher levels of Word-As-Picture
errors were marginally associated with fewer perceptual misinformation endorsements
while higher levels of Picture-As-Word errors were associated with both increased levels
of perceptual misinformation endorsement and reduced levels of accurate perceptual
control item endorsement levels.
2.2.4 Personality Inventories & Picture-Word Task Links
Bonferroni corrected correlations between the administered personality measures
and responses on the picture-word task and are presented in Table 9. None of the
personality measures were significantly related to any of the Picture-Word task response
rates.
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Table 9: Study 1 Personality Inventories & Picture-Word Response Correlations
Picture-As-Word Word-As-Picture
MC-SDS

-.13

.11

DES

-.12

.07

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

2.2.5 Personality Inventories & Misinformation Effect Links
A significant correlation was noted between the MC-SDS and DES scales, r(87)
= .293, p = .006. This result suggests that higher levels of concern regarding social
presentation (MC-SDS) are significantly associated with dissociative tendencies. While
intriguing, exploring the potential nature of this link is beyond the scope of the current
dissertation. With regard to the primary measure of this study, intercorrelations between
the personality inventories and the primary misinformation task responses are in
presented in Table 10. None of the personality measures were significantly directly
correlated with any of the primary misinformation task response rates either pre- or postBonferroni correction. It is important, however, to note that MC-SDS scores exhibited
poor levels of internal consistency (α= .24) in this sample, limiting the inferences that can
be drawn from them.
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Table 10: Study 1 Personality Inventories & Misinformation Response Correlations

MC-SDS
DES

Perceptual Event

Perceptual Misled

Perceptual Misled

Item Endorsements

Item Endorsements

Item Rejections

> .01

.07

.19

.03

-.06

.16

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The potential moderating role of these personality measure scores on the observed
links between Picture-As-Word and Word-As-Picture errors was also assessed by
individually adding these variables to the models presented in section 2.3.3 as fully
interacting variables. The results of these analyses showed that DES scores were
uncorrelated with Picture-As-Word errors (r(87) = -.08, p = .481) and Word-As-Picture
errors (r(87) = -.12, p = .27). DES scores also did not significantly predict misinformation
error rates on their own (r(87) = -.06, p = .560) or after controlling for Word-As-Picture
and Picture-As-Word errors, B < .001, SE = .006, F(1,81) = .01, p = .942. DES scores
also did not show a moderating effect on the link between Picture-As-Word or Word-AsPicture errors and misinformation susceptibility (B < .001, SE = .004, F(1,81) = .02, p
= .879 and B < .001, SE = .001, F(1,81) = .87, p = .353 respectively). Picture-As-Word
errors also continued to significantly predict misinformation errors (B = .310, SE = .137,
F(1,81) = 5.14, p = .026) after controlling for DES scores. The link between Word-AsPicture errors and misinformation susceptibility was marginally negative in this model (B
= -.114, SE = .064, F(1,81) = 3.13, p = .080).
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The results of these analyses also showed that MC-SDS scores were uncorrelated
with Picture-As-Word errors (r(87) = -.13, p = .232) and Word-As-Picture errors (r(87)
= .11, p = .32). SDS scores also did not significantly predict misinformation susceptibility
on their own (r(87) = .07, p = .528), or after controlling for Word-As-Picture and PictureAs-Word errors, B = .067, SE = .059, F(1,81) = 1.88, p = .174). While moderation effects
involving the MC-SDS were not anticipated, these effects were nonetheless assessed for
completeness. In these analyses, MC-SDS scores also did not show a moderating effect
on the link between Picture-As-Word or Word-As-Picture errors and misinformation
susceptibility (B = -.003, SE = .033, F(1,81) = .01, p = .921 and B = -.023, SE = .019,
F(1,81) = 1.42, p = .238 respectively). Picture-As-Word errors also continued to
significantly predict misinformation errors (B = .342, SE = .115, F(1,81) = 8.84, p
= .003) after controlling for MC-SDS scores. The relationship between Word-As-Picture
errors and misinformation susceptibility was also significantly negative (B = -.126, SE
= .061, F(1,81) = 4.19, p = .044) in this model.

2.3

Study 1 Discussion
In line with Specific Aim 1 (i.e. the contrasting of differences in the strength of

the association between misinformation susceptibility and basic visual as well as verbal
source monitoring errors), the results of Study 1 show a significantly stronger link
between misinformation susceptibility and verbalization source monitoring attribution
errors (i.e., Picture-As-Word) relative to visualization errors (i.e., Word-As-Picture) on
the picture-word source monitoring task. Specifically, higher levels of Word-As-Picture
errors were marginally associated with fewer perceptual misinformation endorsements
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while higher levels of Picture-As-Word errors were associated with both increased levels
of perceptual misinformation endorsement and reduced levels of accurate perceptual
control item endorsement levels.
These results suggest that misinformation endorsements may be more strongly
associated with verbalization based source monitoring errors relative to visualization
focused ones. In other words, the perceptual endorsement of misleading postevent
information is more strongly driven by the processes related to source misattributions of
verbal or narrative related encoding. These findings are in line with theoretical work
emphasizing the importance of verbal and narrative processing in the misinformation
effect (see Section 1.5). Of particular relevance, they are congruent with Zaragoza et al.
(2011)’s findings on how reflecting on conceptual aspects of misinformation material can
lead to even greater levels of perceptual misinformation endorsements relative to
visualization based perceptual elaboration.
In addition to these primary results, Study 1 also showed the MC-SDS and DES
to have no direct or indirect links to misinformation susceptibility in this target
population; though it should be noted that MC-SDS scores exhibited poor levels of
internal consistency in this study’s sample. The observed verbalization link was also
shown to be independent of these two measures. These null results regarding direct links
to misinformation susceptibility are in line with prior work in this area involving the MCSDS (Hyman & Billings, 1998) and DES (Drivdahl & Zaragoza, 2001; Eisen, Morgan, et
al., 2002; Monds et al., 2013; Otgaar et al., 2017; Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin, He, Chen, Li,
Moyzis, et al., 2010) scales. Of primary importance to the focus of this dissertation is the
null result regarding indirect links involving the DES, Picture-Word source monitoring
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performance and misinformation susceptibility. The absence of significant moderated
links between these measures suggests that it is not the case that a link between
visualization and misinformation susceptibility emerges among individuals with higher
levels of dissociative tendencies, a group which may perhaps be particularly likely to
demonstrate such an association. Instead, verbalization source monitoring errors appear
to have a significantly stronger role in misinformation susceptibility regardless of
individual differences in the propensity towards dissociative experiences.
Study 2

3

3.1

Study 2: Introduction
The goal of Study 2 is to achieve Specific Aim 2 of this dissertation (i.e., to test the

robustness and replicability of detected relationships between misinformation
susceptibility and basic visual as well as verbal source monitoring errors).
As discussed in the preface to Study 1, the True/False test format on the
misinformation effect has several distinct advantages such as the direct targeting of
specific event memories. Nonetheless there are numerous other testing formats frequently
used to assess memory performance on the misinformation effect paradigm such as cued
recall (Chan & Lapaglia, 2011; Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Stephen Lindsay et al., 2004),
free recall (Huff et al., 2016; Wilford et al., 2014) and two-alternative force-choice
(2AFC) tests (Bonto & Payne, 1991; Loftus et al., 1978; Oeberst & Blank, 2012). Of
these variants, the 2AFC format is particularly interesting to consider. In a standard
administration of a 2AFC misinformation test, participants are presented with questions
involving event details presented alongside two response options. These options are
typically either a control and foil item or a control and misinformation option. As a result
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of this simultaneous presentation of event and misinformation recognition cues, the
2AFC test arguably represents a more powerful test of the impact of misinformation on
memory as participants are directly presented with cues prompting retrieval of both the
event and misinformation memory traces.
The goal of Study 2 is to replicate the findings of Study 1 using this more robust
assessment of misinformation susceptibility. To achieve this aim, the same procedure
utilized in Study 1 was administered in Study 2, albeit with a 2AFC misinformation test
measure instead of a true/false test. The primary hypothesis of Study 2 is that, as in Study
1, verbalization error rates will be more strongly predictive of misinformation
susceptibility than visualization error rates. Given the potentially increased role for
visual-based strategies on the 2AFC test, however, the relationship between Picture-AsWord errors and misinformation susceptibility was anticipated to be weaker in Study 2.
The Creative Experiences Questionnaire (CEQ) was administered in this study as a
replacement for DES from Study 1. The CEQ is a self-report measure of individual
differences in imagination vividness and fantasy proneness (Merckelbach et al., 2001).
While researchers have repeatedly failed to find a link between misinformation
susceptibility and CEQ scores (Desjarlais & Bernstein, 2012; though see Frost et al.,
2013 for a discussion the potential moderating influence of retention interval; Greening,
2002; Merckelbach et al., 2000), the inventory was administered in this study to test the
possibility of a visualization-misinformation susceptibility link being present among
individuals with high levels of fantasy proneness.
A second measure, the Internal/External Encoding Style Questionnaire was also
administered with a similar goal. The Internal/External Encoding Style Questionnaire
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(Lewicki, 2005) assess individual differences in how information encoding draws on
external (i.e., environmental) versus internal (i.e., internal mental schemata) cues. Like
the CEQ, this inventory was administered in this study to test the possibility of a
visualization-misinformation susceptibility link being present among individuals who
indicated a greater tendency to rely on internal sources of information.
Finally, the VVIQ was administered in this study as a measure of visualization
vividness. Extensively discussed in the introduction section (see Section 1.4), the VVIQ
(Marks, 1973) is a measure of individual differences in visual imagery vividness. While
the VVIQ is usually shown to be uncorrelated with misinformation susceptibility
(Desjarlais & Bernstein, 2012; Greening, 2002; Nichols, 2014), it is possible that
individuals with higher levels of visualization vividness may show a stronger link
between visualization and misinformation susceptibility relative to individuals with lower
levels of mental imagery vividness. To assess this possibility, the VVIQ was
administered in this study.

3.2

Methods

3.2.1 Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants completed a brief demographics
measure. They then completed the misinformation study phase followed by the pictureword study phase. These study phases were followed by approximately 15 minutes of
filler tasks consisting of the Creative Experiences Questionnaire (CEQ) and the
Internal/External Encoding Style Questionnaire personality inventory. After completing
these tasks, participants completed the misinformation narrative study phase after which
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they completed the VVIQ inventory (5 minutes), the misinformation test phase and the
picture-word test phase.

3.2.2 Participants
In order to more robustly assess the effects observed in Study 1, a larger sample
of 179 participants (135 female, mean age=19.52, SD =2.67, range 18-28) was recruited
in Study 2, with the larger sample providing additional power to compensate for the
anticipated power loss arising from the impact of the 2AFC test on the misinformation
effect’s magnitude. All participants were recruited from the UNL Psychology
Department subject pool via an online research participation platform (SONA). The local
IRB approved all procedures with participants providing informed consent and receiving
1.5 hours of research credit for their participation.

3.2.3 Materials
Demographics measure: The same demographics measure used in Study 1 was also used
in Study 2 with one minor modification in which the gender item was changed from a
choice selection option to a fill-in-the-blank response format.
Creative Experiences Questionnaire (CEQ): The CEQ (Merckelbach et al., 2001) is a
questionnaire which assesses fantasy proneness, defined as a combination of the strength
of one’s imagination and one’s inclination towards engaging in imagination/fantasy
related activities. The CEQ was developed to be a viable alternative to the Inventory of
Childhood Memories and Imaginings which the authors of the CEQ considered to be
overly long. The CEQ contains 25 items such as “Currently, I spend more than half the
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day (daytime) fantasizing or daydreaming) and “I often confuse fantasies with real
memories”, all of which are self-report with a dichotomous yes/no response format.
Scores on this scale exhibited moderate levels of internal consistency in this study (α =
0.82)
Internal/External Encoding Style Questionnaire (NISROE): The NISROE (Lewicki,
2005) questionnaire aims to assess individual differences in how information encoding
draws on external (i.e., based on data from the environment) versus internal (i.e., based
on data from preexisting mental schemata) cues. The questionnaire consists of 21-items
comprised of 15 filler items and 6 critical items (e.g. “For a split second from a distance,
I sometimes mistake strangers for people I know”, “I’ve sometimes noticed a particular
object to my left or right, and only after I turned my head I realized it was something
else” each of which is rated on a 6-point Likert scale with 1 indicating strong
disagreement and 6 indicating strong agreement. Higher scores on the inventory are
indicative of a greater reliance on internal sources of information during information
encoding. Scores on this scale exhibited acceptable levels of internal reliability in this
study (α = 0.66).
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ): The VVIQ (Marks, 1973) is a 16item measure of individual differences in visual imagery which builds on the Betts
Questionnaire upon Mental Imagery (Sheehan, 1967). The VVIQ verbally instructs
participants to visually image specific details of specific visual scenes and record the
vividness of the imagery on a five-point scale (e.g., “Close your eyes and think of some
relative of a friend who you frequently see. Consider carefully the picture that comes
before your mind's eye” followed by instructions to rate the vividness of “The exact
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contour of face, head, shoulders, and body then rate the exact contour of face, head,
shoulders, and body”). Higher scores on the VVIQ are indicative of higher levels of
visualization strength. This measure of visual imagery has been widely used in hundreds
of studies to investigate the role of subjective visualization vividness across a wide range
of domains (see McKelvie, 1995 for a review). Scores on this scale exhibited high levels
of internal reliability in this study (α = 0.88).
Picture-word source monitoring task: This picture-word task used in Study 2 was
effectively identical to the one used in Study 1. The sole change made was the adjustment
of the number of stimuli from 31 pictures, 31 words and 15 new items to 30 pictures, 30
words and 17 new items upon the realization that one of the items used in the pictureword task (a hanger) was also a critical item in the misinformation test task. This item
was discarded from the study set along with another randomly selected item for
counterbalancing purposes.
Misinformation effect task: The basic structure of the misinformation task used in Study 1
was reused in this study with the following changes: (1) the counterbalancing system was
expanded, (2) the test format was changed from a True/False format to a 2AFC structure.
As in Study 1, Participants were explicitly told that their memory for these events would
be tested at a later point in the study.
The counterbalancing strategy employed in Study 2 ensured that each critical item
served as an event and misled item equally often (i.e., assignment of items to the control
and misled conditions was fully counterbalanced). To achieve this, two different event
versions of each scenario were used, version A and version B. Accordingly, in each event
version, critical event details from 12 event slides had two possible varients, one which
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was shown to any given participant. For each event version, half of those details were
randomly assigned to group X whereas the other half were assigned to group Y. Item
groups X and Y were then assigned to either the control or misinformation conditions
creating four combination conditions for each presented scenario. Table 11 presents the
procedure for a single scenario. Items assigned to the misinformed condition in each
combination (i.e., Set 1A) were described inaccurately in the narrative in a manner which
matched how they were presented in the other event version (e.g., version 1B) whereas
the control items were consistently described neutrally in the narrative (neutral control).
The first and second event sets were then randomly paired to produce four experimental
conditions to which participants were then randomly assigned to.
As an example, version A presented a man breaking into a car with a hanger and
finding cocaine whereas version B presented a man breaking into a car with a credit card
and finding marijuana. The object used to break into the car and what was found were
then assigned to item group X and Y respectively. In example, Set 1A would present the
man breaking into a car with a hanger and finding cocaine with the narrative reading
“He used a credit card to open the car door” and “He pulled out a bag of drugs”; Set
2A would present the man breaking into a car with a hanger and finding cocaine with the
narrative “He used a tool to open the car door” and “He pulled out a bag of
marijuana.”; Set 1B would present a man breaking into a car with a card and finding
marijuana with the narrative reading ““He used a hanger to open the car door” and “He
pulled out a bag of drugs”; Set 2B would present a man breaking into a car with a card
and finding marijuana with the narrative reading He used a tool to open the car door”
and “He pulled out a bag of cocaine”.

58
Table 11: Study 2 Counterbalancing Strategy
Event Version Viewed

Misinformed Items

Neutral Control Items

Set 1A

A

Group X

Group Y

Set 2A

A

Group Y

Group X

Set 1B

B

Group X

Group Y

Set 2B

B

Group Y

Group X

In the 2AFC test used, participants were presented with a series of questions and
two response options. On questions involving sentences that had been targets of
misinformation, the two options were the original event item detail and the
misinformation-based detail (misled item) whereas on questions involving neutral control
sentences, the two options were the original item and a foil item which corresponded to
the misinformation detail presented in the condition in which the detail was assigned to
the misinformed condition (i.e., The foil options in 1A matched the misinformation
details in 1B and vice versa). Continuing with the example in the previous paragraph, all
sets would ask participants to indicate which response detail accurately matched the event
with the response options being hanger/card and cocaine/marijuana for the questions
“What did the man use to break into the car” and “What did the man find in the
car”. Participants made their responses by clicking on the corresponding option via
mouse click. After making their selection, participants were asked to indicate whether
that response had been made based on something remembered seeing (saw), reading
(read), both seeing or reading (both) or whether they had simply been guessing (neither).
For each participant, the test consisted of 12 event item versus foil item 2AFC questions,
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12 event item versus misled item 2AFC questions, and 12 filler 2AFC test questions
based on non-critical shown and not-shown items.

3.3

Results

3.3.1 Misinformation Task: Behavioral Data
Performance on the misinformation test is presented in Tables 12 through 15.
Tables 12 and 13 shows the breakdown of response within the control condition as a
function of endorsement versus rejection selection and their subsequent source judgment
attributions. Table 14 and 15 present the same breakdown for the misled condition. Detail
endorsements given “Seen” and “Seen & Read” responses (i.e., perceptual attributions),
are the critical response categories focused on in subsequent analyses. With regard to
terminology, the term misled condition refers to all the test questions concerning details
which were subjected to misinformation whereas the phrase misled item refers to
individual misled event details.

Table 12: Study 2 Control Condition Response Frequencies and Standard Deviations
Selection

Seen

Seen &

Perceptual

Read

Attribution

Read

Guess

Event Item

5.94 (2.23)

1.45 (1.27)

7.40 (2.16)

.45 (.76)

1.08 (1.21)

Foil

.41 (1.19)

.47 (.62)

.87 (.98)

1.13 (1.07)

1.06 (1.20)
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Table 13: Study 2 Control Condition Response Proportions and Standard Deviations
Selection

Seen

Seen &

Perceptual

Read

Attribution

Read

Guess

Event Item

.49 (.18)

.12 (.11)

.62 (.18)

.04 (.07)

.08 (.10)

Foil

.03 (.05)

.04 (.06)

.07 (.08)

.09 (.09)

.09 (.10)

Table 14: Study 2 Misled Condition Response Frequencies and Standard Deviations
Condition

Seen

Seen &

Perceptual

Read

Attribution

Read

Guess

Misled Item

.80 (.91)

.81 (1.19)

1.61 (1.42)

2.78 (2.14)

.53 (.90)

Event item

5.73 (2.48)

.40 (.74)

6.14 (2.54)

.33 (.61)

.62 (1.12)

Table 15: Study 2 Misled Condition Response Proportions and Standard Deviations
Condition

Seen

Seen &

Perceptual

Read

Attribution

Read

Guess

Misled Item

.07 (.08)

.07 (.10)

.14 (.10)

.23 (.18)

.04 (.07)

Event item

.48 (.21)

.03 (.06)

.51 (.21)

.03 (.05)

.05 (.09)

Within the control test condition, participants made more accurate perceptual
event item selections relative to foil selections (t(178) = 32.88, p < .001). Within the
misled condition, participants also made more accurate perceptual event item selections
relative to misled item selections (t(178) = 19.33, p < .001). A significant misinformation
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effect was present with participants being likely to perceptually endorse misled items as
opposed to matched foil responses in control items (t(178) = 5.67, p <.001). Participants
were also less likely to correctly select and perceptually endorse event items that were
subjected to misinformation (i.e., event item selections in the misled condition) relative to
items that were not (i.e., event item selections in the control condition), t(178) = 6.68, p
< .001. It is important to note, however, that the last two tests are not independent given
the 2AFC testing format used in this study.
Intercorrelations between the primary variables of interest are presented in table
16. The full correlation matrix for all responses is presented in Appendix D. Note that
correlations within the misinformation and control item groups are not completely
independent as an endorsed control or misinformation selection response removes the
possibility of a foil selection or event item response respectively.

Table 16: Study 2 Correlations between misinformation test response selections with
perceptual attributions
Control

Control

Misled

Misled

Foil Item

Event Item

Misled Item

-.32**

.42**

.12

Foil Item

-

-.11

-.06

Event Item

-

-

-.21**

Event Item

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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3.3.2 Picture-Word Task Behavioral Data
Response proportions on the Picture-Word test task are presented in tables 17 and
18. Pairwise t-tests indicated that participants were more likely to correctly attribute
items shown as words as being presented as words relative to misattributing them as
having been pictures (MD = 22.30, SD = 6.94, t(178) = 43.01, p <.001) or unpresented
items (MD = 24.44, SD = 5.30, t(178) = 61.67, <.001). Participants were also more likely
to correctly attribute items shown as pictures as being presented as pictures relative to
misattributing them as having been words (MD = 26.78, SD = 5.10, t(178) = 70.24, p
<.001) or unpresented items (MD = 25.93, SD = 4.85, t(178) = 71.58, <.001). Participants
also more frequently correctly categorized unpresented items as “new” relative to
misattributing them as having been originally presented as pictures (MD = 14.23, SD =
3.88, t(178) = 49.01, <.001) or words (MD = 13.87, SD = 4.64, t(178) = 40.03, p <.001).
Finally, replicating the effect from Study 1, participants were more likely to misattribute
new items as having being presented as words relative to pictures (MD = .36, SD = 2.12,
t(178) = 2.25, p = .026).

Table 17: Study 2 Picture Word Task Response Frequencies and Standard Deviations
Response
Shown As

Picture

Word

New

Picture

27.57 (3.20)

.79 (2.16)

1.64 (1.95)

Word

3.28 (3.23)

25.58 (3.94)

1.14 (1.94)

Not-Shown

.80 (1.40)

1.16 (2.02)

15.03 (2.76)
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Table 18: Study 2 Picture Word Task Response Proportions and Standard Deviations
Response
Shown As

Picture

Word

New

Picture

.92 (.11)

.03 (.07)

.05 (.07)

Word

.10 (.11)

.85 (.13)

.04 (.06)

Not-Shown

.05 (.08)

.06 (.12)

.88 (.16)

3.3.3 Picture-Word & Misinformation Effect Behavioral Links
As in Study 1, an independent set of random linear random intercept models with
robust standard errors were used to model the predictive relationships between “Picture
as Word” (IV1) as well as “Word as Picture” (IV2) source monitoring errors and
misinformation test responses with perceptual attributions (i.e. misled item selections in
the misled condition given perceptual source attributions (DV1), event item selections in
the misled condition given perceptual source attributions (DV2) control items selections
in the control condition given perceptual source attributions (DV3) and foil item
selections in the control condition given perceptual source attributions (DV4)). All
reported beta values can be interpreted as indicating the estimated average increase in
misinformation endorsements with for every one additional picture-word task error in the
indicated response category. As in Study 1, a Bonferroni correction procedure was
applied to each model, keeping the family-wise type 1 error rate of each separate model
at p = .05.
The results of this analysis showed that Picture-As-Word errors were again
positively related to DV1, perceptual misled item endorsements (B = .11, SE = .03,
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F(1,176) = 15.01, p < .001) while Word-As-Picture errors were not significantly related
with this measure, (B = .03, SE = .03, F(1,176) = .76, p = .385). Picture-As-Word errors
were also negatively related to perceptual DV2, event item selections in the misled
condition given perceptual source attributions (B = -.14, SE = .05, F(1,176) = 6.96, p
= .009), with Word-As-Picture not being a significant predictor of this measure (B = -.03,
SE = .06, F(1,176) = .34 p = .563).
Neither Word as Picture (B = -.06 SE = .04, F(1, 176) = 1.91, p = .169) or Picture
as Word errors (B = .10, SE = .07, F(1, 176) = 2.06, p = .153) were significantly related
to DV3, event items selections in the control condition given perceptual source
attributions. Word as Picture (B = -.03 SE = .02, F(1, 176) = 1.22, p = .271) or Picture as
Word errors variable (B = -.01, SE = .03, F(1, 176) = .19, p = .664) were also not
significantly related to DV4, foil item selections in the control condition given perceptual
source attributions.

3.3.4 Personality Inventories & Picture-Word Task Links
Bonferroni corrected correlations between the administered personality measures
and responses on the picture-word task are presented in Table 19. The sole marginally
significant correlation noted was between the VVIQ and Word as Picture error rates
(r(179) = .19, p = .013). This relationship suggests a weak relationship between the
VVIQ and the tendency to misattribute verbal memory traces to a visual source.
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Table 19: Study 2 Personality Inventories & Picture-Word Response Correlations
Picture as

Word as

Word

Picture

VVIQ

-.03

.19*

NISROE

-.04

.02

CEQ

.06

-.01

** Corrected correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

3.3.5 Personality Inventories & Misinformation Effect Links
Bonferroni corrected Intercorrelations between the personality inventories are
presented in Table 20. The sole relationship that approached conventional levels of
significance was one between the VVIQ and NISROE inventory, r(179) = .16, p = .038,
with higher VVIQ scores being associated with higher NISROE scores. This link
suggests that higher levels of subjective visualization vividness are weakly associated
with a greater inclination towards relying on internal sources of encoding information.
This correlation did not, however, survive any form of family-wise p-value correction.

Table 20: Study 2 Correlations between Personality Inventories
VVIQ

NISROE

CEQ

.02

.03

VVIQ

-

.16*

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

66
Intercorrelations between the personality inventories and the primary
misinformation task responses of interest (i.e., endorsements and rejections with
perceptual source attributions) are presented in Table 21. Note that in this matrix,
rejections for control and neutral items refers to the selection of foil response in the
control condition while misinformation rejection refers to event item selections in the
misled condition. A Bonferroni correction procedure was applied to the p-values of the
correlations observed between personality inventory scores and performance on the
misinformation task. Post-correction, none of the measures demonstrated significant
correlations with misinformation task performance though a marginal trend was noted
where higher CEQ scores were marginally negatively correlated with the frequency of
accurate event item endorsements in the control condition.

Table 21: Study 2 Personality Inventories & Misinformation Response Correlations

Control Condition:

VVIQ

NISROE

CEQ

-.11

-.07

-.18

-.03

.05

-.03

.08

.03

-.06

-.02

.15

-.09

Event Item selection: perceptual attributions
Control Condition:
Foil Item selections: perceptual attributions
Misinformation Condition:
Misled Item selections: perceptual attributions
Misinformation Condition:
Event Item selections: perceptual attributions

67
The potential moderating role of these personality measure scores on the observed
links between Picture-As-Word and Word-As-Picture errors was also assessed by
individually adding these variables to the models presented in section 3.3.3 as fully
interacting variables.
The results of these analyses showed that VVIQ scores were uncorrelated with
picture as word errors (r(179) = -.03, p = .666) but were significantly correlated with
Word-As-Picture errors (r(179) = .19, p = .013). VVIQ scores did not significantly
predict misinformation error rates on their own (r(179) = .08, p = .291) or after
controlling for Word-As-Picture and Picture-As-Word errors, B = .029, SE = .187,
F(1,173) = .02, p = .876. VVIQ scores also did not show a moderating effect on the link
between Picture-As-Word or Word-As-Picture errors and misinformation susceptibility
(B = .067, SE = .062, F(1,173) = 1.19, p = .278 and B = .008, SE = .046, F(1,173) = .03,
p = .857 respectively). Picture-As-Word errors also continued to significantly predict
misinformation errors (B = .117, SE = .035, F(1,173) = 11.40, p < .001) after controlling
for VVIQ scores.
NISROE scores were uncorrelated with Picture-As-Word errors (r(179) = -.04, p
= .595) or Word-As-Picture errors (r(179) = .02, p = .781). NISROE scores also did not
significantly predict misinformation error rates on their own (r(179) = .03, p = .660) or
after controlling for Word-As-Picture and Picture-As-Word errors, B = .064, SE = .045,
F(1,173) = 2.01, p = .158. NISROE scores also did not show a moderating effect on the
link between Picture-As-Word or Word-As-Picture errors and misinformation
susceptibility (B = -.011, SE = .020, F(1,173) = .31, p = .579 and B = .010, SE = .012,
F(1,173) = .69, p = .406 respectively). Picture -As-Word errors also continued to
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significantly predict misinformation errors (B = .109, SE = .043, F(1,173) = 6.50, p
= .0012) after controlling for NISROE scores.
Finally, CEQ scores were uncorrelated with between Picture-As-Word errors
(r(179) = -.06, p = .446) or Word-As-Picture errors (r(179) = -.01, p = .866). CEQ scores
also did not significantly predict misinformation error rates on their own (r(179) = -.06, p
= .845) or after controlling for Word-As-Picture and Picture-As-Word errors, B = .013,
SE = .017, F(1,173) = .60, p = .439. CEQ scores also did not show a moderating effect on
the link between Picture-As-Word or Word-As-Picture errors and misinformation
susceptibility (B = .014, SE = .010, F(1,173) = 1.38, p = .170 and B < .001, SE = .003,
F(1,173) = .01, p = .934 respectively). Picture -As-Word errors also continued to
significantly predict misinformation errors (B = .189, SE = .076, F(1,173) = 6.17, p
= .014) after controlling for CEQ scores.

3.4

Study 2 Discussion
In line with Specific Aim 2 (i.e. the assessment of the robustness and replicability

of relationships between misinformation susceptibility and basic visual as well as verbal
source monitoring errors), Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1, showing again that
relative to Word-As-Picture errors, individual differences in susceptibility towards
Picture-As-Word source monitoring errors are more closely related to misinformation
susceptibility. These results also extend the findings of Study 1 to show that the
previously observed effect is robust under testing formats which directly contrast true and
false memory traces (i.e., 2AFC versus True/False judgments). Notably, the link between
Picture-As-Word errors and misinformation susceptibility in Experiment 2 was also

69
notably weaker (B = .32 vs. B = .11, t(258) = 2.19, p = .029). While a decrease in the
number of misinformation endorsements was noted in Study 2 relative to Study 1 (MD
= .39), the magnitude of this reduction seems too small to account for the drop in effect
size. Thus, it is possible this shift was driven by the change in testing format though it is
also possible the measurement of effect size in Study 2 is more precise given its larger
sample size.
Specifically, unlike the single item true/false test, the 2AFC test in Experiment 2
involves a comparison between original and misinformation item memory traces. For
instance, with regard to misinformation items, the single item true/false format targets
specific narrative memory traces without directly encouraging the retrieval of the
conflicting event memory detail. In contrast, misinformation endorsements on the 2AFC
test represent the outcome of a more complex comparison process involving the relative
weighing of the strength of visual and verbally presented information. Thus the fact that
Picture-As-Word errors continue to be a significant predictor under these testing
conditions lends additional support to the idea that verbalization related processes play a
stronger role in the misinformation effect than visualization.
With regard to the questionnaires, the observed link between the CEQ and the
NISROE inventory is interesting to note, and to the best of my knowledge, the first
known demonstrated link between the measures. With regard to the purpose of Study 2
however, none of the administered measures displayed significant direct or moderating
associations with the primary misinformation measures of interest. These results suggest
that the observed link between Picture as Word errors and misinformation susceptibility
is not driven by individual differences in visualization ability, internal versus external
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information encoding preferences or fantasy proneness. Furthermore, these findings also
show that the role of visualization-driven source monitoring errors in misinformation
susceptibility is not stronger among individuals most likely to exhibit such a link (i.e.,
individuals with higher levels of mental imagery vividness, fantasy proneness, and
internal information source preferences).
Study 3

4

4.1

Study 3: Introduction
Study 3 utilizes high-density electroencephalography (EEG) to assess differences

in neural activity associated with recognition responses on both the misinformation effect
and Picture-Word source monitoring paradigm. In doing so, Study 3 aims to meet
Specific Aim 3 of this dissertation (i.e., to investigate potential links between neural
activity associated with recollective processing in misinformation endorsements and
basic visual as well as verbal source monitoring errors).

4.1.1 Introduction to EEG and target ERP components of interest in Study 3
Electroencephalography refers to the measurement of brain electrical fields via
electrodes placed on the surface of the scalp. These fields arise from the electrochemical
activity within neurons which, when present in a sufficiently synchronous and
geometrically aligned fashion, can produce local field potentials powerful enough to be
detected at the surface of the scalp (Niedermeyer et al., 2011; Nunez, 1981). The current
“standard model” of EEG proposes that local field potentials and EEG represent
extracellular currents arising from dendritic postsynaptic potentials in thousands to
millions of cortical pyramidal cells in parallel alignment. Other neural processes such as
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ion spikes (Murakami et al., 2003), glial cell activity (Amzica & Steriade, 2000) and
active currents (Reimann et al.) have also been proposed to play a role in shaping
ongoing EEG activity.
At a higher-order level, however, a comprehensive understanding of the specific
computational neural processes which give rise to many of the well-established features
of the EEG remains an unexplored area of study (Cohen, 2017). Nonetheless, while the
specific mechanisms underlying many aspects of the EEG signal are not yet completely
known, decades of meticulous and ongoing work on EEG has shed significant light on
the functional links between specific EEG components and a wide range of cognitive
processes. This growth has been especially expansive with regard to event-related
potentials (ERPs), portions of the ongoing EEG waveform time-locked to the onset of a
specific target event (i.e., stimulus presentations, motor responses). When averaged
across multiple trials and evaluated concerning a neutral baseline, the ERP waveform
consists of a series of positive and negative deflections. Decades of research has linked
specific spatial topographies and associated time-windows, often referred to as ERP
components, within these fluctuations with many aspects of cognitive processing. Several
of these components arise consistently and predictably enough to have significant
research value.
Study 3 focuses on the specific memory related ERP component most strongly
associated with recollective processing, the late-positive-component (LPC). Typically
taking the form of a positive ERP modulation maximal over parietal regions (ca. 500900 ms post-stimulus onset), the Late Positive Component (LPC) has been shown to be
more positive for memory test items endorsed as “remembered,” with a relatively weaker
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positive deflection for memory test items endorsed as “known”. The LPC’s amplitude has
also been repeatedly shown to be positively associated with the recollection of accurate
source information from both a threshold (Rugg et al., 1996; Rugg et al., 1998; Vilberg et
al., 2006; Wilding et al., 1995; Wilding & Rugg, 1996) and graded perspective (Leynes
& Phillips, 2008; Paller et al., 1995; Wilding, 2000; Woroch & Gonsalves, 2010),
mapping onto phenomenological reports of recollection-based recognition (Woodruff et
al., 2006). In the context of dual-process models, the LPC is often proposed as a
continuous index of recollective strength (Woroch & Gonsalves, 2010).

4.1.2 Goals of study 3
Study 3 has two primary goals. The first goal is to shed light on differences in
recollective strength, as indexed by the LPC, between true and false memory
endorsements on the misinformation effect in isolation. Links between the LPC and
source recollection (Rugg et al., 1996; Rugg et al., 1998; Vilberg et al., 2006; Wilding et
al., 1995; Wilding & Rugg, 1996) and evidence for reduced reliance on verbatim and
source features (Mather et al., 1997) in false memories suggests that the LPC towards
true event item endorsements will be more positive than endorsements of false
misinformation-based content. Misinformation rejections made on the basis of retrieving
conflicting perceptual event information are also likely to show elevated LPC levels
relative to false memories, though to a weaker degree relative to true memory recognition
in which the true event detail is provided as a retrieval cue. Thus with regard to this aim,
it is hypothesized that true memories will exhibit an elevated LPC relative to
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misinformation endorsements with misinformation rejection responses exhibiting an LPC
level in-between the two.
The second goal of Study 3 is to shed light on links between the recollective
responses on the Picture-Word task and misinformation endorsements. Specifically,
Study 3 aims to assess the association between the LPC response in misinformation
endorsements, visual recollections (Picture-As-Picture) and verbal recollections (WordsAs-Word). While it would be interesting to link error responses (i.e., Picture-As-Word,
Word-As-Picture) directly, the results of Study 1 and 2 indicate that participants would
not make sufficient errors on the Picture-Word task to allow for reliable ERP analyses.
With regard to this aim, it is hypothesized that the LPC towards misinformation
endorsement will be more strongly related to verbal (Word-As-Word) source attributions
as opposed to visual ones (Picture-As-Picture).
Of secondary interest in Study 3 are the responses to the Picture-Word task itself
given that this relationship has already been previously studied in prior work. Drawing on
this prior work, the first clear hypothesis is that items recognized as having been
previously presented should show an elevated LPC relative to items categorized as being
“new”. This prediction is in line with past ERP studies of the Picture-Word task
(Gonsalves & Paller, 2000; Johansson et al., 2002). Again drawing on prior work in this
area (Johansson et al., 2002), no significant LPC difference is anticipated to be present
between Word-As-Word and Picture-As-Picture responses.
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4.2

Methods

4.2.1 Power Analysis
The target sample size was estimated using empirical power simulation in SAS
9.3 (Zhao & Li, 2012) with parameters observed in data from prior ERP investigations
contrasting true and false perceptual memories (Gonsalves & Paller, 2000), as well as
relevant and irrelevant event item (Gamer & Berti, 2012) and word probe (Meixner &
Rosenfeld, 2014), concealed information test differentiation. With these parameters, 1000
simulated datasets were simulated for ten potential target sample sizes (10 – 30 in
increments of 5). This power simulation indicated that 20 participants were sufficient to
achieve 75% power to detect medium within-subject sizes (f ≥ 0.25).

4.2.2 Participants
Nineteen participants (12 female, 15 right-handed, mean age=19.84, SD =2.49,
range 18-23) participated in this study. The local IRB approved all procedures with
participants providing informed consent and receiving research credit for their
participation. No participant attrition was noted in this study.

4.2.3 Materials
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory: The Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield,
1971) was used to assess individual differences right and left-handed dominance (i.e.,
laterality). The inventory is a 10-point questionnaire in which participants are asked to
rate their handedness preference for a range of activities by either indicating an average
or a strong preference for a particular hand or equal preference. Handedness scores are
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then determined by calculating a laterality quotient for each subject via the formula (RL)/(R+L) where R is the number of activities in which the right hand is preferred and L
the number of activities in which the left hand is preferred.
Picture-word source monitoring task: The procedure of the study phase of the picture
word task in Study 3 was identical to the ones used in the two prior experiments with the
following modifications. First, the number of stimuli was expanded from 77 to 190 (95
pictures and 95 words) in an attempt to ensure a sufficient number of source monitoring
errors for EEG analysis. Second, to boost the number of errors made further, a one-day
retention interval was present between the study and test stages. Finally, to present the
expanded stimuli set within a reasonable time frame, participants were asked to list one
use for the item as opposed to two with all stimuli being presented on screen for 6
seconds instead of the 8 seconds utilized in Studies 1 and 2.
EEG data was only recorded during the testing phase of this task. The testing
procedure, shown in Figure 1, was similar to the testing procedure used in Studies 1 and 2
save that instead of presenting the names of the objects auditorily—which would have
made it more difficult to temporally localize the ERP components given variation in the
acoustic presentation of the items (e.g., varying number of syllables, “Axe” versus
“Magnifying Glass”)--all test items were presented visually within a 2 degree angle of
All responses were made on a 4-key button box. Participants were instructed to abstain
from blinking in slides A through D and permitted to blink during Slide E if necessary.
Participants were tested on all 190 studied items as well as 20 new unstudied items.
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Figure 1: EEG picture-word testing procedure and presentation durations.
Misinformation effect task: EEG data on this task was collected solely during the
testing phase. The misinformation task used was similar to the one used in Studies 1 and
2 with four main changes. First, the number of events slides was expanded from two to
four (Narratives 1 through 4 in Appendix B) with all events coming from Okado and
Stark (2005). These separate events depicted (1) a man breaking into a car, (2) a woman’s
wallet being stolen, (3) a repairman stealing office supplies and (4) two friends getting
into a fight.
Second, the same procedure used in Study 1 was utilized in Study 3 with a lack of
counterbalancing between event and post-event items. As in Study 1, participants were
explicitly told that their memory for these events would be tested at a later point in the
study. To ensure a sufficient number of trials for reliable ERP analysis, the number of
critical details tested per event was expanded from 12 to 24. This expansion was done by
assigning all the critical items from Study 1 to the misinformation condition and adding
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12 new control items for each event. This modification meant that a full counterbalancing
of the selection of items assigned to control and. Misinformation conditions between
participants was not possible due to the limited number of details that varied between
Version A and Version B in Okado & Stark’s (2005) materials. However, the type of
misinformation participants received was counterbalanced between-participants (i.e., half
the participants viewed event version A and received misinformation in line with what
was shown in version B and vice versa). The use of a consistent control condition was
maintained from Study 1 as referring to central items in a neutral fashion (e.g., referring
to a hanger as a “tool”) or not mentioning them at would have led to differential
processing of control and misled items during the misinformation phase. Not mentioning
central items in the narrative at all would have led to the misled items receiving a recency
study boost relative to control items. The same issue would apply even if control items
were mentioned neutrally with the additional complication of potentially prompting
participants to actively retrieve the specific event detail itself (e.g., reading that a “tool”
was used would likely prompt participants to actively retrieve the specific memory of that
specific tool), potentially creating additional cognitive operation related cues not
prompted with regard to misinformation content.
Finally, the type of test was the True/False test used in Study 1 as the
simultaneous presentation of items in the 2AFC would have made it difficult to
disentangle the neural recollection signatures associated with each item.
Participants were tested on all 48 misinformed details (12 from each event) and,
due to testing time constraints, 40 randomly selected details from the 48 consistent
control items (10 from each event). The testing procedure is presented in Figure 2.
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Participants were instructed to make source judgments on the basis of the recalled source
they were basing their True/False evaluation on. All responses were made on a 4-key
button box. A blank screen was presented for 2000 ms between each trial. Participants
were instructed to abstain from blinking in slides A through D and permitted to blink
during Slides E & F. Test items were blocked by event and presented in random nonchronological order within blocks. A short sentence reinstated the context of each event
at the start of each block.

Figure 2: EEG misinformation testing procedure and presentation durations.
4.2.4 Procedure
The study consisted of five phases across two days. In the first three phases
conducted on the first day, participants viewed all four events sequentially followed by
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the picture-word study and misinformation narrative study phases. Participants were
instructed that the goal of the study was to investigate the neural processes of event
memory and provided signed informed consent. They were then briefed on the
experimental procedures and were seated in individual testing rooms where they
completed the misinformation event study phase (Phase 1) followed by the picture-word
task study phase (Phase 2) and the misinformation narrative study phase (Phase 3). All
stimuli were presented on a personal computer. At the end of this process, the participants
were dismissed and reminded to return and attend the testing session on the next day.
Testing for both tasks (Phases 4 & 5) was conducted between 12 pm and 5 pm on
the following day. In this session, participants first complete a standard Snellen test of
visual acuity test to establish normal/corrected-normal visual acuity of at least 20/30.
Participants kept on any prescription lenses/contacts they required. Each participant stood
approximately 20 feet from the 22” x 11” Snellen chart. From this distance, the
participant then read out letters on each line, starting from the top and going to the
bottom. The experimenter stopped the vision screener when the participant incorrectly
read three or more letters on a single line. Visual acuity levels were recorded as that of
the line before the line in which three mistakes were made. The participant completed
this procedure separately for their right and left eye.
Following this screening test, the participant was then given a refresher briefing
on the purpose of the experiment and were asked to verbally reaffirm their participation
consent. Upon providing consent, the electrode net was applied to the participant’s head
and adjusted to ensure proper placement and sufficiently low impedances (< 45 ohms).
The participant was then seated in a quiet, dark room facing a computer monitor placed
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1-meter away with a 4-button button box in their hands. They then first completed the
misinformation test (Phase 4) followed by the picture-word test (Phase 5). Impedances
were inspected and readjusted if necessary between the two tests. Each participant was
then tested individually with two experimenters monitoring the participant and real-time
waveforms for ocular and movement artifacts.

4.2.5 Electrophysiological Recording
EEG data was recorded using a 256 high-density AgCl electrode Hydrocel
Geodesic Sensor Net connected to a NetAmps 300 amplifier on Netstation version 4.4.2
(Electro Geodesics, Inc., Eugene, OR). Electrode impedances were below 45 kΩ, a level
appropriate for the high impedance system. Impedances were inspected and adjust in
between each presented task. Incoming data was analogue filtered from 0.1-100 Hz and
digitized at 250 Hz.

4.2.6 EEG Data Preprocessing
First, the continuous EEG was digitally filtered using a 0.3–30 Hz Hamming
windowed-sinc finite impulse response zero-phase filter with cutoff frequencies at 0.05
Hz and 30.05 Hz attenuated at -6 dB. The filtered data was then segmented to the onset
of the critical item presentation (Slide D in Figure 1, above), beginning 100 ms before
onset and continuous for 1000 ms onwards for the misinformation task and 1500 ms
onwards for the picture-word task.
The Automatic Artifact Removal (AAR) toolbox (Delorme & Makeig, 2004;
Gomez-Herrero et al., 2006) was then used to remove ocular and electromyographic
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artifacts using spatial filtering and blind source separation. Bad channels were then
identified and interpolated in ERP PCA Toolkit (version 2.49; Dien, 2010a). Bad
channels were identified across the entire session via poor overall correlation (<0.40)
between neighboring channels and identified within each segment via unusually high
differences between an electrode’s average voltage and that of their neighbors (>30 µv)
and/or via extreme voltage differences within electrode channels (>100 µv min to max).
A channel was also marked as bad for the entire session if more than 20% of its segments
were classified as being bad. All identified bad channels were replaced using whole head
spline interpolation. After bad channels were identified and interpolated, trials with more
than 10% interpolated channels were removed from the analysis set. Segments were then
re-referenced to an average reference and baseline corrected using the 100 ms prestimulus average,
Regrettably, there was an insufficient number of Perceptual Control Rejections
(Mean = 7.16, SD = 2.79) for reliable analysis. The average number of clean trials in the
three critical categories (Control Endorsement, Control Rejection, Misinformation
Endorsement, Misinformation Rejection) were, however, sufficient for analysis. The
average number of trials in each condition was 13.21 (SD=4.21) in the Perceptual
Misinformation Endorsement Category, 20.07 (SD = 5.20) in the Perceptual Control
Endorsement Category and 16.02 (SD=4.08) in the Perceptual Misinformation Rejection
category.
In the Picture-Word task, data from one participant was unfortunately lost due to a
technical error. In the remaining 18 participants, the average number of clean trials in
each response category were as follows : Picture-As-Picture (M = 64.67 SD = 13.98),
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Picture-As-Word (M = 15.29 SD = 8.94), Picture-As-New (M = 15.00 SD = 8.94), WordAs-Picture (M = 19.29 SD = 10.89), Word-As-Word (M = 60.86 SD = 14.94), Word-AsNew (M = 14.10 SD = 8.90), New-As-New (M = 15.19 SD = 3.80), New-As-Picture (M
= 2.47 SD = 1.51), New-As Word (M = 3.59 SD = 2.60). Unfortunately however, nine
participants performed extremely well on the task resulting in an insufficient number of
errors (< 10) for analysis. As removing these participants would result in an insufficient
number of subjects for reliable analyses, the decision was made to focus subsequent
analyses on Picture-As-Picture, Word-As-Word, and New-As-New responses instead.

4.3

Results

4.3.1 Misinformation Effect Behavioral Results
Test performance is presented in Tables 22 through 25. Tables 22 and 23 show
the breakdown of control items as a function of endorsement versus rejection and
subsequent source judgment. Tables 24 and 25 present the same breakdown for
misinformed items. “Seen” and “Seen & Read” responses (i.e., perceptual attributions),
was the critical response category focused on in subsequent analyses.

Table 22: Study 3 Control Item Response Frequencies and Standard Deviations
Condition

Seen

Seen &

Perceptual

Read

Attribution

Read

Guess

Endorsement 11.15 (4.52) 10.42 (5.32)

21.57 (5.06)

1.16 (2.03)

3.63 (2.65)

Rejection

7.26 (2.75)

3.42 (3.73)

2.95 (2.39)

5.00 (2.81)

2.26 (1.76)
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Table 23: Study 3 Control Item Response Proportions and Standard Deviations
Condition

Seen

Seen &

Perceptual

Read

Attribution

Read

Guess

Endorsement

.28 (.11)

.26 (.13)

.54 (.13)

.09 (.09)

.09 (.07)

Rejection

.13 (.07)

.06 (.04)

.18 (.07)

.03 (.05)

.07 (.60)

Table 24: Study 3 Misinformed Item Response Frequencies and Standard Deviations
Condition

Seen

Seen &

Perceptual

Read

Attribution

Read

Guess

Endorsement

13.36 (4.16)

5.47 (4.15)

18.84 (4.09)

2.74 (2.74)

3.68 (3.35)

Rejection

7.31 (4.41)

6.16 (3.56)

13.47 (4.06)

6.68 (4.66)

2.58 (2.12)

Table 25: Study 3 Misinformed Item Response Proportions and Standard Deviations
Condition

Seen

Seen &

Perceptual

Read

Attribution

Read

Guess

Endorsement

.15 (.09)

.13 (.07)

.28 (.08)

.14 (.10)

.05 (.04)

Rejection

.28 (.09)

.11 (.09)

.39 (.09)

.06 (.06)

.08 (.07)

Pairwise t-tests indicated that participants made more control endorsements than
misinformation endorsements with perceptual attributions (MD = 8.11, SD = 4.77, t(18)
= 7.405, p < .001), a greater number of perceptual based misinformation rejections than
misinformation endorsements (MD = 5.37, SD = 4.67, t(18) = 5.012, p < .001) and a
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greater number of perceptual misinformation endorsements than perceptual control
rejections. Intercorrelations between the primary variables of interest are presented in
table 26. The full correlation matrix for all responses is presented in Appendix E. Note
that, as in Study 1, correlations within the misinformation and control item groups are not
completely independent as the selection of a control option on misinformed item
(misinformation rejection) precludes the possibility of a misinformation endorsement for
that item.

Table 26: Study 3 Correlations Misinformation Test Responses
Perceptual Misled

Perceptual Misled

Item Endorsements

Item Rejections

Perceptual Event Item Endorsements

.47*

.47*

Perceptual Misled Item Endorsements

-

.34

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

4.3.2 Picture Word Behavioral Data
Response proportions on the Picture-Word test task are presented in Tables 27
and 28. Pairwise t-tests indicated that participants were more likely to correctly attribute
items shown as words as being presented as words relative to misattributing them as
having been pictures (MD = 43.50, SD = 20.42, t(17) = 9.04, p <.001) or unpresented
items (MD = 46.50, SD = 21.21, t(17) = 9.30, p =<.001). Participants were also more
likely to correctly attribute items shown as pictures as being presented as pictures relative
to misattributing them as having been words (MD = 47.27, SD = 21.52, t(17) = 9.32, p
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<.001) or unpresented items (MD = 47.72, SD = 20.48, t(17) = 9.88, p =<.001).
Participants also more frequently correctly categorized unpresented items as “new”
relative to misattributing them as having been originally presented as pictures (MD =
14.22, SD = 3.38, t(17) = 17.81, p < .001) or words (MD = 13.11, SD = 4.87, t(17) =
11.41, p <.001). Finally, participants were marginally more likely to misattribute new
items as having being presented as words relative to pictures (MD = 1.11, SD = 2.29,
t(17) = 2.05, p = .056).

Table 27: Study 3 Picture Word Task Response Frequencies and Standard Deviations
Response
Shown As

Picture

Word

New

Picture

63.33 (13.32)

16.05 (9.69)

15.61 (8.91)

Word

18.17 (9.68)

61.67 (12.93)

15.17 (9.68)

Not-Shown

1.56 (1.04)

2.67 (2.28)

15.78 (2.69)

Table 28: Study 3 Picture Word Task: Response Proportions and Standard Deviations
Response
Shown As

Picture

Word

New

Picture

.67 (.14)

.17 (.10)

.16 (.09)

Word

.19 (.10)

.65 (.14)

.16 (.11)

Not-Shown

.08 (.05)

.13 (.11)

.79 (.13)
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4.3.3 Misinformation and Picture-Word Behavioral Links
While an apriori power analysis indicated that the projected number of
participants in the EEG study would not have sufficient power (>80%) to detect the
effects observed in Studies 1 and 2, an exploratory analysis was conducted to assess the
direction of the previously detected effects in Experiment 3. A single linear random
intercept model with robust standard errors was used to model the predictive relationship
between misinformation susceptibility (DV) and “Picture-As-Word” (IV1) as well as
“Word-As-Picture” (IV2) source monitoring errors. The results of this analysis showed
that Word-As-Picture errors were not significantly related with misinformation
susceptibility, B = .116, SE = .095, F(1,15) = 1.48, p = .243, while a greater number of
picture as word errors were marginally related to higher levels of perceptual
misinformation susceptibility, B = .175, SE = .095, F(1,15) = 3.34, p = .088. Neither
Word-As-Picture or Picture-As-Word errors were significant predictors of perceptual
control item endorsement levels (B = -.139, SE = .129, F(1,15) = 1.17, p = .297, and B =
-.042, SE = 129, F(1,16) = .11, p = .749 respectively).

4.4

ERP Analyses

4.4.1 Temporal-spatial Analyses of Misinformation task ERPs
ERP components were quantified using temporal-spatial PCA in ERP PCA
Toolkit. First, a temporal PCA was performed on the data using all time points from each
participant’s averaged ERP as variables, considering participants, condition and
recording sites as observations. This step reduced the temporal structure of the ERP data
(275 measurement points) to a set of temporal components. Promax rotation was used,
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and nineteen temporal components (92% of total variance) were extracted based on
parallel analysis (Horn, 1965).
The spatial distribution of these components was then decomposed using spatial
PCA. This PCA used all recording sites as variables, considering participants, conditions
and temporal factor scores as observations. This step reduced the electrode structure
(257-channels) to a set of virtual electrodes on which the original electrodes loaded.
Infomax rotation was used, and six spatial components (72% of total variance) were
extracted based on parallel analysis.
Standardized Low-Resolution Brain Electromagnetic Tomography (sLORETA;
Pascual-Marqui et al., 1994) was used to estimate the standardized distribution of current
density of the grand-average waveform (averaged across all response conditions) during
the peak time point of all components. The significance threshold was estimated using a
statistical non-parametric mapped permutation test (Nichols & Holmes, 2002), utilizing
10000 randomizations of 6430 voxels (3-shell spherical head model, 5 mm resolution)
with subject-wise normalization.
Selection of the LPC component was conducted in a two-step process. First,
components that accounted for at least 40 ms of temporal-spatial variance were
identified. Three components met this criterion, a posterior positivity with a peak
timespan (component temporal loadings > 0.8) 288-416 ms post-onset (4.2% of total
variance), a posterior positivity peaking 444-616 ms post-onset (6.7% of total variance).,
and a weak late positivity spanning 772-900 ms post-onset onset (4.2% of total variance).
Based on their time-course and topography in light of prior P3b (see Polich, 2007 for a
review) and LPC work (Curran et al., 2001), the first component (288-416 ms) was
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classified as the P3b whereas the second was classified as an LPC (444-616 ms). Given
the memory related focus of this dissertation, the LPC component will be the focus of all
subsequent analyses.
The source localization of the LPC component supported its classification.
Activity in this component localized to the left parahippocampal gyrus, a region
associated with LPC activity (e.g. Hoppstädter et al., 2015; Klaver et al., 2005) and
episodic memory retrieval (see Wais, 2008 for a review) as well as true and false item
memory differentiation (Cabeza et al., 2001; von Zerssen et al., 2001). Critically, both
these regions have been previously implicated in differentiating between response
categories in the misinformation effect paradigm (Stark et al., 2010). The time course and
scalp topographies of these components are shown in Figure 3 while the grand average
waveforms for electrodes with high loadings on the components are shown in Figure 4.

Figure 3: LPC component waveforms at its highest loading electrode, scalp topographies
by condition and the sLORETA solution at the component’s peak time-point.
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Figure 4: Average waveforms by condition for electrodes with high loadings (> 0.80) on
the LPC component (marked on the electrode map). High loading (> 0.80) time points on
the component are shaded on the waveform plot.
4.4.2 Misinformation Task LPC Analyses
The LPC component peak (i.e., PCA waveform voltage at the highest loading
temporal-spatial point) voltage means and standard errors for responses on the
misinformation task are presented in Table 29.

Table 29: Study 3 Misinformation Task LPC Component Mean Voltages and Standard
Errors
LPC
Voltage
Control Endorsement

1.97 µV (.52)

Misinfo. Rejection

.84 µV (.53)

Misinfo. Endorsement

-.45 µV (.90)
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A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to contrast LPC scores
across conditions. As the assumption of sphericity was not met χ2 = 10.21, df = 2, p = .006,
degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε
= .689). The ANOVA indicated LPC voltages were significantly different across
conditions, F(1.38, 24.80) = 4.08, p = .043, η2𝑝 = .185. Follow-up pairwise comparisons
showed Control Endorsements had a higher mean LPC voltage than both Misinformation
Endorsements (MD = 2.42 µV, SE = 1.03 µV, t(18) = 2.34 p = .031, d = .775) and
Rejections (MD = 1.12 µV, SE = .51 µV, t(18) = 2.22, p = .040, d = .502). The difference
between Misinformation Endorsements and Rejections was not statistically significant
(MD = 1.30 µV, SE = .91 µV, t(18) = 1.43, p = .172, d = .404).

4.4.3 Temporal-spatial Analyses of the Picture-Word Task ERPs
The same procedure applied to the misinformation task ERPs were also applied to
the Picture-Word task ERPs to extract the underlying component structure. First, a
temporal PCA was performed on the data using all time points from each participant’s
averaged ERP as variables, considering participants, condition and recording sites as
observations. This step reduced the temporal structure of the ERP data (375 measurement
points) to a set of temporal components. Promax rotation was used, and twenty-two
temporal components (94% of total variance) were extracted based on parallel analysis
(Horn, 1965).
The spatial distribution of these components was then decomposed using spatial
PCA. This PCA used all recording sites as variables, considering participants, conditions
and temporal factor scores as observations. This step reduced the electrode structure
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(257-channels) to a set of virtual electrodes on which the original electrodes loaded on.
Infomax rotation was used, and five spatial components (71% of total variance) were
extracted based on parallel analysis.
Selection of the LPC component was conducted in a two-step process. First,
components that accounted for at least 40 ms of temporal-spatial variance were
identified. Two components met this criterion, a posterior positivity with a peak timespan
(component temporal loadings > .8) 624-922 ms post-onset (7.1% of total variance) and a
frontal positivity peaking 1200-1500 ms post-onset (6.1% of total variance). Based on
their time-course and topography in light of prior cued source monitoring related LPC
work (Addante et al., 2012; Cui et al., 2016) , the first component (624-922 ms) was
classified as an LPC ., The topography of the second component was exclusively focused
in ocular regions, an observation supported by the bilateral source localization of this
component to the frontal eyefields. Based on these observations, the second component
was classified as being artifactual and was not considered in subsequent analyses.
Standardized Low-Resolution Brain Electromagnetic Tomography (sLORETA;
Pascual-Marqui et al., 1994) was used to estimate the standardized distribution of current
density of the grand-average waveform (averaged across all response conditions) during
the peak time point of the LPC component. The significance threshold was estimated
using a statistical non-parametric mapped permutation test (Nichols & Holmes, 2002),
utilizing 10000 randomizations of 6430 voxels (3-shell spherical head model, 5 mm
resolution) with subject-wise normalization.
The source localization of these components supported the classifications of the
observed LPC. As shown in figure 5, activity in his component peaked in bilaterally in
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the right and left temporal lobes, possibly reflecting activity associated with the retrieval
of memory traces in this task (Kennepohl et al., 2007; Mitchell & Johnson, 2009). The
time course and scalp topographies of these components are shown in Figure 5 while the
grand average waveforms for electrodes with high loadings on the components are shown
in Figure 6.

4.4.4 Picture-word ERP analyses
The LPC component peak (i.e., PCA waveform voltage at the highest loading
temporal-spatial point) voltage means and standard errors for analyzable responses on the
Picture-Word task are presented in Table 3.

Figure 5: LPC component waveforms at its highest loading electrode, scalp topographies
by condition and the sLORETA solution at the component’s peak time-point.
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Figure 6: Average waveforms by condition for electrodes with high loadings (> 0.70) on
the LPC component (marked on the electrode map). High loading (> 0.80) time points on
the component are shaded on the waveform plot.

Table 30: Study 3 Picture-Word Task LPC Component Mean Voltages and Standard
Errors
LPC
Voltage
Picture-As-Picture

1.84 µV (.91)

Word-As-Word

2.27 µV (.62)

New-As-New

1.41 µV (.70)

A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to contrast LPC scores
(presented in table 30) across conditions. The assumption of sphericity was met
χ2 = 2.41, df = 2, p = .300. The ANOVA indicated LPC voltages were significantly
different across conditions, F(2, 34) = 3.56, p = .039, η2𝑝 = .173. Follow-up pairwise
comparisons showed Word as Word responses had a higher mean LPC voltages than
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New as New responses (MD = 1.21 µV, SE = 1.59 µV, t(17) = 3.23 p = .005) but were
not significantly different from Picture as Picture responses (MD = .43 µV, SE = 2.23
µV, t(18) = .82, p = .43). LPC voltage differences between Picture as Picture and New as
New responses were also not significantly different (MD = .78 µV, SE = 1.96 µV, t(17) =
1.68, p = .112).

4.4.5 Picture-Word & Misinformation Performance ERP Links
Correlations between LPC responses on the misinformation effect and pictureword task are presented in Table 31. Given that the LPC from both tasks were measured
from the same participants, it is not surprising to note that all the measures show a
moderate degree of association. However, as hypothesized, verbal recollection response
on the Picture-Word task exhibited relatively higher zero-order correlations with
misinformation endorsement LPC levels relative to the LPC observed in other
misinformation task responses.

Table 31: Study 3 Picture-Word and Misinformation LPC correlations

Picture-As-Picture LPC
Word-As-Word LPC
New-As-New LPC

Perceptual Misled

Perceptual Misled

Perceptual Event

Item Endorsement

Item Rejection

Item Endorsement

LPC

LPC

LPC

.38

.44

.46

.67**

.48*

.40

.32

.34

.44

* Corrected correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Corrected correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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To empirically assess the uniqueness of the association between the LPC
waveforms observed with perceptual misinformation endorsements and Word-As-Word
responses, a series of linear regression models were conducted in which Picture-AsPicture and Word-As-Word LPC responses were entered simultaneously with one of the
Misinformation task LPCs as the target dependent variable. Results showed that
Misinformation Endorsement LPC levels were positively related only to Word-As-Word
LPC levels (semipartial correlation = .64, B = 1.62, SE = .44, t(15) = 3.72, p = .002) and
marginally negatively related to Picture-As-Picture (semipartial correlation = -.32, B =
-.55, SE = .32, t(15) =1.87, p = .081). After controlling for their shared variance, PictureAs-Picture and Word-As-Word LPC responses were not significantly related to either
Control Endorsement (semipartial correlation = .23, B = .25, SE = .34, t(15) = 1.03, p
= .319 and semipartial correlation = .02, B = .04, SE = .37, t(14) = .103, p = .919
respectively) or Misinformation Rejection LPC levels (semipartial correlation = .09, B
= .10, SE = .24, t(15) = .39, p = .903 and semipartial correlation = .19, B = .31, SE = .36,
t(15) = .837, p = .416 respectively). The zero order correlation scatterplots are presented
in Figures 7 through 9).
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Figure 7: Plot of perceptual misinformation endorsement LPC voltages versus LPC
voltage for (A) Word as Word, (B) Picture as Picture and (C) New as New responses on
the Picture-Word source monitoring task.
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Figure 8: Plot of perceptual control item endorsement LPC voltages versus LPC voltage
for (A) Word as Word, (B) Picture as Picture and (C) New as New responses on the
Picture-Word source monitoring task.
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Figure 9: Plot of perceptual misinformation rejection LPC voltages versus LPC voltage
for (A) Word as Word, (B) Picture as Picture and (C) New as New responses on the
Picture-Word source monitoring task.

4.5

Study 3: Discussion
In line with Specific Aim 3 (i.e. the investigation of potential links between neural

activity associated with recollective processing in misinformation endorsements and
basic visual as well as verbal source monitoring errors), Study 3 assessed links between
the LPC response, an ERP component associated with recollective processing and
strength, towards false memory endorsements on the misinformation effect and accurate
verbal as well as visual source attributions on a Picture-Word source monitoring task.
The results of study 3 show that the LPC associated with false memory endorsements on
the misinformation effect was more strongly related to accurate verbal as opposed to
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visual memory attributions responses on the picture-word monitoring task. In other
words, individual differences in the strength of their recollective responses during false
memory endorsement were more strongly related to the strength of their recollective
response when they made accurate verbal memory attributions as opposed to visual ones.
This result lends support to the idea that individual differences in misinformation
susceptibility are more strongly related to verbalization relative to visualization based
processing, providing additional support for the results of Study 1 and Study 2.
In addition to this finding, Study 3 also makes several other important direct
contributions to research on the misinformation effect. Of particular value, this
investigation represents the first EEG investigation of the misinformation effect aimed at
investigating retrieval processes that differentiate between event and misinformationbased memories. To the best of my knowledge, Study 3 is also the first investigation of
recollective differences between true versus false recognition of episodic details
embedded in their narrative context. In this regard, the findings of Study 3 indicate that
false memory endorsements on the misinformation effect are associated with a
significantly weaker recollective signature relative to true memory endorsements. This
result is consistent with extensive work that has linked greater positivity in the LPC with
superior source monitoring performance (Leynes & Phillips, 2008; Paller et al., 1995;
Rugg et al., 1996; Rugg et al., 1998; Vilberg et al., 2006; Wilding, 2000; Wilding et al.,
1995; Wilding & Rugg, 1996; Woroch & Gonsalves, 2010). There are however two
distinct accounts for this observed effect.
The first is that relative to the narrative study of the misinformation details,
perceptual exposure provides true event memories with a stronger perceptual and
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verbatim memory traces. Thus, the observed LPC difference between true versus false
memories observed in Study 3 may be reflective of perceptual memory trace strength
differences between true relative to false perceptual memories (Brainerd et al., 2008;
Gonsalves & Paller, 2000; Mather et al., 1997). The second complementary factor resides
in the type of control being used to assess “true” memories. All control items in this study
were “consistent controls” (i.e., test items that were consistent with both the event and the
narrative), a type of control commonly used in many misinformation effect investigations
(e.g. Calvillo, 2014; Wang et al., 2014; Zhu et al., 2013; Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin, He,
Chen, Li, Moyzis, et al., 2010). Thus, it is possible that part of the observed LPC
differences between control and misinformation items may be due to participants being
exposed to control items twice (once in the event and once in the narrative) but only
being exposed to the misinformation items once (in the narrative). Building on these
findings by contrasting the memory signature of consistent versus pure control (i.e., test
items consistent with the event and mentioned neutrally in the narrative) items would
represent an important contribution to the field given the largely interchangeable use of
these types of control items in the literature.
Fortunately, this limitation does not directly impact the link between
misinformation endorsement and Word-As-Word LPCs observed in this study. Drawing
on this demonstrated link between verbal processing and misinformation endorsements at
test, the next logical step is to move towards assessing the links between verbal
processing and misinformation as well as event encoding on the misinformation effect
paradigm. The final experiment in this dissertation, Study 4, was developed to achieve
this goal.
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Study 4

5

5.1

Study 4: Introduction
Study 4 examines the relationship between individual differences in

misinformation susceptibility and oscillatory neural activity during the event as well as
narrative encoding stages of the misinformation effect paradigm. In doing so, the present
study aims to achieve Specific Aim 4 (i.e., to investigate potential links between neural
activity associated with event and narrative encoding on the misinformation effect and
misinformation susceptibility). As opposed to a local approach in which responses to
specific items are conditionalized on subsequent behavioral responses (e.g., Study 3), a
global approach is adopted in which encoding activity associated with all the event
images and narrative sentences is analyzed collectively for each subject, based on the
consistency with event items (i.e., consistent vs. inconsistent) independent of subsequent
behavioral responses. The logic of this approach is that individual differences in
processing orientation during encoding which are predictive of misinformation
susceptibility are likely to be present throughout the entire encoding process. Adopting
this approach resolves the issue of low trial numbers present in Study 3 by including all
items in the analytic model, substantially improving the signal-to-noise ratio in all target
categories.
A full discussion of prior neuroimaging work on the misinformation effect is
presented in section 1.6. Of primary relevance, prior work by Okado and Stark (2005)
and Baym and Gonsalves (2010) utilized fMRI to investigate event and misinformation
encoding activity on the misinformation effect paradigm. However, Okado and Stark
(2005) utilized the unorthodox approach of presenting both the event and misinformation
visually making it difficult to link their findings to the standard visual event followed by
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verbal misinformation design. As a result, the primary relevant study in this area comes
from Baym and Gonsalves (2010), who utilized a standard misinformation effect design
in their investigation. The primary result of interest in their findings with regard to the
focus of Study 4 was the observed directionally greater activity in BA45 (left
insula/inferior frontal gyrus), a neural region associated with semantic processing (Keller
et al., 2009; Novick et al., 2009; Oh et al., 2014) and verbal retrieval (Heim et al., 2009),
in false relative to foil memories.
This finding from Baym and Gonsalves (2010)’s work lays the foundation for the
present investigation. A key difference between the current study and Baym and
Gonsalves (2010)’s work is the use of EEG as opposed to fMRI. While fMRI imaging
has many advantages with regard to localization specificity, the method still faces
considerable challenges with regard to temporal resolution. Of particular relevance to this
investigation, the relatively slow and indirect Blood-Oxygen-Level Dependent (BOLD)
contrast imaging fMRI approach utilized in Baym and Gonsalves (2010) does not allow
neural activity to be decomposed into its constituent neural frequencies. The phrase
neural frequencies refer to the presence of voltage oscillations in the ongoing EEG which
are associated with a wide range of cognitive, perceptual, emotional and motor processes
(Cheung et al., 2014; Griffiths et al., 2016; Gulbinaite et al., 2014; Imperatori et al., 2014;
Lansbergen et al., 2011; Vandenbroucke et al., 2015). The most frequently assessed
frequencies are denoted using Greek letters such as the Delta, Theta, Alpha, Beta,
Gamma and Mu frequencies. Most of these frequencies are remarkably quick. Theta, for
instance, a relatively “slow” rhythm in the 4-8 Hz range is still almost an order of
magnitude faster than most fMRI scanning protocols can capture. Given that BOLD

103
fMRI typically records one data-point every 1-2 seconds, fMRI simply cannot decompose
the dynamics of these frequencies.
Shedding light on the dynamics of these neural frequencies is important for
several reasons. Firstly, neural frequencies have the potential to be a common language
for disparate disciplines within the field of neuroscience. These oscillations are studied in
detailed computational models, in vitro single-cell work, implanted electrode
investigations and of course scalp based EEG and magnetoencephalography. There is
even evidence to suggest that fMRI is also primarily driven by perturbations in neural
frequency related activity, albeit indirectly (Engell et al., 2012). Furthermore, through the
use of high-density arrays and cutting edge source localization methods, it is also possible
to estimate the neural generators of these observed rhythms, an approach which has
significant potential to boost the discipline bridging value of frequency based analyses.
The primary target frequency band of interest in this experiment is the theta (4 – 8
Hz) band as increased activity in this range has been consistently associated with
encoding and consolidation related activity (Duzel et al., 2010; Griffiths et al., 2016;
Hanslmayr et al., 2011; Schneider & Rose, 2016; Staudigl & Hanslmayr, 2013), likely
playing a key role in event-context binding (Fell & Axmacher, 2011; Summerfield &
Mangels, 2005). The primary goals of Study 4 with regard to encoding activity are to:
1) Assess links between neural activity during the visual event encoding phase and
individual differences in misinformation susceptibility. In this study,
misinformation susceptibility levels were quantified as the number of
misinformation endorsements given a perceptual source attribution. Participants
were divided into low and high misinformation susceptibility groups using a
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median-split approach as the analytic techniques utilized in this study could not
accommodate continuous variables in the modeling process.
2) Assess links between individual differences in neural activity during the verbal
narrative encoding and individual differences in misinformation susceptibility.
The primary hypotheses for the first goal are that (1) activity in low-level visual or
higher-level visual associated regions will not be associated with misinformation
susceptibility and (2) increased activity in regions associated with semantic and verbal
processing will be significantly related to misinformation susceptibility. The primary
hypothesis for the second goal is that increased activity in regions associated with
semantic and verbal processing in all three statement types (indicative of global
differences in modality processing) will be significantly related to misinformation
susceptibility levels. Drawing on the work of Baym and Gonsalves (2010), the primary
target area of interest with regard to verbal and semantic processing is the left inferior
frontal region. In addition to these two primary goals, a secondary set of hypotheses for
Study 4 is that given the more direct link between misinformation item encoding and
subsequent endorsement, this relationship will be stronger for misinformation items
relative to consistent control items within participants.
With regard to test items, as the use of full item counterbalancing in this study
resulted in too few misinformation endorsements to differentiate responses as a function
of response, neural responses during the retrieval (i.e., test) phase were analyzed in a
global fashion collapsing across response type (i.e. endorsement versus rejection) within
the control and misled item categories. The sole prior investigation of retrieval activity on
the misinformation effect was conducted by Stark et al. (2010) using visually presented
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events and auditorily presented verbal misinformation. Stark et al. (2010) found that
misinformation-based false memories were associated with activity in regions associated
with auditory and language processing (BA22 & 42; see (Buchsbaum et al., 2001; Chan
et al., 2014; Leff et al., 2009; Moseley et al., 2014). In line with these findings, the
primary hypothesis for this phase is that, as per the encoding stage, (1) activity in lowlevel visual or higher-level visual associated regions will not be associated with
misinformation susceptibility and (2) increased activity in regions associated with
semantic and verbal processing will be significantly related to misinformation
susceptibility levels. A secondary test stage focused hypothesis is that given the more
direct link between misinformation item responses and their endorsement, the
relationship between misinformation susceptibility levels and semantic and verbal
processing related neural response towards misinformation items at test will be stronger
relative to the response to consistent control items.

5.2

Methods

5.2.1 Power Analysis
While the bootstrapped driven permutation based analyses for frequency power
analyses preclude precise calculations of projected power (particularly given the yet
untested empirical relationship between trial numbers and the reliability of localized
spectral activity related analyses), significance thresholds estimated from my prior work
utilizing this technique with significantly fewer trials (Kiat et al., 2018) suggests the
target sample size of 30 participants is large enough to detect relationships > r = 0.50
(post p-value correction), between oscillatory activity target voxels and misinformation
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susceptibility levels, considerably larger than the effect sizes typically noted in use of
localized cross-spectrum analyses (Imperatori et al., 2015; Imperatori et al., 2013;
Meltzer et al., 2009; Shao et al., 2012; Yun et al., 2012). The target sample size of 30 in
this study is also notably larger than the samples used in most published investigations
utilizing analytic techniques similar to those employed in this study (14 participants :
Imperatori et al., 2013; 16 participants : Meltzer et al., 2009; 20 participants : Yun et al.,
2012).

5.2.2 Participants
Thirty participants (17 female, 29 right-handed, mean age=19.70, SD =2.18,
range 17-28) participated in this study. All participants were recruited from the UNL
Psychology Department subject pool via an online research participation platform
(SONA). The University’s IRB approved all procedures with participants providing
informed consent and receiving 2.0 hours of research credit for their participation. Four
participants were subsequently removed from the analysis due to excessive EEG artifacts,
leaving a final sample of 26 participants. Two of these participants had hairstyles which
prevented the EEG electrodes from maintaining good contact, despite the use of hairnets.
Two of these participants had dry eye issues which led to excessive levels of ocular and
EMG related artifacts.

5.2.3 Materials
Encoding Focused Misinformation EEG task: A modified version of the EEG-suitable
misinformation effect task used in Study 3 was employed in this investigation. As in

107
Study 3, a total of four events were presented with participants being explicitly told that
their memory for these events would be tested at a later point in the study. Each event
was first presented in 50 event slides followed by 50 narrative slides. Each narrative slide
contained one sentence with only one critical item per sentence. A total of 12 critical
details were selected from each event, 6 of which were assigned to the control condition
and 6 to the misled condition for a total of 24 control and 24 misled items. Participants
were tested on all 24 control and 24 misled items at test.
Instead of the partial counterbalancing procedure used in Study 3, the full
counterbalancing procedure used in Study 2 was utilized with consistent controls. This
counterbalancing strategy proceeded as follows. Two different event versions of each
event were used (i.e., version A and version B). Across these two versions, critical event
details from 12 slides were different. Half of those details were randomly assigned to
group X whereas the other half were assigned to group Y. Item groups X and Y were
assigned to either the control or misinformation conditions creating four combination
conditions for each presented scenario. Table 32 presents the procedure for a single
scenario. Items assigned to the misinformed condition in each combination (i.e., Set 1A)
were described inaccurately in the narrative in a manner matching how they were
presented in the other event version (e.g., version 1B) whereas control items were
described in a manner consistent in the narrative (consistent control).
The same counterbalancing structure utilized in Study 2 was utilized in Study 4,
reproduced here for convenient reference. In this approach, version A presented a man
breaking into a car with a hanger and finding cocaine whereas version B presented a man
breaking into a car with a credit card and finding marijuana. The object used to break into
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the car and what was found were then assigned to item group X and Y respectively. In
example, Set 1A would present the man breaking into a car with a hanger and finding
cocaine with the narrative reading “He used a credit card to open the car door” and “He
pulled out a bag of drugs”; Set 2A would present the man breaking into a car with a
hanger and finding cocaine with the narrative “He used a tool to open the car door” and
“He pulled out a bag of marijuana.”; Set 1B would present a man breaking into a car
with a card and finding marijuana with the narrative reading ““He used a hanger to
open the car door” and “He pulled out a bag of drugs”; Set 2B would present a man
breaking into a car with a card and finding marijuana with the narrative reading He
used a tool to open the car door” and “He pulled out a bag of cocaine”.

Table 32: Study 4 Counterbalancing Strategy
Event Version

Misinformed Items

Consistent Control

Viewed

Items

Set 1A

A

Group X

Group Y

Set 2A

A

Group Y

Group X

Set 1B

B

Group X

Group Y

Set 2B

B

Group Y

Group X

Another modification to the study phase, implemented to ensure a sufficiently
long baseline period for effective frequency related analysis, was the extensions of the
interstimulus interval to 1000 ms from the original 500 ms time-window.
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Auditory Oddball Paradigm: This task was utilized as a filler task to ensure a reasonable
retention interval between the misinformation narrative study and testing phases. In this
task, participants were presented with 1000 Hz (frequent) and 2000 Hz (infrequent) 350
ms tones with a 1000 – 1500 ms pseudo-randomly varied interstimulus interval. All tones
were presented at 60 dB SPL as measured at the subject’s ear. 40 frequent and 320
infrequent trials (20:80 frequent: infrequent presentation ratio) will be presented.
Participants were asked to silently count the number of infrequent responses (Debener et
al., 2005) to minimize the influence of non-detection related muscle responses. The
results of this task were not linked with the misinformation analyses.
DRM Association Response Task: This task was utilized as a filler task to ensure a
reasonable retention interval between the misinformation event and narrative study
phases. In this task, participants were presented with 72 five-item DRM drawn from the
norms of Stadler et al. (1999). The presentation of each list will begin with a central
fixation (+) presented for 1000 ms followed by a blank screen for 1000 ms; five
associates presented one at a time for 1000 ms each with a 1000 ms blank screen interval
between associates. In 36 of the lists, the strongest associate (i.e., what would usually
have been the critical lure in the list) will be presented as the 2nd word whereas, in the
remaining 36, the associate will be presented as the 5th word in the list. The results of this
task will not be linked with the analyses in this dissertation.
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5.3

Procedure

5.3.1 Experiment Procedure
All participants were tested individually. In each test session, the participant was
first briefed on the purpose of the experiment and verbally guided through the informed
consent form. Upon providing informed consent, participants completed a brief
demographics measure after which the electrode net was applied to the participant’s head
and adjusted to ensure proper placement and sufficiently low impedances (< 45 ohms).
After the adjustment process, 3 minutes of open-eye resting state data were collected (3
minutes). Participants then completed the misinformation event study phase (10 minutes)
followed by an auditory oddball filler task (10 minutes). Upon completion of this task,
net impedances were inspected and adjusted as needed (5-10 minutes). Participants then
completed the misinformation narrative study phase (10 minutes). After reading through
all narratives, participants completed the DRM filler task (10 minutes). This task was
then followed by a final impedance adjustment (5-10 minutes) and the misinformation
paradigm test (20 minutes). The entire session took a maximum of 2 hours to complete.

5.3.2 Electrophysiological Recording
EEG data was recorded using a 256 high-density AgCl electrode Hydrocel
Geodesic Sensor Net connected to a NetAmps 300 amplifier on Netstation version 4.4.2
(Electro Geodesics, Inc., Eugene, OR). Electrode impedances were below 45 kΩ, a level
appropriate for the high impedance system. Impedences were inspected and adjusted in
between each presented task. Incoming data was analogue filtered from 0.1-100 Hz and
digitized at 1000 Hz.
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5.3.3 EEG Preprocessing
EEG data were analyzed using custom MATLAB scripts and the EEGLAB
toolbox (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). First, the continuous EEG was digitally filtered
using a 0.1–30 Hz Hamming windowed-sinc finite impulse response zero-phase filter
with cutoff frequencies at .05 Hz and 30.05 Hz attenuated at -6 dB. The continuous
filtered data was then downsampled to 250 Hz and cleaned using the following
procedure. First flat line (duration threshold = 5 seconds) and noisy (line noise relative to
signal > 4 standard deviations above the total channel population) channels as well as
channels with poor correlations with their neighbors (r < 0.85) were removed. Noisy
segments were then cleaned using the Artifact Subspace Reconstruction adaptive based
spatial filtering approach (Kothe & Makeig, 2013; Mullen et al., 2015). The ASR filter
operates by first identifying and applying Principal Component Analysis based
decomposition to clean portions of data and then identifying segments of the data with
signal components that deviate significantly (> 5 standard deviations) from the
calibration data. These bad segments are then corrected using the mixing matrix
computed from the clean data segment. After this procedure was completed, the initially
removed channels were spherically interpolated via whole head spline interpolation in
EEGlab. The preprocessed data was then submitted to an extended infomax ICA (Bell &
Sejnowski, 1995; Lee et al., 1999) using the runica function (Makeig et al., 1996) from
the EEGlab toolbox with each subject being processed individually. Given that estimating
a number of components equal to the number of recording channels (256) would be both
computationally prohibitive and empirically questionable, the dimensionality of the data
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was first reduced to 128 components via PCA before being submitted to the ICA
procedure.
The goal of the application of ICA is to derive independent sources from highly
correlated data (in this case, ongoing EEG) statistically using a source blind approach
(i.e., an approach that disregards spatial locations and source generator configurations).
This goal is accomplished by estimating a matrix (i.e., the “unmixing” matrix/vector) that
when applied to the data vector linearly transform the vector into a set of independent
(i.e., zero mutual information) elements (i.e., components). This effectively assumed that
the EEG data V (a channels by t time matrix) is composed of a set of independent
components M (a components k by time t matrix) such that M = W-1V where W-1 is a
matrix consisting of k by c weights (the unmixing matrix).
This method differs from decorrelation based procedures such as principal
components analysis (PCA) which instead strive to ensure the cross-products (i.e.,
correlation) between components is zero. PCA does not perform as well with regard to
extracting non-orthogonal spatially overlapping sources (Delorme & Makeig, 2004; Dien,
2010b; Dien et al., 2007; Richards, 2004), characteristic of the scalp level EEG signal.
Furthermore, as the PCA approach strives to maximize the amount of variance each
successively extracted component accounts for that is uncorrelated with previously
determined components, the method often summates activity from multiple independent
sources making it less suitable for isolating maximally independent sources (Delorme &
Makeig, 2004).
The ICA approach is suited for performing source separation in domains in which
sources are independent, sum linearly at the scalp with minimal propagation delays, and
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that the number of independent signals does not exceed the number of sensors (Delorme
et al., 2007; Makeig et al., 1996). These assumptions are considered hold true for EEG
derived data (Delorme et al., 2007; Makeig et al., 1996).
The rationale behind utilizing ICA to “un-mix” the EEG signal draws on research
showing that, in line with theoretical models of the generation of EEG components, the
behavior of ICA identified temporally independent sources are significantly more bipolar
(i.e., dipole-like) than the raw EEG signal (Delorme et al., 2012). This step is important
as virtually all EEG source localization procedures rely on estimating a number of
equivalent current dipoles (or estimating activity across multiple dipole moments in gray
matter voxel space (Pascual-Marqui, 2002)) whose summed projections to the scalp best
reproduces observed scalp-level activity (Cohen, 2017). Unmixing the signal at the scalp
level is thus both theoretically in line with the generation model of EEG and empirically
in line with the projection model underlying dipole based source localization procedures.
Drawing on this empirical background, after the EEG data was preprocessed and
decomposed using ICA, the equivalent current dipole model for each derived ICA
component was computed using a non-custom realistically shaped boundary element
model (BEM) in the DIPFIT toolbox. This procedure was applied to each participant
individually using an average reference montage. The use of realistically shaped BEMs
has been shown to significantly improve the accuracy of EEG source localization relative
to less realistic sphere based procedures (Vanrumste et al., 2001; Vanrumste et al., 2002;
Vatta et al., 2010).
The data was then segmented to the onset of each event image or sentence
presentation, beginning 1000 ms before onset and continuous for 3500 ms thereafter.
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Epochs with abnormal spectral profiles (>50 or < -50 dB threshold across the 1-30 Hz
band) were then identified and rejected using EEGlab’s spectra rejection functions.
Finally, the retained events were classified based on their trial type (control event,
misinformation event, noncritical event).
This procedure was applied to both the visual and narrative event data. With
regard to the visual event data, each participant retained an average of 162.96 visual
event study trials (SD = 5.10, Range = 152-169) comprised of 20.54 control event (SD =
1.86, Range = 15-23), 20.19 misinformation event (SD. = 2.17, Range = 15-125) and 122
noncritical event trials (SD = 5.28, Range = 111-129). With regard to the narrative data,
each participant retained an average of 165.00 narrative sentence study trials (SD = 5.37,
Range = 155-175) comprised of 20.08 control sentences (SD = 1.60, Range = 16-23),
19.96 misinformation sentences (SD. = 2.05, Range = 17-24) and 124.96 noncritical
sentence trials (SD = 5.39, Range = 114-135). Finally, with regard to the test stage, each
participant retained an average of 22.07 control (SD = 1.21, Range = 19-24) and 22.18
misinformation (SD. = 1.70, Range = 15-24) target item responses.

5.3.4 Analytic Strategy
Combining information from multiple participants and conditions, each associated
with their own set of source processes and scalp projections, across complex EEG
measures in source space presents considerable challenges. Contrasting 3D source
locations and dynamics as opposed to equating scalp channel locations across participants
(a potentially problematic approach in itself) is an analytic approach that has only
recently begun to be applied to EEG related data.
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One of the more well-known methods in this area is standardized low-resolution
brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) (Pascual-Marqui, 2002). The
sLORETA approach standardizes the current density estimates given by the minimum
norm inverse solution first developed by Hämäläinen and Ilmoniemi (1994). The
sLORETA approach divides the brain space into a fixed number of voxels, each of
which possesses a set of dipole moments which are estimated by the technique
(Pascual-Marqui, 2002). Given the fixed number of voxels, source current dipole
moments can then be compared across conditions via estimating significance
thresholds via statistical nonparametric mapping based non-parametric permutation
tests (Patihis et al., 2013).
The sLORETA approach is powerful and is widely used. Indeed, the original
analytic strategy of this study was to decompose scalp-recorded oscillatory activity
during encoding trials and localize that activity into frequency bands using
standardized low-resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) The
Talairach coordinates of the electrode positions of the EGI Hydrocel system would be
used to compute the sLORETA transformation matrix used to estimate the current
density of underlying cortical generators.
Despite the widespread use of sLORETA, there are some limitations involving
the use of the technique. One of the most pressing limitations is the current restrictions
with regard to the application of baseline activity normalization methods in frequency
space with the sLORETA method. In the context of EEG frequency-based analyses,
baseline normalization refers to the use of procedures which recharacterize event-
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related changes in power as deviations with respect to a particular baseline as opposed
to their original unnormalized form.
Baseline subtraction is highly recommend for frequency based EEG analysis
given that (1) the distribution of EEG time-frequency power data follows a 1/f power
law function which makes it difficult to make quantitative comparisons of power
across frequency bands, (2) individual and session specific differences make it difficult
to aggregate effects across participants, and (3) task-related changes in power can
otherwise be difficult to disentangle from background activity. While the sLORETA
approach allows for baseline activity subtraction via subtracting the total band
frequency power data from the data, thereby resolving some of these issues, it cannot
currently implement time-window baseline based correction. This limitation raises a
key interpretive issue.
Without time-window based baseline normalization, it is impossible to
determine if observed differences in spectral activity are driven by inherent differences
between participants or task-related. For example, assume that participants with
inherently higher levels of frontal alpha activity also happen to be less susceptible to
false memories but that higher frontal alpha on a specific task response had no impact
on task performance. Without correcting for inherent individual differences via
normalization, one can easily be led into interpreting higher levels of task-related
alpha as being reflective of the engagement of memory-related neural processes.
The solution to this issue is to apply pretrial based baseline normalization to the
trial level data in which time-frequency activity in a pretrial baseline is effectively
used to establish a baseline to which critical trial related activity can be contrasted
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with. Among several analytic advantages such as the converting power results into a
common interpretable metric (i.e., change in power relative to baseline), time-window
baseline normalization transforms power data across multiple frequencies to the same
scale and disentangles time-frequency related dynamics from subject-specific factors.
Returning to the earlier frontal alpha – false memory example, applying pretrial
baseline normalization to the trial level data ensures that the trial related changes in
neural frequency power represent changes beyond a participant’s baseline state.
To implement this procedure while still assessing individual differences in EEG
frequency activity in source space, the Measure Project Analysis (MPA) method was
utilized. The MPA technique is an elegant general approach for estimating and
statistically contrasting source-resolved EEG measures recently developed by BigdelyShamlo et al. (2013). The MPA method resolves the problem of comparing EEG
source localization and dynamics across participants and conditions in source space by
adopting a novel probabilistic approach. Following the decomposition of the EEG data
via ICA into independent components to which source equivalent dipoles were
estimated (see section), the EEG measure of interest in all derived components are
probabilistically represented within a cubic dipole source grid with 8-mm spacing
(3908 vertices) in MNI space. This projection process is accomplished by representing
each dipole in that space as a 3D Gaussian distribution centered at the estimated dipole
location with a standard error of 12 mm extending outwards for three standard
deviations. This projected representation of the component is referred to as the
“projected measure”. The local convergence (i.e., similarity matrix) between the
projected measure vectors is then calculated with a significance threshold for
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convergence values obtained via permutation of the similarity matrix which removes
the correspondence between each IC and its associated measure, representing the null
hypothesis of no stable association between region and measure. Finally, voxels with
significant convergence values are clustered into domains using a threshold-based
affinity propagation clustering method (Frey & Dueck, 2007) which, using the matrix
of pairwise correlations between projected measure values at each voxel, iteratively
determines an appropriate number of domain clusters.
The MPA procedure was applied to both the visual event study, narrative study
and test response datasets. The projected measure of interest was the frequency power
of the projected components within the event and narrative study time-windows (3500
ms). Frequency power was estimated using a Fast-Fourier transform (Cooley & Tukey,
1965) spectral decomposition focused on the 1 – 20 Hz range with a 1000 ms prestimulus baseline. A time-frequency based decomposition approach was not utilized
given significant variation in sentence length and the position of the critical item
within them. Activity in higher frequencies was not assessed as to reduce
contamination from electromyographic activity induced by the free-viewing conditions
of the task. A group-wise p < .0125 threshold corrected using False Discovery Rate
(FDR) testing which gave a raw voxel significance threshold of p < .0045 (event) and
p < .001 (text) for the visual event and narrative datasets respectively.
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5.4

Results

5.4.1 Misinformation Effect Behavioral Data
Test performance is presented in Tables 33 through 36. Tables 33 and 34 show
the breakdown of control items as a function of endorsement versus rejection and
subsequent source judgment. Tables 35 and 36 present the same breakdown for
misinformed items. “Seen” and “Seen & Read” responses (i.e., perceptual attributions),
was the critical response category focused on in subsequent analyses.

Table 33: Study 4 Event Item Response Frequencies and Standard Deviations
Condition

Seen

Seen &

Perceptual

Read

Attribution

Read

Guess

Endorsement

2.60 (3.68)

12.27 (5.32)

14.87 (2.60)

3.17 (2.18)

1.43 (1.48)

Rejection

1.50 (1.80)

1.00 (1.02)

2.50 (1.74)

.73 (.83)

1.30 (1.34)

Table 34: Study 4 Event Item Response Proportions and Standard Deviations
Condition

Seen

Seen &

Perceptual

Read

Attribution

Read

Guess

Endorsement

.11 (.15)

.51 (.18)

.62 (.11)

.13 (.09)

.06 (.06)

Rejection

.06 (.07)

.04 (.04)

.10 (.07)

.03 (.03)

.05 (.06)
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Table 35: Study 4 Misled Item Response Frequencies and Standard Deviations
Condition

Seen

Seen &

Perceptual

Read

Attribution

Read

Guess

Endorsement

5.93 (4.75)

2.17 (2.03)

8.10 (3.80)

.87 (1.36)

1.30 (1.29)

Rejection

1.60 (2.13)

4.77 (3.51)

6.37 (3.47)

5.93 (3.37)

1.43 (1.17)

Table 36: Study 4 Misled Item Response Proportions and Standard Deviations
Condition

Seen

Seen &

Perceptual

Read

Attribution

Read

Guess

Endorsement

.25 (.20)

.09 (.08)

.34 (.16)

.04 (.06)

.05 (.05)

Rejection

.07 (.09)

.20 (.14)

.27 (.15)

.25 (.14)

.06 (.05)

Pairwise t-tests indicated that participants made more control endorsements than
misinformation endorsements with perceptual attributions (MD = 6.77, SD = 3.85, t(29)
= 9.63, p < .001) and more perceptual misinformation endorsements than perceptual
control rejections (MD = 5.60, SD = 3.88, t(29) = 7.90, p < .001) with the difference
between perceptual based misinformation rejections and misinformation endorsements
being not statistically different from zero (MD = 1.73, SD = 6.01, t(29) = 1.581, p
= .125). Intercorrelations between the primary variables of interest are presented in table
37. The full correlation matrix for all responses is presented in Appendix F. Note that, as
in Study 1, correlations within the misinformation and control item groups are not
completely independent as an endorsed control or misinformation item cannot also be
rejected.
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To form low and high misinformation susceptibility groups for subsequent
analyses, participants were divided into two groups using a median split approach (x̃ = 9)
on the obtained perceptual misled item endorsement scores. This division was
implemented as the methods utilized in this study, in line with many advanced EEG
procedures, could not accommodate continuous variables in the modeling process.

Table 37: Study 4 Correlations Misinformation Test Responses
Perceptual Misled

Perceptual Misled

Item Endorsements

Item Rejections

Perceptual Event Item Endorsements

.32

.17

Perceptual Misled Item Endorsements

-

-.36

5.4.2 Measure Projection Analysis Results: Event Study Phase
Given the free-viewing conditions of the event study phase in which participants
were allowed to blink and move their eyes, prior to analysis the possibility of a noise
confound between misinformation and control conditions was first assessed. If present,
this would indicate a differential level of artifacts between conditions which could
potentially drive apparent differences in derived frequency activity between them. This
possibility was assessed using a procedure first proposed by Schimmel (1967) in which
the polarity of every other trial was first inverted. Inverted and un-inverted trials were
then re-averaged so that consistent ERP signals canceled out, leaving a noise estimate of
overall noise levels (quantified via the average absolute voltage value left post-averaging)
assuming an equivalent number of inputted trials. The results of this analysis showed that
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there were no significant differences in noise between control and misinformation event
items, t(1,25) = .96, p = .364. Furthermore, differences in noise levels between control
and misinformation event was not significantly related to individual differences in
subsequent levels of misinformation (all p’s > .13) or control item endorsement levels (all
p’s > .44).
Figure 10 shows the frequency profile and significant voxels for the measureconsistent IC domains for projected EEG frequency activity during the event study phase
(p < .0045; group-wise p < .0125 under FDR). These results indicate the engagement
1) A posterior brain domain which localized to the posterior cingulate cortex
(BA31, BA30) and secondary as well as associative visual cortex (BA18,
BA19)
2) A central domain which localized to the posterior medial cortex and posterior
cingulate cortex [BA31, BA23] and precuneus [BA7])
3) A bilateral frontal domain localized in prefrontal (BA10, BA46, BA9) and
dorsal anterior cingulate (BA32) regions.
The statistical significance of observed frequency differences between slide
responses as a function of individual differences in misinformation susceptibility was
assessed using permutation-based t-test comparison corrected for multiple comparisons
using False Discovery Rate with an alpha of .05. The toolboxes utilized to conduct
these analyses currently do not provide specific inferential statistics for specific
observations but instead provide significant thresholds which are used to assess the
“significance level” of those values. Utilizing this analytic approach, none of these
domains showed significant differences in engagement between slides containing
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details that were assigned to the control condition versus slides with details that were
assigned to the misinformation condition.

Figure 10: Event-related Measure Projection Analysis results. (A) Brain domains
revealed by MPA analysis of EEG frequency activity during the event study phase. (B-D)
Plots of grand average power spectral densities by event slide type within (B) Domain 1
(C) Domain 2 (D) Domain 3.

As shown in Figure 11, significant differences in activity were observed in
domain 3 as a function of individual differences in misinformation susceptibility across
several frequency domains for all slide types. Specifically, significantly higher levels of
theta and alpha activity (specific frequency values highlighted in gray in Figures 11C-D),
extending to the low beta range was noted in this domain for all slide types among

124
participants with higher levels of misinformation susceptibility (defined in this study as
making a number of perceptual misinformation endorsements above the sample
median of x̃ = 9). None of the other domains showed significant differences as a function
of participant type in any of the misinformation task response conditions.

Figure 11: Measure Projection Analysis results for event domain 3. (A) Significance
contrasts between participants with low versus high susceptibility to misinformation in
the MPA derived event domain 3 (BA10, BA46, BA9, and BA32). (B-C) Plots of grand
average power spectral densities by misinformation susceptibility levels for (B)
misinformation and (C) control and (D) non-critical event slides.
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5.4.3 Measure Projection Analysis Results: Narrative Study Phase
As was done for the event study response, the possibility of a noise confound
between neural responses during the narrative study phase was first assessed prior to
conducting the MPA procedure. The results of this analysis showed that there were no
significant differences in noise levels between the control and misinformation sentence
study trials, t(1,25) = .93, p = .364. Furthermore, differences in noise levels between
control and misinformation sentence study trials was not significantly related to
individual differences in subsequent levels of misinformation (all p’s > .24) or control
item endorsement levels (all p’s > .34).
Figure 12 shows the frequency profile and significant voxels for the measureconsistent IC domains for projected EEG frequency activity during the narrative study
phase (p < .001; group-wise p < .025 under FDR). These results indicate the
engagement of:
1) A posterior brain domain which localized to the posterior cingulate cortex
(BA31, BA30) and secondary visual cortex (BA18)
2) A left frontal domain which localized to the left anterior prefrontal (BA10),
orbitofrontal (BA11), dorsolateral prefrontal (BA46) and inferior frontal
(BA47) regions.
None of these domains showed significant differences in activity between
slides containing details that were consistent with the control condition versus slides
with details that were consistent with the misinformation condition.
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Figure 12: Narrative related Measure Projection Analysis results. (A) Brain domains
revealed by MPA analysis of EEG frequency activity during the narrative study phase.
(B-C) Plots of grand average power spectral densities by event slide type within (B)
Domain 1 and (C) Domain 2.
As shown in Figure 13, significant differences in activity were observed in
domain 2as a function of individual differences in misinformation susceptibility across
several frequency domains for all slide types. Specifically, significantly higher levels of
theta activity registered during the processing of misinformation containing slides among
participants who subsequently expressed higher levels of misinformation susceptibility.
Participants with higher misinformation susceptibility levels also showed significantly
higher levels of low Beta level activity in this domain during the processing of non-
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critical slides. This effect was also directionally present in the other conditions but did
not achieve significance. None of the other domains showed significant differences as a
function of participant type in any of the misinformation task response conditions.

Figure 13: Measure Projection Analysis results for narrative domain 2. (A) Significance
contrasts between participants with low versus high susceptibility to misinformation in
the MPA derived narrative domain 2 (BA31, BA23, and BA7). (B-C) Plots of grand
average power spectral densities by misinformation susceptibility levels for (B)
misinformation and (C) control and (D) non-critical event slides.
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5.4.4 Measure Projection Analysis Results: Test Phase
As was done for the event study response, the possibility of a noise confound
between neural responses during the narrative study phase was first assessed prior to
conducting the MPA procedure. The results of this analysis showed that there were no
significant differences in noise between control and misinformation event items, t(1,25)
= .69, p = .497. Furthermore, differences in noise levels between control and
misinformation event was not significantly related to individual differences in subsequent
levels of misinformation (all p’s > .35) or control item endorsement levels (all p’s > .65).
Figure 14 shows the frequency profile and significant voxels for the measureconsistent IC domains for projected EEG frequency activity during the test phase (p
< .0015; group-wise p < .0125 under FDR). These results indicate the engagement of a
1) A posterior brain domain which localized to the posterior cingulate cortex
(BA31, BA30, BA23).
2) A left lateralized central region which localized to anterior (BA24) and
posterior cingulate cortex (BA23, BA31).
3) A left frontal domain which localized to the left anterior prefrontal (BA10),
orbitofrontal (BA11), and inferior frontal (BA47) regions.
4) A right lateralized temporal domain which localized to superior (BA22), middle
(BA21), and anterior transverse temporal (BA41, BA42) gyri.
None of these domains exhibited significant differences in engagement between
control test items versus misinformation-based test items across the full study sample.
Furthermore, none of these domains showed significant differences in engagement as a
function of individual differences in misinformation susceptibility for the processing
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of either control or misinformation test items. Note that these analyses collapse
endorsement and rejection responses and thus do not provide information regarding
differences between control endorsement and misinformation rejection responses.

Figure 14: Measure Projection Analysis results. (A) Brain domains revealed by MPA
analysis of EEG frequency activity during the test phase. (B-E) Plots of grand average
power spectral densities by event slide type within (B) Domain 1 (C) Domain 2 (D)
Domain 3, (E) Domain 4.
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5.5

Study 4: Discussion
In line with Specific Aim 4 (i.e., the investigation of potential links between

neural activity associated with event and narrative encoding on the misinformation effect
and misinformation susceptibility), Study 4 4 assessed links between individual
differences in oscillatory neural activity during the event and narrative encoding stages
with regard to misinformation effect susceptibility. Drawing on the findings of Study 1,
Study 2, Study 3 and prior work by Baym and Gonsalves (2010), the primary hypotheses
of Study 4 were that (1) misinformation susceptibility would not be associated with
increased activity in low-level visual or higher-level visual associated regions and (2)
misinformation susceptibility would be associated with increased activity in regions
associated with semantic processing and verbal retrieval. The primary frequency of
interest in all hypotheses was activity in the theta range. The same hypotheses were
proposed to apply to the event, narrative and test stages of the misinformation effect.
The secondary hypotheses of this study was that the relationship between
misinformation susceptibility and activation in regions associated with semantic
processing as well verbal retrieval would be stronger for misinformation items relative to
control items. Again, the same hypotheses were proposed to apply to the event, narrative
and test stages of the misinformation effect paradigm.

5.5.1 Study 4 Event and Narrative Phase Results
To assess the level of support for these hypotheses with regard to the study
phases, the general domain results (i.e., MPA results excluding the role of misinformation
susceptibility) will first be discussed. The findings highlight neural frequency domains
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which show coherent patterns of activity during encoding on the misinformation effects
across all participants and trial types. Tentatively, these results indicate that these
domains play a role in encoding episodic information presented in a visual and verbal
form.
In both study phases, significant activity was noted in a posterior domain which
localized to regions in the posterior cingulate and secondary visual cortex. The posterior
cingulate is often implicated in episodic memory formation (Huijbers et al., 2012; Kim et
al., 2010; Lega et al., 2017; Papma et al., 2017) and some aspects of source memory
(Uncapher et al., 2006). Most likely activity in this region was associated with general
attention-related processes during encoding (Cabeza et al., 2008), an observation which
would be in line with recent work linking misinformation susceptibility with individual
differences in attentional processing (Kiat, 2018). This interpretation gains additional
support from the observation that activity in this area was higher related to activity in the
secondary visual cortex, a region associated with the encoding of both words (Ragland et
al., 2004) and pictures (Menard et al., 1996)
During visual encoding, coherent frequency activity was also noted in a domain
which localized to the precuneus. This point is interesting in the context of this
dissertation as activity in the precuneus is often linked with mental imagery (Fletcher et
al., 1995; Zhang & Li, 2012). Of particular relevance, activity in the precuneus during
encoding of words has repeatedly been shown to be significantly associated with the
likelihood of those words being subsequently misattributed to a visual source (Gonsalves
et al., 2004; Stephan-Otto et al., 2017). Collectively, this body of research suggests that
precuneus was playing some role associated with imagery focused encoding of the
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presented event. Notably, this domain did not present itself as a significant source of
coherent activity during the verbal narrative study phase.
In the visual encoding phase, coherent activity was noted in a bilateral frontal
domain encompassing prefrontal and dorsal anterior cingulate regions during visual
encoding. Activity in prefrontal regions has long been associated with source monitoring
related processes during both the encoding and retrieval phases (Mitchell & Johnson,
2009; Ranganath et al., 2000). While still an active area of research, there is considerable
support for the view that activity in these regions plays a key role in implemental topdown control processes associated with selectively enhancing the representation of goalrelevant information for subsequent transfer to long-term memory (Blumenfeld &
Ranganath, 2007; Simons & Spiers, 2003). Prior work by Okado & Stark (2005) has also
linked activity in left-lateralized medial frontal regions during event encoding on the
misinformation effect with both true and false memory endorsement levels, speculatively
suggesting that memories with a stronger semantic/verbal base may be more vulnerable
to subsequent distortion. Nonetheless, given the myriad of functions the prefrontal region
subserves, it is impossible to definitively isolate the specific factors driving this observed
activity.
Similar activity was also noted in a left-lateralized domain encompassing anterior
prefrontal, inferior frontal and orbitofrontal regions during verbal encoding. In line with
the observed coherent activity during the event study phase (Blumenfeld & Ranganath,
2007; Simons & Spiers, 2003), it is likely that this activity was associated with similar
top-down control related processes linked with encoding the presented information. In
contrast to the visual encoding stage, however, this domain was left lateralized during the
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verbal encoding phase. This observation is interesting as activity in the left ventromedial
prefrontal cortex has been shown to be selectively associated with the encoding of verbal
semantic stimuli, with activity in the right ventromedial prefrontal cortex being
associated with visual encoding (Prendergast et al., 2013). While admittedly highly
speculative, this notion suggests that encoding during the narrative study phase was
primarily verbal while the visual study phase (which exhibited a bilateral profile) may
have been exemplified by a combination of verbal and visual encoding processes. It is
also intriguing to note that activity in the left prefrontal region has been associated
specifically with increased levels of associative verbal encoding (Kim, 2011; Kirwan et
al., 2008), supporting the idea that the observed activity may be associated with
elaborative verbal processing.
Moving next to discuss the role of individual and trial type conditions on the
abovementioned general patterns of activation, it is in these frontal domains that we see
significant differences between individuals as a function of misinformation susceptibility.
During visual encoding, increased levels of activity in the theta and alpha range were
noted in this domain among individuals who subsequently exhibited higher levels of
misinformation susceptibility. Prefrontal theta activity is frequently proposed to play an
important role in supporting memory integration via bidirectional interactions with
medial temporal lobe regions (Anderson et al., 2010; Backus, Schoffelen, Szebenyi, et
al., 2016; Nyhus & Curran, 2010), with some researchers proposing the activity to reflect
the integration of prior knowledge in new memory formation (Backus, Schoffelen,
Szebényi, et al., 2016); which is intriguing given work involving the role of narrative
construction in the misinformation effect.
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The role of the observed increased alpha and low beta activity in this domain in
individuals with higher levels of misinformation susceptibility during visual encoding is,
however, less clear, particularly given the absence of hypotheses involving activity in this
range. Speculatively, relative increases in alpha activity is often associated with reduced
attention (Babiloni et al., 2004; Dockree et al., 2004; Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva,
1999) and reduced inhibition of task-irrelevant information (Chen & Huang, 2015) while
higher levels of beta activity has been linked with increased memory load levels (Chen &
Huang, 2015; Deiber et al., 2007). Given these links, it is possible that the combined
increase in activity in the alpha and beta range reflects increased encoding difficulty
among individuals with higher levels of misinformation susceptibility driven by less
efficient working memory-related processes. This account would be in line with research
linking misinformation susceptibility with reduced working memory capacity (Bi et al.,
2010; Jaschinski & Wentura, 2002). This hypothesis is however speculative and requires
significant levels of additional work before it can be seriously considered.
During the narrative encoding phase, significantly higher levels of theta activity
for misinformation responses as well as increased beta activity for true responses was
noted in a left-lateralized frontal domain as a function of heightened misinformation
susceptibility. As discussed earlier, increased frontal theta activity is associated with
memory integration related processes (Anderson et al., 2010; Backus, Schoffelen,
Szebenyi, et al., 2016; Nyhus & Curran, 2010) and the integration of prior knowledge in
new memory formation (Backus, Schoffelen, Szebényi, et al., 2016). Collectively this
body of work suggests that individuals with higher levels of misinformation susceptibility
display increased levels of encoding-related activity associated with the integration of

135
prior experiences (possibly reflective of narrative construction) during the encoding of
the misinformation related items. Activity in the left prefrontal region has been associated
specifically with increased levels of controlled semantic processes during associative
verbal encoding (Kim, 2011; Kirwan et al., 2008) lending additional support to this
interpretation.
The significant increase in beta activity for noncritical items is less easy to
interpret. Given that this condition has the largest number of trials, it would be
questionable to evaluate this result by contrasting it with its apparent absence in the other
conditions. Speculatively, drawing again on research linking higher levels of beta activity
with working memory load (Chen & Huang, 2015; Deiber et al., 2007), this increased
activity may be reflective of a generally less efficient working memory among
individuals with higher levels of misinformation susceptibility (Bi et al., 2010; Jaschinski
& Wentura, 2002). Again this hypothesis is speculative and requires additional
investigation before being considered seriously.
Overall, these results provide general support for the hypotheses of this study
related to the encoding stages. The hypothesis that activity in low-level visual or higherlevel visual associated regions during event and narrative encoding would not be
associated with misinformation susceptibility was supported, though appropriate
caution on the potential of insufficient power driving this should be noted. While
general activity in visual processing related regions was observed during both the
event and narrative study phases, in line with the visual presentation of materials, this
activity was not significantly predictive of misinformation susceptibility.
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The hypothesis of event and narrative encoding activity in regions (specifically
the left inferior frontal gyrus) associated with semantic and verbal processing being
significantly related to misinformation susceptibility was also supported. Of primary
interest, increased levels of memory integration related activity in left inferior frontal
regions were observed among individuals with heightened levels of misinformation
susceptibility during the encoding of verbally presented misinformation. Increased
activity in frontal regions, including left inferior frontal regions, was also observed
among these misinformation susceptible individuals during visual encoding, though this
activity was more bilaterally distributed.

5.5.2 Study 4: Misinformation Testing Phase Results
To assess the level of support for these hypotheses with regard to the testing
stage, the general domain results (i.e., MPA results excluding the role of misinformation
susceptibility) will first be discussed. The findings highlight neural frequency domains
which show coherent patterns of activity during testing on the misinformation effect
paradigm across all participants and trial types. Tentatively, these results indicate that
these domains play a role in retrieving and evaluating episodic information.
During the testing phase, as in both the event and narrative study phases, coherent
frequency activity noted in posterior domains which localized to the cingulate cortex.
Activity in this region is, consistent with its links to episodic memory formation
(Huijbers et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2010; Lega et al., 2017; Papma et al., 2017), also
frequently implicated in episodic memory retrieval (Düzel et al., 1999; Rugg & Vilberg,
2013) and source recollection (Duarte et al., 2011; Frithsen & Miller, 2014; Hayama et
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al., 2012). For the most part, activity in the posterior cingulate at test is viewed as being
associated with general content-independent recollective processing (Hayama et al.,
2012; Rugg & Vilberg, 2013).
Coherent activity during the testing stage was also noted in a frontal leftlateralized domain with significant overlap with the frontal domain observed during the
narrative study phase. In line with its role in verbal encoding, activity in left frontal
regions is frequently implicated in the retrieval of semantic/verbal retrieval (Düzel et al.,
1999; Incisa della Rocchetta & Milner, 1993; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997) and
processing (Gabrieli et al., 1998). Activity in the left frontal regions is also associated
with general cognitive control mechanisms (Badre & Wagner, 2007b; Hirshorn &
Thompson-Schill, 2006; Kramer et al., 2005) which are also likely to be implicated in
memory retrieval on the misinformation effect.
Finally, coherent activity during testing was also noted in a right-lateralized
temporal domain which localized to superior (BA22), middle (BA21), and anterior
transverse temporal (BA41, BA42) gyri. Activity in right temporal regions has been
previously noted in the context of episodic sentence recognition (Tulving et al., 1994)
and word (Gernsbacher & Kaschak, 2003) and sentence processing in general
(Friederici et al., 2003). The lateralization is however somewhat unexpected as leftlateralized regions are more frequently implicated in this processing domain
(Friederici et al., 2003). One factor which may have driven this shift is this
investigation’s use of a sentence completion style presentation which may have
resulted in sentence generation related processing at test. Prior work by Kircher et al.
(2001) found that right temporal regions are more strongly associated with the
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generation of words to complete sentence stems. Kircher et al. (2001) propose this
shift in the typical left-lateralization of language processing reflects the processing and
resolution of context ambiguity. This notion would be in line with work showing a
right lateralization in language processing associated with complex sentence
processing (Bookheimer, 2002; Bottini et al., 1994; Cooke et al., 2002; Kircher et al.,
2001; Mashal et al., 2005; Rapp et al., 2004; Virtue et al., 2006)
With regard to individual and response condition hypotheses during the testing
phase, only the hypothesis that activity in low-level visual or higher-level visual
associated regions would not be associated with individual differences in
misinformation susceptibility levels was supported though again, appropriate caution
on the potential of insufficient power driving this should be noted. Coherent activity in
visual regions was not noted during this phase across all participants. The hypotheses
of activity in regions associated with semantic and verbal processing being significantly
related to misinformation susceptibility levels during the testing phase, on the other hand,
were not supported. While general activity in domains associated with verbal and
semantic processing was noted in this phase, this activity was not predictive of
subsequent misinformation susceptibility.
These results can be interpreted in several ways. First, given the fact that
endorsement and rejection responses were collapsed due to insufficient critical trials, it
may be that individual differences in misinformation susceptibility are driven by
processes specific to misinformation endorsement related responses. It is also possible
that differences in endorsement and rejection related effects cancel out at the global
level. For instance, merging a perceptual misinformation rejection response (associated
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with the recollection of conflicting memory traces from the event phase) and
perceptual misinformation endorsement response (associated with recollecting memory
traces from the narrative phase), leads to an outcome that is a mixture of both. Given
that misinformation rejections are more frequent; it is perhaps not surprising that
overall misinformation item condition closely resembles the control item one. Finally,
it is also possible that encoding processes play a more important role in driving
individual differences in misinformation susceptibility relative to retrieval processin g.
Additional work that differentiates endorsement and rejection responses is needed,
however, before this hypothesis can be considered seriously.
General Discussion

6

This dissertation presented four studies that investigate links between
visual/verbal source monitoring and false memory susceptibility on the misinformation
effect paradigm.
In Study 1, participants completed the misinformation task paradigm developed
by (Okado & Stark, 2005) and were tested using a true/false memory test. They also
completed a picture-word source monitoring task and several personality inventories (The
CEQ, MC-SDS, and DES). The results of this study showed that individual differences in
misinformation susceptibility were significantly related to individual differences in
susceptibility towards making visual-to-verbal source monitoring errors (i.e., Picture-AsWord) and not significantly related to verbal-to-visual source monitoring ones (i.e.,
Word-As-Picture). These results were also shown to be independent of individual
differences in the inclination towards engaging in imagination/fantasy related activities,
having dissociative experiences and desires for being view in a socially positive manner.
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These findings provided evidence to support the hypothesis of misinformation
endorsements being more closely related to verbalization or narrative driven source
monitoring errors as opposed to visualization based ones.
In Study 2, participants again completed the misinformation paradigm
administered in Study 1 but were tested using a 2AFC memory test this time around.
Participants also completed the same picture-word source monitoring task utilized in
Study 1 as well as several personality inventories (the Creative Experiences
Questionnaire, the Internal/External Encoding Style Questionnaire, and the VisualizerVerbalizer Questionnaire). The findings of Study 2 replicated the results of Study 1. Once
again individual differences in misinformation susceptibility were significantly related to
individual differences in susceptibility towards making visual-to-verbal source
monitoring errors (i.e., Picture-As-Word) and not significantly related to verbal-to-visual
source monitoring ones (i.e., Word-As-Picture). Importantly, these results were shown to
be independent of individual differences in visualization ability and preferences towards
internal versus external sources of encoding related information.
In Study 3, participants again completed the misinformation paradigm and
picture-word task utilized in the prior two studies. This time around, the study and test
phases was separated by a 1-day retrieval interval with EEG data being recorded during
the testing phase of both tasks. The EEG component of interest in this investigation was
the LPC, an ERP component strongly associated with recollective strength. The results of
this study showed a strong and significant link between recollection linked neural activity
associated with misinformation endorsements and recollection activity associated with
verbal memory endorsement on the picture-word source monitoring task
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In Study 4, participants completed the misinformation paradigm while EEG data
were recorded during the study and testing phase. This time around, the design
compromises made to the task in Study 3 were removed to allow for full
counterbalancing control of the materials. While this precluded a retesting of the effects
observed in Study 3 due to signal-to-noise issues posed by insufficient critical trial
numbers, the primary focus of Study 4 was not to replicate those findings but to instead
link individual differences in encoding related neural activity during the event and
narrative study phases with individual differences in misinformation susceptibility.
Drawing on the findings of Studies 1 through 3, the primary hypothesis of Study 4 was
that encoding-related activity in neural regions associated with semantic/verbal
processing would be elevated among individuals with higher levels of misinformation
susceptibility during the event, narrative, and testing phases. The results of Study 4 were
partially in support of this a stronger role in predicting misinformation susceptibility in
such a design.
Collectively, the results of Studies 1 through 4 suggest that individual differences
in the tendency to draw on verbal/semantic processes play an important role in driving
false memory susceptibility in the misinformation effect paradigm. These findings are in
line with research indicating that individual differences in visualization based processing
ability (Cann & Katz, 2005; Desjarlais & Bernstein, 2012; Greening, 2002; Nichols &
Holmes, 2002; Pérez-Mata & Diges, 2007; Tomes & Katz, 1997) and preferences (Tomes
& Katz, 1997; Tousignant, 1984) have a relatively weak relationship to false memory
susceptibility on the misinformation effect. Instead, these results lend weight to research
indicating that verbalization and semantic-based processes have a stronger relationship
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with misinformation effect susceptibility (Baym & Gonsalves, 2010; Lee, 2004; Nori et
al., 2014; Schooler et al., 1986; Tomes & Katz, 1997; Tousignant et al., 1986; Zaragoza
et al., 2011).
These findings are intriguing as, on the surface, they run counter to a longrunning trend in false memory research that considers visualization and mental imagery
to play a key role in false-memory endorsements on the misinformation effect. However,
as discussed extensively in the introduction section of this paper, the evidence in support
of this point is considerably weaker than one would expect with considerably more
evidence in support of the role of verbalization\semantic-based processing.
It is particularly interesting to consider these findings in the context of the source
monitoring framework (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Johnson et al., 1977), coexistence
hypothesis (Belli, 1989; Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay & Johnson, 1987), and theoretical
work linking the SMF and misinformation effect susceptibility (Dodhia & Metcalfe,
1999; Hekkanen & McEvoy, 2002; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989a; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994).
To illustrate this integration, Figure 15 presents a potentially useful model in which to
position these observed findings. Figure 15 shows a simplified diagram of the formation
of true and misinformation based memory traces with memory traces marked by
hexagons and their constituent source feature traces marked in squares, with the size of
each square indicating the hypothetical strength of the enclosed feature. In this
framework, the primary difference between true and misinformation based memory
traces are elevated visual feature strength in true memories as well as elevated semantic
and temporal (due to the relative recency of the narrative information) feature strength in
misinformation memories. In addition to its evident links to the source monitoring
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framework, this model can also be viewed from a memory impairment perspective,
specifically in light of the coexistence hypothesis (Belli, 1989; Johnson et al., 1993;
Lindsay & Johnson, 1987) in which both the original event and misleading information
are proposed to co-exist in memory. From this angle, increased preferences for
verbal\semantic processes would elevate both the initial encoding strength as well as the
likelihood and\or strength of reactivation of verbal\semantic traces during memory
retrieval, reducing the likelihood of those visual traces being activated sufficiently
enough to produce an endorsement response.

Figure 15: A Source Monitoring Derived Framing of the Misinformation Effect

This framing of the misinformation effect paradigm has several interesting
implications. Firstly, in the context of this study, this framework emphasizes why
individual differences in the tendency to attribute verbally presented information to a
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visual source (i.e., picture as word errors) would be associated with the tendency to
attribute verbally presented misinformation to a visually presented event. Specifically,
both responses reflect a similar type of source-monitoring error wherein verbal\semantic
memory traces are misattributed as being evidence of visual study. Secondly, this
framework potentially accounts for why visualization based measures fail to predict
misinformation susceptibility as misinformation memory traces draw primarily on
semantic information without the need to recruit visualization based processes. Drawing
on models proposing a shift towards semantic\gist-related functioning in older adults
(Balota et al., 1999; Tun et al., 1998), this framework also anticipates the generally
higher levels of misinformation susceptibility in older populations (see Wylie et al., 2014
for a review), which thus far has been attributed to general deficits in source monitoring
ability. One prediction of this framework is that the misinformation susceptibility
differences between older and younger adults will be reduced using a modified variant of
the reversed-misinformation design (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989b) in which participants
are presented with a narrative followed by a visual event and tested on their memory of
the narrative, or in the context of designs involving the administration of visual event and
visual misinformation details.
This model also predicts that test instructions promoting the use of visual feature
based criteria at test (e.g. “make sure you can form a firm visual image of the event
detail”) will lead to reduced levels of misinformation susceptibility, which is contrary to
the misinformation-visualization framework which would instead anticipate visualization
effort at recall to be a strong driver of real-world false memory (Lindsay & Read, 1995;
Paddock & Terranova, 2001). This contrary prediction is not without precedence,
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however, as prior work in the context of false childhood memories has shown that active
visualization during memory retrieval can promote true event memories without
enhancing false memory report rates (Qin et al., 2008). In addition to this prediction, the
model in Figure 15 also suggests that test instructions aimed at biasing participants
towards relying on semantic traces (e.g., “make sure you can clearly recall the narrative
surrounding that event detail”) are likely to elevate levels of perceptual misinformation
endorsement.Another hypothesis, which also builds on this framing of the misinformation
effect as a source monitoring paradigm, draws on the link it predicts between
misinformation susceptibility and individual differences in the susceptibility towards
temporal source-monitoring errors (i.e., the tendency to misattribute recently studied
material to an earlier temporal stage). This prediction draws on work showing reduced
levels of dropoff in misinformation based memories relative to true memories over time
(Frost & Weaver, 1997; Thomas et al., 2017) which, in addition to reflecting the relative
strength of semantic memory features, may also be partly driven by higher levels of
temporal trace strength. As the misinformation narrative is presented after the event
narrative, resulting in the elevated strength of the temporal features associated with
misinformation memory traces. Indeed, researchers have long acknowledged that the
recency of the misinformation narrative relative to event study is likely to be one of the
contributing factors in the misinformation effect (Morton et al., 1985). However, the
possibility of individual differences in the tendency to misattribute more recently studied
material to earlier event encoding stages, something which could be assessed using an
interpolated list design, has yet to be directly assessed.
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It would also be interesting to test the prediction of this model that visualization
related features of misled information play a minimal role in driving perceptual
misinformation endorsements. One way to do so would be to administer a variant of the
misinformation effect paradigm in which the sentences of the verbal narrative are
alternated between encoding-test trials of a task that either required participants to
maintain a visualized precept (e.g., a visual working memory task) or non-visual one
(e.g., an auditory tone sequence). In addition to this, it would also be interesting to
explore these effects using implementations of the misinformation effect design in which
the event contains more semantic/verbal/auditory information such as spoken voices. It
would be particularly interesting to explore these links in the context of ear-witnessing in
which the original event is present completely in auditory form (e.g., spoken
conversations).
Another important point to consider is the potential mode specific differences in
quality and relative strength in the semantic traces formed during visual and verbal
processing. In Figure 15 the magnitude of the strength of semantic features formed during
visual event processing is presented as being slightly weaker than those formed during
verbal event processing. This is however only one of several possibilities as a reliance on
verbal\semantic features relative to visual ones could lead to elevated misinformation
susceptibility, regardless of the strength of the semantic traces formed during the visual
event processing stage, through (1) raising the difficulty of source differentiation (in the
case of strong semantic traces from the visual event stage) or (2) increasing the reliance
on narrative semantic features (in the case of weak semantic traces from the visual event
study). Shedding light on the relative strength of formed semantic traces in both visual as
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well as verbal processing and the potential for individual differences in these domains
thus represents an important direction for continued study.
On a final note, it would be important to assess the longitudinal stability of the
individual difference effects observed in this investigation. Currently, little research has
been conducted on the stability of individual differences in source monitoring ability
across time. While some research has shown performance on false memory tasks such as
the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm to have decent temporal stability
(Hastie et al., 2009) little is known about the temporal stability of other source
monitoring tasks such as the misinformation effect. While some work on habitual
misinformation acceptance has been conducted by Cann and Katz (2005) and Tomes and
Katz (1997), this research focused on identifying factors that predicted habitual
susceptibility as opposed to assessing the stability of individual differences in
misinformation susceptibility (i.e., test-retest stability). Another investigation by Ost et
al. (2013) did show reasonable test-retest reliability (r = .57). However, participants in
Ost et al. (2013) were questioned on the same event with the same test at varying time
points, making it hard to disentangle the contribution of stable individual differences in
misinformation susceptibility on a single set of stimuli versus stability across a range of
different events. Thus it would be important to assess if the effects observed in the studies
presented in this dissertation reflect individual traits that are relatively stable over time as
opposed to more transient state related effects.
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6.1

Conclusions
In conclusion, this dissertation presents a series of studies which generally support

the idea that semantic/verbal processes may play a stronger role in driving
misinformation susceptibility relative to visualization. These results suggest that
individual differences in preferences towards relying on semantic\verbal sources of
information may play a key role in driving misinformation susceptibility in designs in
which the misinformation is presented verbally in narrative form. These findings also
broadly highlight the potential unexplored dynamics of modality-specific processing in
the misinformation effect, setting the stage for many interesting future directions of
continued exploration.

149
References
Addante, R. J., Ranganath, C., & Yonelinas, A. P. (2012). Examining ERP correlates of
recognition memory: evidence of accurate source recognition without
recollection. Neuroimage, 62(1), 439-450.
Aguirre, G. K., Zarahn, E., & D'Esposito, M. (1998). An area within human ventral
cortex sensitive to "building" stimuli: evidence and implications. Neuron, 21(2),
373-383.
Amzica, F., & Steriade, M. (2000). Neuronal and glial membrane potentials during sleep
and paroxysmal oscillations in the neocortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 20(17),
6648-6665.
Anderson, K. L., Rajagovindan, R., Ghacibeh, G. A., Meador, K. J., & Ding, M. (2010).
Theta Oscillations Mediate Interaction between Prefrontal Cortex and Medial
Temporal Lobe in Human Memory. Cerebral Cortex, 20(7), 1604-1612.
Babiloni, C., Miniussi, C., Babiloni, F., Carducci, F., Cincotti, F., Del Percio, C., . . .
Rossini, P. M. (2004). Sub-second "temporal attention" modulates alpha rhythms.
A high-resolution EEG study. Brain Research, 19(3), 259-268.
Backus, A. R., Schoffelen, J.-M., Szebényi, S., Hanslmayr, S., & Doeller, C. F. (2016).
Hippocampal-Prefrontal Theta Oscillations Support Memory Integration. Current
Biology, 26(4), 450-457.
Badre, D., & Wagner, A. D. (2007a). Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and the
cognitive control of memory. Neuropsychologia, 45(13), 2883-2901.
Badre, D., & Wagner, A. D. (2007b). Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and the
cognitive control of memory. Neuropsychologia, 45(13), 2883-2901.

150
Balota, D. A., Cortese, M. J., Duchek, J. M., Adams, D., Roediger, H. L., McDermott, K.
B., & Yerys, B. E. (1999). Veridical and false memories in healthy older adults
and in dementia of the alzheimer's type. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 16(3-5),
361-384.
Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering. Oxford, England: University Press.
Bayen, U., Nakamura, G., Dupuis, S., & Yang, C.-L. (2000). The use of schematic
knowledge about sources in source monitoring. Memory & Cognition, 28(3), 480500.
Baym, C. L., & Gonsalves, B. D. (2010). Comparison of neural activity that leads to true
memories, false memories, and forgetting: An fMRI study of the misinformation
effect. Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 10(3), 339-348.
Behrman, B. W., & Richards, R. E. (2005). Suspect/Foil Identification in Actual Crimes
and in the Laboratory: A Reality Monitoring Analysis. Law and Human Behavior,
29(3), 279-301.
Bekerian, D. A., & Bowers, J. M. (1983). Eyewitness testimony: Were we misled?
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 9(1),
139-145.
Bell, A. J., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1995). An information-maximization approach to blind
separation and blind deconvolution. Neural Computing & Applications, 7(6),
1129-1159.
Belli, R. F. (1989). Influences of misleading postevent information: Misinformation
interference and acceptance. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
118(1), 72-85.

151
Belli, R. F., Lindsay, D. S., Gales, M. S., & McCarthy, T. T. (1994). Memory impairment
and source misattribution in postevent misinformation experiments with short
retention intervals. Memory & Cognition, 22(1), 40-54.
Belli, R. F., & Loftus, E. F. (1994). Recovered memories of childhood abuse: A source
monitoring perspective. In S. J. Lynn, J. W. Rhue, S. J. Lynn & J. W. Rhue
(Eds.), Dissociation: Clinical and theoretical perspectives. (pp. 415-433). New
York, NY, US: Guilford Press.
Belli, R. F., & Loftus, E. F. (1996). The pliability of autobiographical memory:
Misinformation and the false memory problem. In D. C. Rubin & D. C. Rubin
(Eds.), Remembering our past: Studies in autobiographical memory. (pp. 157179). New York, NY, US: Cambridge University Press.
Belli, R. F., Windschitl, P. D., McCarthy, T. T., & Winfrey, S. E. (1992). Detecting
memory impairment with a modified test procedure: Manipulating retention
interval with centrally presented event items. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 18(2), 356-367.
Bernheim, H. (1884). Suggestion dans l’état hypnotique et dans l’état de veille. Paris,
France: Octave Doin.
Bernstein, E. M., & Putnam, F. W. (1986). Development, reliability, and validity of a
dissociation scale. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 174(12), 727-735.
Bertossi, E., Candela, V., De Luca, F., & Ciaramelli, E. (2017). Episodic future thinking
following vmPFC damage: Impaired event construction, maintenance, or
narration? Neuropsychology, 31(3), 337-348.

152
Bi, Z., Chuansheng, C., Loftus, E. F., Chongde, L., Qinghua, H., Chunhui, C., . . . Qi, D.
(2010). Individual differences in false memory from misinformation: Cognitive
factors. Memory, 18(5), 543-555.
Bigdely-Shamlo, N., Mullen, T., Kreutz-Delgado, K., & Makeig, S. (2013). Measure
projection analysis: A probabilistic approach to EEG source comparison and
multi-subject inference. NeuroImage, 72(0), 287-303.
Blume, E. S. (1990). Secret survivors: Uncovering incest and its aftereffects in women.
Oxford, England: John Wiley & Sons.
Blumenfeld, R. S., & Ranganath, C. (2007). Prefrontal cortex and long-term memory
encoding: an integrative review of findings from neuropsychology and
neuroimaging. Neuroscientist, 13(3), 280-291.
Bonto, M. A., & Payne, D. G. (1991). Role of environmental context in eyewitness
memory. American Journal of Psychology, 104(1), 117-134.
Bookheimer, S. (2002). Functional MRI of Language: New Approaches to Understanding
the Cortical Organization of Semantic Processing. Annual Review of
Neuroscience, 25(1), 151-188.
Bottini, G., Corcoran, R., Sterzi, R., Paulesu, E., Schenone, P., Scarpa, P., . . . Frith, D.
(1994). The role of the right hemisphere in the interpretation of figurative aspects
of language A positron emission tomography activation study. Brain, 117(6),
1241-1253.
Brainerd, C. J., Reyna, V. F., & Ceci, S. J. (2008). Developmental reversals in false
memory: A review of data and theory. Psychological Bulletin, 134(3), 343-382.

153
Brandt, V. C., Bergström, Z. M., Buda, M., Henson, R. N. A., & Simons, J. S. (2014).
Did I turn off the gas? Reality monitoring of everyday actions. Cognitive,
Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 14(1), 209-219.
Brodeur, M. B., Dionne-Dostie, E., Montreuil, T., & Lepage, M. (2010). The Bank of
Standardized Stimuli (BOSS), a New Set of 480 Normative Photos of Objects to
Be Used as Visual Stimuli in Cognitive Research. PLOS ONE, 5(5), e10773.
Brodeur, M. B., Guérard, K., & Bouras, M. (2014). Bank of Standardized Stimuli
(BOSS) Phase II: 930 New Normative Photos. PLOS ONE, 9(9), e106953.
Buchsbaum, B. R., Hickock, G., & Humphries, C. (2001). Role of left posterior superior
temporal gyrus in phonological processing for speech perception and production.
Cognitive Science, 25(5), 663-678.
Cabeza, R., Ciaramelli, E., Olson, I. R., & Moscovitch, M. (2008). Parietal Cortex and
Episodic Memory: An Attentional Account. Nature reviews: Neuroscience, 9(8),
613-625.
Cabeza, R., Rao, S. M., Wagner, A. D., Mayer, A. R., & Schacter, D. L. (2001). Can
medial temporal lobe regions distinguish true from false? An event-related
functional MRI study of veridical and illusory recognition memory. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Science, 98(8), 4805-4810.
Calvillo, D. P. (2014). Individual Differences in Susceptibility to Misinformation Effects
and Hindsight Bias. Journal of General Psychology, 141(4), 393-407.
Cann, D. R., & Katz, A. N. (2005). Habitual acceptance of misinformation: Examination
of individual differences and source attributions. Memory & Cognition, 33(3),
405-417.

154
Caprin, C., Benedan, L., Ciaccia, D., Mazza, E., Messineo, S., & Piuri, E. (2016). True
and false memories in middle childhood: the relationship with cognitive
functioning. Psychology, Crime & Law, 22(5), 473-494.
Ceci, S. J., & Bruck, M. (1995). Jeopardy in the courtroom: A scientific analysis of
children's testimony. Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association.
Chambers, K. L., & Zaragoza, M. S. (2001). Intended and unintended effects of explicit
warnings on eyewitness suggestibility: Evidence from source identification tests.
Memory & Cognition, 29(8), 1120-1129.
Chan, A. M., Dykstra, A. R., Jayaram, V., Leonard, M. K., Travis, K. E., Gygi, B., . . .
Cash, S. S. (2014). Speech-specific tuning of neurons in human superior temporal
gyrus. Cerebral Cortex, 24(10), 2679-2693.
Chan, J. C., & Lapaglia, J. A. (2011). The dark side of testing memory: repeated retrieval
can enhance eyewitness suggestibility. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Applied, 17(4), 418-432.
Chan, J. C. K., & LaPaglia, J. A. (2013). Impairing existing declarative memory in
humans by disrupting reconsolidation. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 110(23), 9309-9313.
Chen, Y., & Huang, X. (2015). Modulation of Alpha and Beta Oscillations during an nback Task with Varying Temporal Memory Load. Frontiers in Psychology, 6,
2031.
Cheung, M.-c., Chan, A. S., Han, Y. M., & Sze, S. L. (2014). Brain activity during
resting state in relation to academic performance: Evidence of neural efficiency.
Journal of Psychophysiology, 28(2), 47-53.

155
Christiaansen, R. E., Sweeney, J. D., & Ochalek, K. (1983). Influencing eyewitness
descriptions. Law and Human Behavior, 7(1), 59-65.
Cichy, R. M., Heinzle, J., & Haynes, J.-D. (2012). Imagery and Perception Share Cortical
Representations of Content and Location. Cerebral Cortex, 22(2), 372-380.
Cohen, M. X. (2017). Where Does EEG Come From and What Does It Mean? Trends in
Neurosciences, 40(4), 208-218.
Cooke, A., Zurif, E. B., DeVita, C., Alsop, D., Koenig, P., Detre, J., . . . Grossman, M.
(2002). Neural basis for sentence comprehension: Grammatical and short-term
memory components. Human Brain Mapping, 15(2), 80-94.
Cooley, J. W., & Tukey, J. W. (1965). An Algorithm for the Machine Calculation of
Complex Fourier Series. Mathematics of Computation, 19(90), 297-301.
Crews, F. (1996). The Memory Wars: Freud's Legacy in Dispute: New York Review of
Books.
Cui, L., Shi, G., He, F., Zhang, Q., Oei, T. P. S., & Guo, C. (2016). Electrophysiological
Correlates of Emotional Source Memory in High-Trait-Anxiety Individuals.
Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1039.
Cui, X., Jeter, C. B., Yang, D., Montague, P. R., & Eagleman, D. M. (2007). Vividness of
mental imagery: individual variability can be measured objectively. Vision
research, 47(4), 474-478.
Curran, T., Schacter, D. L., Jonson, M. K., & Spinks, R. (2001). Brain Potentials Reflect
Behavioral Differences in True and False Recognition. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 13(2), 201.

156
Danielle, F. B., & Robert, G. K. (2015). Forced-Choice False Recognition Controlling for
Response Bias Correlates With Dissociative Amnesia Controlling for Imagery,
but Not With Image Vividness Controlling for Dissociation. Imagination,
Cognition and Personality, 34(3), 218-229.
Debener, S., Makeig, S., Delorme, A., & Engel, A. K. (2005). What is novel in the
novelty oddball paradigm? Functional significance of the novelty P3 event-related
potential as revealed by independent component analysis. Brain Research, 22(3),
309-321.
DeCarlo, L. T. (2003). Source monitoring and multivariate signal detection theory, with a
model for selection. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 47(3), 292-303.
Deiber, M. P., Missonnier, P., Bertrand, O., Gold, G., Fazio-Costa, L., Ibanez, V., &
Giannakopoulos, P. (2007). Distinction between perceptual and attentional
processing in working memory tasks: a study of phase-locked and induced
oscillatory brain dynamics. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19(1), 158-172.
Delorme, A., & Makeig, S. (2004). EEGLAB: an open source toolbox for analysis of
single-trial EEG dynamics including independent component analysis. Journal of
Neuroscience Methods, 134(1), 9-21.
Delorme, A., Palmer, J., Onton, J., Oostenveld, R., & Makeig, S. (2012). Independent
EEG Sources Are Dipolar. PLoS ONE, 7(2), e30135.
Delorme, A., Sejnowski, T., & Makeig, S. (2007). Enhanced detection of artifacts in EEG
data using higher-order statistics and independent component analysis.
NeuroImage, 34(4), 1443-1449.

157
Deschamps, I., Baum, S. R., & Gracco, V. L. (2014). On the role of the supramarginal
gyrus in phonological processing and verbal working memory: Evidence from
rTMS studies. Neuropsychologia, 53, 39-46.
Desjarlais, M., & Bernstein, D. M. (2012). The Role of Individual Differences in Three
False Memory Paradigms. Paper presented at the Northwest Cognition and
Memory, Vancouver, BC. Canada.
Dien, J. (2010a). The ERP PCA Toolkit: An open source program for advanced statistical
analysis of event-related potential data. Journal of Neuroscience Methods, 187(1),
138-145.
Dien, J. (2010b). Evaluating two-step PCA of ERP data with Geomin, Infomax, Oblimin,
Promax, and Varimax rotations. Psychophysiology, 47(1), 170-183.
Dien, J., Khoe, W., & Mangun, G. R. (2007). Evaluation of PCA and ICA of simulated
ERPs: Promax vs. infomax rotations. Human Brain Mapping, 28(8), 742-763.
Dobbins, I. G., & Wagner, A. D. (2005). Domain-general and domain-sensitive prefrontal
mechanisms for recollecting events and detecting novelty. Cerebral Cortex,
15(11), 1768-1778.
Dobson, M., & Markham, R. (1993). Imagery ability and source monitoring: Implications
for eyewitness memory. British Journal of Psychology, 84(1), 111.
Dockree, P. M., Kelly, S. P., Roche, R. A., Hogan, M. J., Reilly, R. B., & Robertson, I.
H. (2004). Behavioural and physiological impairments of sustained attention after
traumatic brain injury. Brain Research, 20(3), 403-414.
Dodhia, R. M., & Metcalfe, J. (1999). False Memories and Source Monitoring. Cognitive
Neuropsychology, 16(3-5), 489-508.

158
Drivdahl, S. B., & Zaragoza, M. S. (2001). The role of perceptual elaboration and
individual differences in the creation of false memories for suggested events.
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 15(3), 265-281.
Duarte, A., Henson, R. N., & Graham, K. S. (2011). Stimulus content and the neural
correlates of source memory. Brain Research, 1373, 110-123.
Düzel, E., Cabeza, R., Picton, T. W., Yonelinas, A. P., Scheich, H., Heinze, H.-J., &
Tulving, E. (1999). Task-related and item-related brain processes of memory
retrieval. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 96(4), 1794-1799.
Duzel, E., Penny, W. D., & Burgess, N. (2010). Brain oscillations and memory. Current
Opinion in Neurobiology, 20(2), 143-149.
Eakin, D. K., Schreiber, T. A., & Sergent-Marshall, S. (2003). Misinformation effects in
eyewitness memory: the presence and absence of memory impairment as a
function of warning and misinformation accessibility. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 29(5), 813-825.
Ebbinghaus, H. (1885). Memory: A Contribution to Experimental Psychology. New
York: Dover.
Edwards, A. L., & Walker, J. N. (1961). A short form of the MMPI: The SD scale.
Psychological Reports, 8, 485-486.
Eisen, M., Quas, J. A., & Goodman, G. S. (2002). Memory and Suggestibility in the
Forensic Interview. Mahwah, NJ: Routledge.
Eisen, M. L., Morgan, D. Y., & Mickes, L. (2002). Individual differences in eyewitness
memory and suggestibility: examining relations between acquiescence,

159
dissociation and resistance to misleading information. Personality and Individual
Differences, 33(4), 553-571.
Ekstrom, R. B., French, J. W., Harman, H. H., & Dermen, D. (1954). Kit of Factor
Referenced Cognitive Tests.
Engell, A. D., Huettel, S., & McCarthy, G. (2012). The fMRI BOLD signal tracks
electrophysiological spectral perturbations, not event-related potentials.
NeuroImage, 59(3), 2600-2606.
Epstein, R., & Kanwisher, N. (1998). A cortical representation of the local visual
environment. Nature, 392(6676), 598-601.
Etcheverry, I., Terrier, P., & Marquié, J. C. (2012). Are older adults less efficient in
making attributions about the origin of memories for web interaction? European
Review of Applied Psychology / Revue Européenne de Psychologie Appliquée,
62(2), 93-102.
Fell, J., & Axmacher, N. (2011). The role of phase synchronization in memory processes.
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 12(2), 105-118.
Fletcher, P. C., Frith, C. D., Baker, S. C., Shallice, T., Frackowiak, R. S., & Dolan, R. J.
(1995). The mind's eye--precuneus activation in memory-related imagery.
Neuroimage, 2(3), 195-200.
Frey, B. J., & Dueck, D. (2007). Clustering by Passing Messages Between Data Points.
Science, 315(5814), 972-976.
Freyd, J. J. (1994). Betrayal Trauma: Traumatic Amnesia as an Adaptive Response to
Childhood Abuse. Ethics & Behavior, 4(4), 307.

160
Friederici, A. D., Rüschemeyer, S.-A., Hahne, A., & Fiebach, C. J. (2003). The Role of
Left Inferior Frontal and Superior Temporal Cortex in Sentence Comprehension:
Localizing Syntactic and Semantic Processes. Cerebral Cortex, 13(2), 170-177.
Frithsen, A., & Miller, M. B. (2014). The posterior parietal cortex: comparing
remember/know and source memory tests of recollection and familiarity.
Neuropsychologia, 61, 31-44.
Frost, P., Ingraham, M., & Wilson, B. (2002). Why misinformation is more likely to be
recognised over time: A source monitoring account. Memory, 10(3), 179-185.
Frost, P., Nussbaum, G., Loconto, T., Syke, R., Warren, C., & Muise, C. (2013). An
individual differences approach to the suggestibility of memory over time.
Memory, 21(3), 408-416.
Frost, P., & Weaver, C. A. (1997). Overcoming Misinformation Effects in Eyewitness
Memory: Effects of Encoding Time and Event Cues. Memory, 5(6), 725-740.
Fulford, J., Milton, F., Salas, D., Smith, A., Simler, A., Winlove, C., & Zeman, A.
(2017). The neural correlates of visual imagery vividness – An fMRI study and
literature review. Cortex.
Gabbert, F., Memon, A., & Allan, K. (2003). Memory conformity: can eyewitnesses
influence each other's memories for an event? Applied Cognitive Psychology,
17(5), 533-543.
Gabrieli, J. D. E., Poldrack, R. A., & Desmond, J. E. (1998). The role of left prefrontal
cortex in language and memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 95(3), 906-913.

161
Gallo, D. A., Bell, D. M., Beier, J. S., & Schacter, D. L. (2006). Two types of
recollection-based monitoring in younger and older adults: Recall-to-reject and
the distinctiveness heuristic. Memory, 14(6), 730-741.
Gamer, M., & Berti, S. (2012). P300 amplitudes in the concealed information test are less
affected by depth of processing than electrodermal responses. Front Hum
Neurosci, 6.
Geraerts, E., Lindsay, D. S., Merckelbach, H., Jelicic, M., Raymaekers, L., Arnold, M.
M., & Schooler, J. W. (2009). Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying RecoveredMemory Experiences of Childhood Sexual Abuse. Psychological Science (WileyBlackwell), 20(1), 92-98.
Gernsbacher, M. A., & Kaschak, M. P. (2003). Neuroimaging Studies of Language
Production and Comprehension. Annual review of psychology, 54, 91-114.
Goldstein, E. (1997). False memory syndrome: Why would they believe such terrible
things if they weren't true? American Journal of Family Therapy, 25(4), 307-317.
Gomez-Herrero, G., De Clercq, W., Anwar, H., Kara, O., Egiazarian, K., Van Huffel, S.,
& Van Paesschen, W. (2006, 7-9 June 2006). Automatic Removal of Ocular
Artifacts in the EEG without an EOG Reference Channel. Paper presented at the
Proceedings of the 7th Nordic Signal Processing Symposium.
Gonsalves, B., & Paller, K. A. (2000). Neural events that underlie remembering
something that never happened. Nature Neuroscience, 3(12), 1316-1321.
Gonsalves, B., Reber, P. J., Gitelman, D. R., Parrish, T. B., Mesulam, M. M., & Paller, K.
A. (2004). Neural evidence that vivid imagining can lead to false remembering.
Psychological Science, 15(10), 655-660.

162
Gordon, L. T., & Shapiro, A. M. (2012). Priming correct information reduces the
misinformation effect. Memory & Cognition, 40(5), 717-726.
Greening, E. K. (2002). The Relationship between False Memory and Paranormal Belief.
(Doctoral Dissertation), University of Hertfordshire.
Griffiths, B., Mazaheri, A., Debener, S., & Hanslmayr, S. (2016). Brain oscillations track
the formation of episodic memories in the real world. NeuroImage, 143, 256-266.
Gudjonsson, G. H. (1983). Suggestibility, intelligence, memory recall and personality: an
experimental study. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 142, 35-37.
Gulbinaite, R., Johnson, A., de Jong, R., Morey, C. C., & van Rijn, H. (2014).
Dissociable mechanisms underlying individual differences in visual working
memory capacity. NeuroImage, 99(0), 197-206.
Hämäläinen, M. S., & Ilmoniemi, R. J. (1994). Interpreting magnetic fields of the brain:
minimum norm estimates. Medical & Biological Engineering & Computing,
32(1), 35-42.
Hanslmayr, S., Volberg, G., Wimber, M., Raabe, M., Greenlee, M. W., & Bäuml, K.-H.
T. (2011). The Relationship between Brain Oscillations and BOLD Signal during
Memory Formation: A Combined EEG–fMRI Study. Journal of Neuroscience,
31(44), 15674-15680.
Harris, R. J. (1973). Answering questions containing marked and unmarked adjectives
and adverbs. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 97(3), 399-401.
Hasson, U., Harel, M., Levy, I., & Malach, R. (2003). Large-scale mirror-symmetry
organization of human occipito-temporal object areas. Neuron, 37(6), 1027-1041.

163
Hastie, T., Tibshirani, R., & Friedman, J. (2009). The Elements of Statistical Learning:
Data Mining, Inference, and Prediction. New York: Springer.
Hayama, H. R., Vilberg, K. L., & Rugg, M. D. (2012). Overlap between the neural
correlates of cued recall and source memory: evidence for a generic recollection
network? Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 24(5), 1127-1137.
Hegerty, S. E. A. (2015). The Effects of Individual Differences in Imagery Ability and
Working Memory Capacity on False Memories for Imagined Actions. (Master of
Arts), Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia.
Heim, S., Eickhoff, S. B., & Amunts, K. (2009). Different roles of cytoarchitectonic BA
44 and BA 45 in phonological and semantic verbal fluency as revealed by
dynamic causal modelling. Neuroimage, 48(3), 616-624.
Hekkanen, S. T., & McEvoy, C. (2002). False memories and source-monitoring
problems: criterion differences. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 16(1), 73-85.
Henkel, L. A., Franklin, N., & Johnson, M. K. (2000). Cross-modal source monitoring
confusions between perceived and imagined events. Journal of Experimental
Psychology : Learning, Memory & Cognition, 26(2), 321-335.
Herndon, P., Myers, B., Mitchell, K., Kehn, A., & Henry, S. (2014). False memories for
highly aversive early childhood events: Effects of guided imagery and group
influence. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, 1(1),
20-31.
Hertel, P. T. (1982). Remembering reactions and facts: The influence of subsequent
information. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 8(6), 513-529.

164
Hirshorn, E. A., & Thompson-Schill, S. L. (2006). Role of the left inferior frontal gyrus
in covert word retrieval: Neural correlates of switching during verbal fluency.
Neuropsychologia, 44(12), 2547-2557.
Hoffman, H. G. (1997). Role of memory strength in reality monitoring decisions:
evidence from source attribution biases. Journal of Experimental Psychology.
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 23(2), 371-383.
Holmes, D. S. (1995). The evidence for repression: An examination of sixty years of
research. In J. L. Singer & J. L. Singer (Eds.), Repression and dissociation:
Implications for personality theory, psychopathology, and health. (pp. 85-102).
Chicago, IL, US: University of Chicago Press.
Hoppstädter, M., Baeuchl, C., Diener, C., Flor, H., & Meyer, P. (2015). Simultaneous
EEG–fMRI reveals brain networks underlying recognition memory ERP old/new
effects. Neuroimage, 116, 112-122.
Horn, J. L. (1965). A rationale and test for the number of factors in factor analysis.
Psychometrika, 30(2), 179-185.
Hornstein, S., & Mulligan, N. (2004). Memory for actions: Enactment and source
memory. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11(2), 367-372.
Huber, P. J. (1967). The behavior of maximum likelihood estimates under nonstandard
condition (Vol. 1). Berkeley: University of California Press.
Huff, M. J., Weinsheimer, C. C., & Bodner, G. E. (2016). Reducing the Misinformation
Effect Through Initial Testing: Take Two Tests and Recall Me in the Morning?
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 30(1), 61-69.

165
Huijbers, W., Vannini, P., Sperling, R. A., Pennartz, C. M. A., Cabeza, R., & Daselaar, S.
M. (2012). Explaining the encoding/retrieval flip: memory-related deactivations
and activations in the posteromedial cortex. Neuropsychologia, 50(14),
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.1008.1021.
Hyman, I. E., Husband, T. H., & Billings, F. J. (1995). False Memories of Childhood
Experiences. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 9(3), 181-197.
Hyman, I. E., Jr., & Kleinknecht, E. E. (1996). False Childhood Memories : Research,
Theory and Applications. In L. M. Williams & V. L. Banyard (Eds.), Trauma &
memory. Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publications, Inc.
Hyman, J. I. E., & Billings, F. J. (1998). Individual Differences and the Creation of False
Childhood Memories. Memory, 6(1), 1-20.
Hyman, J. I. E., & Pentland, J. (1996). The Role of Mental Imagery in the Creation of
False Childhood Memories. Journal of Memory and Language, 35(2), 101-117.
Imperatori, C., Brunetti, R., Farina, B., Speranza, A. M., Losurdo, A., Testani, E., . . .
Della Marca, G. (2014). Modification of EEG power spectra and EEG
connectivity in autobiographical memory: A sLORETA study. Cognitive
Processing, 15(3), 351-361.
Imperatori, C., Fabbricatore, M., Innamorati, M., Farina, B., Quintiliani, M. I., Lamis, D.
A., . . . Della Marca, G. (2015). Modification of EEG functional connectivity and
EEG power spectra in overweight and obese patients with food addiction: An
eLORETA study. Brain Imaging and Behavior, 9(4), 703-716.
Imperatori, C., Farina, B., Brunetti, R., Gnoni, V., Testani, E., Quintiliani, M. I., . . .
Della Marca, G. (2013). Modifications of EEG power spectra in mesial temporal

166
lobe during n-back tasks of increasing difficulty. A sLORETA study. Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience, 7, 109.
Incisa della Rocchetta, A., & Milner, B. (1993). Strategic search and retrieval inhibition:
the role of the frontal lobes. Neuropsychologia, 31(6), 503-524.
Jaschinski, U., & Wentura, D. (2002). Misleading postevent information and working
memory capacity: An individual differences approach to eyewitness memory.
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 16(2), 223-231.
Johansson, M., Stenberg, G., Lindgren, M., & Rosén, I. (2002). Memory for perceived
and imagined pictures: An event-related potential study. Neuropsychologia, 40(7),
986-1002.
Johnson, J. D., McDuff, S. G. R., Rugg, M. D., & Norman, K. A. (2009). Recollection,
familiarity, and cortical reinstatement: A multi-voxel pattern analysis. Neuron,
63(5), 697-708.
Johnson, M. K. (1983). A Multiple-Entry, Modular Memory System. In G. H. Bower
(Ed.), Psychology of Learning and Motivation (Vol. 17, pp. 81-123): Academic
Press.
Johnson, M. K. (1988). Reality monitoring: An experimental phenomenological
approach. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 117(4), 390-394.
Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source monitoring.
Psychological Bulletin, 114(1), 3-28.
Johnson, M. K., Nolde, S. F., & De Leonardis, D. M. (1996). Emotional focus and source
monitoring. Journal of Memory and Language, 35(2), 135-156.

167
Johnson, M. K., & Raye, C. L. (1981). Reality monitoring. Psychological Review, 88(1),
67-85.
Johnson, M. K., Taylor, T. H., & Raye, C. L. (1977). Fact and fantasy: The effects of
internally generated events on the apparent frequency of externally generated
events. Memory & Cognition, 5(1), 116-122.
Keller, S. S., Crow, T., Foundas, A., Amunts, K., & Roberts, N. (2009). Broca's area:
nomenclature, anatomy, typology and asymmetry. Brain and Language, 109(1),
29-48.
Kennepohl, S., Sziklas, V., Garver, K. E., Wagner, D. D., & Jones-Gotman, M. (2007).
Memory and the medial temporal lobe: hemispheric specialization reconsidered.
Neuroimage, 36(3), 969-978.
Kensinger, E. A., & Schacter, D. L. (2006). Neural Processes Underlying Memory
Attribution on a Reality-monitoring Task. Cerebral Cortex, 16(8), 1126-1133.
Kiat, J. E., & Belli, R. F. (2017). An exploratory high-density EEG investigation of the
misinformation effect: Attentional and recollective differences between true and
false perceptual memories. Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 141, 199-208.
Kiat, J. E., Dodd, M. D., Belli, R. F., & Cheadle, J. E. (2018). The Signature of
Undetected Change: An Exploratory Electrotomographic Investigation of Gradual
Change Blindness. Journal of neurophysiology, 119(5), 1629-1635.
Kiat, J. E., Long, D., & Belli, R. F. (2018). Attentional responses on an auditory oddball
predict false memory susceptibility. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral
Neuroscience.

168
Kim, H. (2011). Neural activity that predicts subsequent memory and forgetting: a metaanalysis of 74 fMRI studies. Neuroimage, 54(3), 2446-2461.
Kim, H., Daselaar, S. M., & Cabeza, R. (2010). Overlapping brain activity between
episodic memory encoding and retrieval: Roles of the task-positive and tasknegative networks. NeuroImage, 49(1), 1045-1054.
King, M. F., & Bruner, G. C. (2000). Social Desirability Bias: A Neglected Aspect of
Validity Testing. Psychology & Marketing, 17(2), 79-103.
Kircher, T. T. J., Brammer, M., Tous Andreu, N., Williams, S. C. R., & McGuire, P. K.
(2001). Engagement of right temporal cortex during processing of linguistic
context. Neuropsychologia, 39(8), 798-809.
Kirwan, C. B., Wixted, J. T., & Squire, L. R. (2008). Activity in the medial temporal lobe
predicts memory strength, whereas activity in the prefrontal cortex predicts
recollection. Journal of Neuroscience, 28(42), 10541-10548.
Kitamura, T., Ogawa, S. K., Roy, D. S., Okuyama, T., Morrissey, M. D., Smith, L.
M., . . . Tonegawa, S. (2017). Engrams and circuits crucial for systems
consolidation of a memory. Science, 356(6333), 73-78.
Klaver, P., Fell, J., Dietl, T., Schur, S., Schaller, C., Elger, C. E., & Fernandez, G. (2005).
Word imageability affects the hippocampus in recognition memory.
Hippocampus, 15(6), 704-712.
Kothe, C. A., & Makeig, S. (2013). BCILAB: a platform for brain-computer interface
development. Journal of Neural Engineering, 10(5), 056014.

169
Kraemer, D. J. M., Rosenberg, L. M., & Thompson-Schill, S. L. (2009). The Neural
Correlates of Visual and Verbal Cognitive Styles. Journal of Neuroscience,
29(12), 3792-3798.
Kramer, J. H., Rosen, H. J., Du, A.-T., Schuff, N., Hollnagel, C., Weiner, M. W., . . .
Delis, D. C. (2005). Dissociations in Hippocampal and Frontal Contributions to
Episodic Memory Performance. Neuropsychology, 19(6), 799-805.
Kuhlmann, B. G., & Touron, D. R. (2012). Mediator-based encoding strategies in source
monitoring in young and older adults. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 38(5), 1352-1364.
Kulkofsky, S., & Klemfuss, J. Z. (2008). What the stories children tell can tell about their
memory: narrative skill and young children's suggestibility. Developmental
Psychology, 44(5), 1442-1456.
Landau, J. D., & Marsh, R. L. (1997). Monitoring source in an unconscious plagiarism
paradigm. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 4(2), 265-270.
Lane, S. M., & Zaragoza, M. S. (2007). A little elaboration goes a long way: The role of
generation in eyewitness suggestibility. Memory & Cognition, 35(6), 1255-1266.
Lansbergen, M. M., Arns, M., van Dongen-Boomsma, M., Spronk, D., & Buitelaar, J. K.
(2011). The increase in theta/beta ratio on resting-state EEG in boys with
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder is mediated by slow alpha peak frequency.
Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry, 35(1), 47-52.
Larøi, F., Van der Linden, M., & Marczewski, P. (2004). The effects of emotional
salience, cognitive effort and meta-cognitive beliefs on a reality monitoring task

170
in hallucination-prone subjects. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 43(3),
221-233.
Leding, J. K. (2012). Working memory predicts the rejection of false memories. Memory,
20(3), 217-223.
Lee, K. (2004). Age, Neuropsychological, and Social Cognitive Measures as Predictors
of Individual Differences in Susceptibility to the Misinformation Effect. Applied
Cognitive Psychology, 18(8), 997-1019.
Lee, T. W., Girolami, M., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1999). Independent component analysis
using an extended infomax algorithm for mixed subgaussian and supergaussian
sources. Neural Computation, 11(2), 417-441.
Leff, A. P., Schofield, T. M., Crinion, J. T., Seghier, M. L., Grogan, A., Green, D. W., &
Price, C. J. (2009). The left superior temporal gyrus is a shared substrate for
auditory short-term memory and speech comprehension: Evidence from 210
patients with stroke. Brain: A Journal of Neurology, 132(12), 3401-3410.
Lega, B., Germi, J., & Rugg, M. (2017). Modulation of Oscillatory Power and
Connectivity in the Human Posterior Cingulate Cortex Supports the Encoding and
Retrieval of Episodic Memories. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 29(8), 14151432.
Lewicki, P. (2005). Internal and external encoding style and social motivation. In J. P.
Forgas, K. D. Williams, S. M. Laham, J. P. Forgas, K. D. Williams & S. M.
Laham (Eds.), Social motivation: Conscious and unconscious processes. (pp. 194209). New York, NY, US: Cambridge University Press.

171
Leynes, P. A., Crawford, J. T., Radebaugh, A. M., & Taranto, E. (2013). Event-related
potential evidence of accessing gender stereotypes to aid source monitoring.
Brain Research, 1491, 176-187.
Leynes, P. A., & Kakadia, B. (2013). Variations in retrieval monitoring during action
memory judgments: Evidence from event-related potentials (ERPs). International
Journal of Psychophysiology, 87(2), 189-199.
Leynes, P. A., & Phillips, M. C. (2008). Event-related potential (ERP) evidence for
varied recollection during source monitoring. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 34(4), 741-751.
Lindner, I., & Davidson, P. S. (2014). False action memories in older adults: relationship
with executive functions? Neuropsychology, Development, and Cognition. Section
B, 21(5), 560-576.
Lindner, I., Echterhoff, G., Davidson, P. S. R., & Brand, M. (2010). Observation
inflation: Your actions become mine. Psychological Science, 21(9), 1291-1299.
Lindsay, D. S. (1990). Misleading suggestions can impair eyewitnesses' ability to
remember event details. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 16(6), 1077-1083.
Lindsay, D. S., & Johnson, M. K. (1987). Reality Monitoring and Suggestibility:
Children’s Ability to Discriminate Among Memories From Different Sources. In
S. J. Ceci, M. P. Toglia & D. F. Ross (Eds.), Children’s Eyewitness Memory (pp.
92-121). New York, NY: Springer US.
Lindsay, D. S., & Johnson, M. K. (1989a). The eyewitness suggestibility effect and
memory for source. Memory & Cognition, 17(3), 349-358.

172
Lindsay, D. S., & Johnson, M. K. (1989b). The reversed eyewitness suggestibility effect.
Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 27(2), 111-113.
Lindsay, D. S., & Read, J. D. (1994). Psychotherapy and memories of childhood sexual
abuse: A cognitive perspective. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 8(4), 281-338.
"Memory work" and recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse: Scientific evidence
and public, professional, and personal issues, 1 C.F.R. (1995).
Loftus, E. F. (1975). Leading questions and the eyewitness report. Cognitive Psychology,
7(4), 560-572.
Loftus, E. F. (1977). Shifting human color memory. Memory & Cognition, 5(6), 696-699.
Loftus, E. F. (1979). The malleability of human memory. American Scientist, 67(3), 312320.
Loftus, E. F. (1993). The reality of repressed memories. American Psychologist, 48(5),
518-537.
Loftus, E. F. (1998). The Price of Bad Memories. Skeptical Inquirer, 22, 23-24.
Loftus, E. F., & Hoffman, H. G. (1989). Misinformation and memory: The creation of
new memories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 118(1), 100-104.
Loftus, E. F., & Loftus, G. R. (1980). On the permanence of stored information in the
human brain. American Psychologist, 35(5), 409-420.
Loftus, E. F., Miller, D. G., & Burns, H. J. (1978). Semantic integration of verbal
information into a visual memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Learning and Memory, 4(1), 19-31.

173
Loftus, E. F., & Palmer, J. C. (1974). Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An
Example of the Interaction Between Language and Memory. Journal of Verbal
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 13, 585-589.
Makeig, S., Bell, A. J., Jung, T. P., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1996). Independent Component
Analysis of Electroencephalographic Data. Paper presented at the Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems 8.
Manzi, A., & Nigro, G. (2008). Long-term memory for performed and observed actions:
Retrieval awareness and source monitoring. Memory, 16(6), 595-603.
Marks, D. F. (1973). Visual imagery differences in the recall of pictures. British Journal
of Psychology, 64(1), 17-24.
Marsh, R. L., Landau, J. D., & Hicks, J. L. (1997). Contributions of inadequate source
monitoring to unconscious plagiarism during idea generation. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 23(4), 886-897.
Mashal, N., Faust, M., & Hendler, T. (2005). The role of the right hemisphere in
processing nonsalient metaphorical meanings: Application of Principal
Components Analysis to fMRI data. Neuropsychologia, 43(14), 2084-2100.
Mather, M., Henkel, L. A., & Johnson, M. K. (1997). Evaluating characteristics of false
memories: remember/know judgments and memory characteristics questionnaire
compared. Memory & Cognition, 25(6), 826-837.
McCloskey, M., & Zaragoza, M. (1985). Misleading postevent information and memory
for events: Arguments and evidence against memory impairment hypotheses.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 114(1), 1-16.

174
McKague, M., McAnally, K. I., Skovron, M., Bendall, S., & Jackson, H. J. (2012).
Source monitoring and proneness to auditory-verbal hallucinations: A signal
detection analysis. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 17(6), 544-562.
McKelvie, S. J. (1995). Vividness of visual imagery: Measurement, nature, function &
dynamics. New York, NY, US: Brandon House.
McNally, R. J., Clancy, S. A., Barrett, H. M., & Parker, H. A. (2005). Reality Monitoring
in Adults Reporting Repressed, Recovered, or Continuous Memories of
Childhood Sexual Abuse. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 114(1), 147-152.
Meade, M. L., & Roediger, H. L. (2002). Explorations in the social contagion of memory.
Memory & Cognition, 30(7), 995-1009.
Meixner, J. B., & Rosenfeld, J. P. (2014). Detecting knowledge of incidentally acquired,
real-world memories using a p300-based concealed-information test.
Psychological Science, 25(11), 1994-2005.
Meltzer, J. A., Fonzo, G. A., & Constable, R. T. (2009). Transverse patterning dissociates
human EEG theta power and hippocampal BOLD activation. Psychophysiology,
46(1), 153-162.
Memon, A., Fraser, J., Colwell, K., Odinot, G., & Mastroberardino, S. (2010).
Distinguishing truthful from invented accounts using reality monitoring criteria.
Legal & Criminological Psychology, 15(2), 177-194.
Menard, M. T., Kosslyn, S. M., Thompson, W. L., Alpert, N. M., & Rauch, S. L. (1996).
Encoding words and pictures: a positron emission tomography study.
Neuropsychologia, 34(3), 185-194.

175
Merckelbach, H., Horselenberg, R., & Muris, P. (2001). The Creative Experiences
Questionnaire (CEQ): a brief self-report measure of fantasy proneness.
Personality and Individual Differences, 31(6), 987-995.
Merckelbach, H., Muris, P., Rassin, E., & Horselenberg, R. (2000). Dissociative
experiences and interrogative suggestibility in college students. Personality and
Individual Differences, 29(6), 1133-1140.
Mitchell, K. J., & Johnson, M. K. (2000). Source monitoring: Attributing mental
experiences. In E. Tulving, F. I. M. Craik, E. Tulving & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), The
Oxford handbook of memory. (pp. 179-195). New York, NY, US: Oxford
University Press.
Mitchell, K. J., & Johnson, M. K. (2009). Source monitoring 15 years later: What have
we learned from fMRI about the neural mechanisms of source memory?
Psychological Bulletin, 135(4), 638-677.
Mitchell, K. J., & Zaragoza, M. S. (1996). Repeated Exposure to Suggestion and False
Memory: The Role of Contextual Variability. Journal of Memory and Language,
35(2), 246-260.
Mitchell, K. J., & Zaragoza, M. S. (2001). Contextual overlap and eyewitness
suggestibility. Memory & Cognition, 29(4), 616-626.
Monds, L. A., Paterson, H. M., Kemp, R. I., & Bryant, R. A. (2013). Do Distress
Responses to a Traumatic Film Predict Susceptibility to the Misinformation
Effect? Journal of Trauma & Dissociation, 14(5), 562-575.
Morton, J., Hammersley, R. H., & Bekerian, D. A. (1985). Headed records: A model for
memory and its failures. Cognition, 20(1), 1-23.

176
Moseley, P., Fernyhough, C., & Ellison, A. (2014). The role of the superior temporal lobe
in auditory false perceptions: A transcranial direct current stimulation study.
Neuropsychologia, 62, 202-208.
Mullen, T. R., Kothe, C. A., Chi, Y. M., Ojeda, A., Kerth, T., Makeig, S., . . .
Cauwenberghs, G. (2015). Real-Time Neuroimaging and Cognitive Monitoring
Using Wearable Dry EEG. IEEE Trans Biomed Eng, 62(11), 2553-2567.
Murakami, S., Hirose, A., & Okada, Y. C. (2003). Contribution of Ionic Currents to
Magnetoencephalography (MEG) and Electroencephalography (EEG) Signals
Generated by Guinea-Pig CA3 Slices. The Journal of Physiology, 553(3), 975985.
Naselaris, T., Olman, C. A., Stansbury, D. E., Ugurbil, K., & Gallant, J. L. (2015). A
voxel-wise encoding model for early visual areas decodes mental images of
remembered scenes. NeuroImage, 105, 215-228.
Newman, S. D., Just, M. A., Keller, T. A., Roth, J., & Carpenter, P. A. (2003).
Differential effects of syntactic and semantic processing on the subregions of
Broca’s area. Cognitive Brain Research, 16(2), 297-307.
Nichols, R. M. (2014). Not All False Memories Are Created Equal. (Doctor of
Philosophy), University of California, Irvine.
Nichols, T. E., & Holmes, A. P. (2002). Nonparametric permutation tests for functional
neuroimaging: a primer with examples. Human Brain Mapping, 15(1), 1-25.
Niedermeyer, E., Schomer, D. L., & Lopes da Silva, F. H. (2011). Niedermeyer's
electroencephalography : basic principles, clinical applications, and related
fields. Philadelphia: Wolters Kluwer/Lippincott Williams & Wilkins Health.

177
Nori, R., Bensi, L., Gambetti, E., & Giusberti, F. (2014). Individual differences in the
Enhanced Cognitive Interview: the role of imagery. Psychology, Crime & Law,
20(9), 833-851.
Novick, J. M., Kan, I. P., Trueswell, J. C., & Thompson-Schill, S. L. (2009). A case for
conflict across multiple domains: memory and language impairments following
damage to ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 26(6),
527-567.
Nunez, P. L. (1981). Electric fields of the brain : the neurophysics of EEG. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Nyhus, E., & Curran, T. (2010). Functional Role of Gamma and Theta Oscillations in
Episodic Memory. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 34(7), 1023-1035.
O'Craven, K. M., & Kanwisher, N. (2000). Mental imagery of faces and places activates
corresponding stimulus-specific brain regions. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 12(6), 1013-1023.
Oeberst, A., & Blank, H. (2012). Undoing suggestive influence on memory: the
reversibility of the eyewitness misinformation effect. Cognition, 125(2), 141-159.
Oh, A., Duerden, E. G., & Pang, E. W. (2014). The role of the insula in speech and
language processing. Brain and language, 135, 96-103.
Okado, Y., & Stark, C. E. L. (2005). Neural activity during encoding predicts false
memories created by misinformation. Learning & Memory, 12(1), 3-11.
Oldfield, R. C. (1971). The Assessment and Analysis of Handedness: The Edinburgh
Inventory. Neuropsychologia, 9(1), 97-113.

178
Ost, J., Blank, H., Davies, J., Jones, G., Lambert, K., & Salmon, K. (2013). False
Memory ≠ False Memory: DRM Errors Are Unrelated to the Misinformation
Effect. PLoS ONE, 8(4), 1-6.
Ost, J., & Costall, A. (2002). Misremembering Bartlett: A study in serial reproduction.
British Journal of Psychology, 93(2), 243.
Otgaar, H., Howe, M. L., & Muris, P. (2017). Maltreatment increases spontaneous false
memories but decreases suggestion-induced false memories in children. British
Journal of Developmental Psychology, 35(3), 376-391.
Paddock, J. R., & Terranova, S. (2001). Guided Visualization and Suggestibility: Effect
of Perceived Authority on Recall of Autobiographical Memories. The Journal of
Genetic Psychology, 162(3), 347-356.
Paddock, J. R., Terranova, S., Kwok, R., & Halpern, D. V. (2000). When Knowing
Becomes Remembering: Individual Differences in Susceptibility to Suggestion.
The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 161(4), 453-468.
Paller, K. A., Kutas, M., & McIsaac, H. K. (1995). Monitoring Conscious Recollection
via the Electrical Activity of the Brain. Psychological Science, 6(2), 107-111.
Papma, J. M., Smits, M., de Groot, M., Mattace Raso, F. U., van der Lugt, A., Vrooman,
H. A., . . . Prins, N. D. (2017). The effect of hippocampal function, volume and
connectivity on posterior cingulate cortex functioning during episodic memory
fMRI in mild cognitive impairment. European Radiology, 27(9), 3716-3724.
Pascual-Marqui, R. D. (2002). Standardized low-resolution brain electromagnetic
tomography (sLORETA): technical details. Methods and Findings in
Experimental and Clinical Pharmacology, 24 Supplement D, 5-12.

179
Pascual-Marqui, R. D., Michel, C. M., & Lehmann, D. (1994). Low resolution
electromagnetic tomography: A new method for localizing electrical activity in
the brain. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 18(1), 49-65.
Patihis, L., Frenda, S. J., LePort, A. K. R., Petersen, N., Nichols, R. M., Stark, C. E.
L., . . . Loftus, E. F. (2013). False memories in highly superior autobiographical
memory individuals. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America, 110(52), 20947-20952.
Paulesu, E., Frith, C. D., & Frackowiak, R. S. J. (1993). The neural correlates of the
verbal component of working memory. Nature, 362, 342.
Payne, D. G., Toglia, M. P., & Anastasi, J. S. (1994). Recognition performance level and
the magnitude of the misinformation effect in eyewitness memory. Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review, 1(3), 376-382.
Pérez-Mata, N., & Diges, M. (2007). False recollections and the congruence of suggested
information. Memory, 15(7), 701-717.
Pfurtscheller, G., & Lopes da Silva, F. H. (1999). Event-related EEG/MEG
synchronization and desynchronization: basic principles. Clinical
Neurophysiology, 110(11), 1842-1857.
Platt, R. D., Lacey, S. C., Iobst, A. D., & Finkelman, D. (1998). Absorption, dissociation,
fantasy-proneness as predictors of memory distortion in autobiographical and
laboratory-generated memories. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 12(Spec Issue),
S77-S89.
Polich, J. (2007). Updating P300: An Integrative Theory of P3a and P3b. Clinical
Neurophysiology, 118(10), 2128-2148.

180
Prendergast, G., Limbrick-Oldfield, E., Ingamells, E., Gathercole, S., Baddeley, A., &
Green, G. G. R. (2013). Differential Patterns of Prefrontal MEG Activation during
Verbal & Visual Encoding and Retrieval. PLOS ONE, 8(12), e82936.
Qin, J., Ogle, C. M., & Goodman, G. S. (2008). Adults' memories of childhood: true and
false reports. Journal of Experimental Psychology : Applied, 14(4), 373-391.
Ragland, J. D., Gur, R. C., Valdez, J., Turetsky, B. I., Elliott, M., Kohler, C., . . . Gur, R.
E. (2004). Event-Related fMRI of Frontotemporal Activity During Word
Encoding and Recognition in Schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry,
161(6), 1004-1015.
Ranganath, C., Johnson, M. K., & D'Esposito, M. (2000). Left Anterior Prefrontal
Activation Increases with Demands to Recall Specific Perceptual Information.
The Journal of Neuroscience, 20(22), RC108-RC108.
Rapp, A. M., Leube, D. T., Erb, M., Grodd, W., & Kircher, T. T. J. (2004). Neural
correlates of metaphor processing. Cognitive Brain Research, 20(3), 395-402.
Reimann, Michael W., Anastassiou, Costas A., Perin, R., Hill, S. L., Markram, H., &
Koch, C. A Biophysically Detailed Model of Neocortical Local Field Potentials
Predicts the Critical Role of Active Membrane Currents. Neuron, 79(2), 375-390.
Reynolds, W. M. (1982). Development of Reliable and Valid Short Forms of the
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. Journal of Clinical Psychology,
38(1), 119-125.
Richards, J. E. (2004). Recovering dipole sources from scalp-recorded event-relatedpotentials using component analysis: principal component analysis and

181
independent component analysis. International Journal of Psychophysiology,
54(3), 201-220.
Richardson, A. (1977). Verbalizer-visualizer: A cognitive style dimension. Journal of
Mental Imagery, 1(1), 109-125.
Ritter, M. (1991). Sudden Recall of Forgotten Crimes Is a Puzzler for Juries, Experts
Say : Justice: Experts disagree on whether suppressed traumas can be truthfully
described years later. Parents have been sued for long-ago abuses., Los Angeles
Times.
Roe, C. M., & Schwartz, M. F. (1996). Characteristics of previously forgotten memories
of sexual abuse: A descriptive study. Journal of Psychiatry & Law, 24(2), 189206.
Roebers, C. M., & Schneider, W. (2005). Individual differences in young children's
suggestibility: Relations to event memory, language abilities, working memory,
and executive functioning. Cognitive Development, 20(3), 427-447.
Roediger, H. L., Meade, M. L., & Bergman, E. T. (2001). Social contagion of memory.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8(2), 365-371.
Rosburg, T., Johansson, M., & Mecklinger, A. (2013). Strategic retrieval and retrieval
orientation in reality monitoring studied by event-related potentials (ERPs).
Neuropsychologia, 51(3), 557-571.
Rosburg, T., Mecklinger, A., & Johansson, M. (2011a). Electrophysiological correlates of
retrieval orientation in reality monitoring. NeuroImage, 54(4), 3076-3084.
Rosburg, T., Mecklinger, A., & Johansson, M. (2011b). Strategic retrieval in a reality
monitoring task. Neuropsychologia, 49(10), 2957-2969.

182
Rugg, M. D., Schloerscheidt, A. M., Doyle, M. C., Cox, C. J. C., & Patching, G. R.
(1996). Event-related potentials and the recollection of associative information.
Cognitive Brain Research, 4(4), 297-304.
Rugg, M. D., Schloerscheidt, A. M., & Mark, R. E. (1998). An electrophysiological
comparison of two indices of recollection. Journal of Memory and Language,
39(1), 47-69.
Rugg, M. D., & Vilberg, K. L. (2013). Brain networks underlying episodic memory
retrieval. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 23(2), 255-260.
Rules of Evidence for United State Courts and Magistrates, 3 C.F.R. (1973).
Schimmel, H. (1967). The (±) reference: accuracy of estimated mean components in
average response studies. Science, 157, 92-94.
Schneider, S. L., & Rose, M. (2016). Intention to encode boosts memory-related prestimulus EEG beta power. NeuroImage, 125, 978-987.
Schooler, J. W., Foster, R. A., & Loftus, E. F. (1988). Some deleterious consequences of
the act of recollection. Memory & Cognition, 16(3), 243-251.
Schooler, J. W., Gerhard, D., & Loftus, E. F. (1986). Qualities of the unreal. Journal of
Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 12(2), 171-181.
Schooler, J. W., & Loftus, E. F. (1993). Multiple mechanisms mediate individual
differences in eyewitness accuracy and suggestibility. In J. M. Puckett, H. W.
Reese, J. M. Puckett & H. W. Reese (Eds.), Mechanisms of everyday cognition.
(pp. 177-203). Hillsdale, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

183
Schreiber, T. A., & Sergent, S. D. (1998). The role of commitment in producing
misinformation effects in eyewitness memory. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review,
5(3), 443-448.
Shao, S., Shen, K., Yu, K., Wilder-Smith, E. P., & Li, X. (2012). Frequency-domain EEG
source analysis for acute tonic cold pain perception. Clinical Neurophysiology,
123(10), 2042-2049.
Sheehan, P. W. (1967). A shortened form of Betts' questionnaire upon mental imagery.
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 23(3), 386-389.
Simons, J. S., Davis, S. W., Gilbert, S. J., Frith, C. D., & Burgess, P. W. (2006).
Discriminating imagined from perceived information engages brain areas
implicated in schizophrenia. Neuroimage, 32(2), 696-703.
Simons, J. S., & Spiers, H. J. (2003). Prefrontal and medial temporal lobe interactions in
long-term memory. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4, 637.
Slusher, M. P., & Anderson, C. A. (1987). When reality monitoring fails: The role of
imagination in stereotype maintenance. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 52(4), 653-662.
Smith, R. E., Hunt, R. R., & Dunlap, K. R. (2015). Why do pictures, but not visual
words, reduce older adults’ false memories? Psychology and Aging, 30(3), 647655.
Spoltore, J. D., & Smock, D. J. (1983). The Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire:
Additional normative data. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 56(2), 382-382.
Stadler, M. A., Roediger, H. L., 3rd, & McDermott, K. B. (1999). Norms for word lists
that create false memories. Memory & Cognition, 27(3), 494-500.

184
Stark, C. E. L., Okado, Y., & Loftus, E. F. (2010). Imaging the reconstruction of true and
false memories using sensory reactivation and the misinformation paradigms.
Learning & Memory, 17(10), 485-488.
Staudigl, T., & Hanslmayr, S. (2013). Theta Oscillations at Encoding Mediate the
Context-Dependent Nature of Human Episodic Memory. Current Biology, 23(12),
1101-1106.
Stephan-Otto, C., Siddi, S., Senior, C., Muñoz-Samons, D., Ochoa, S., Sánchez-Laforga,
A. M., & Brébion, G. (2017). Visual Imagery and False Memory for Pictures: A
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study in Healthy Participants. PLoS
ONE, 12(1), e0169551.
Stephen Lindsay, D., Allen, B. P., Chan, J. C. K., & Dahl, L. C. (2004). Eyewitness
suggestibility and source similarity: Intrusions of details from one event into
memory reports of another event. Journal of Memory and Language, 50(1), 96111.
Stevens, M. J., Rapp, B. J., Pfost, K. S., & Johnson, J. J. (1986). Further evidence of the
stability of the Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire. Perceptual and Motor Skills,
62(1), 301-302.
Strahan, R., & Gerbasi, K. C. (1972). Short, Homogeneous Versions of the MarlowCrowne Social Desirability Scale. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 28(2), 191193.
Sugimori, E., & Tanno, Y. (2010). The effects of cognitive activity and perceptual details
on speech source monitoring. British Journal of Psychology, 101(4), 777-790.

185
Summerfield, C., & Mangels, J. A. (2005). Coherent theta-band EEG activity predicts
item-context binding during encoding. Neuroimage, 24(3), 692-703.
Thierry, K. L., & Pipe, M. E. (2009). The susceptibility of young preschoolers to source
similarity effects: confusing story or video events with reality. Journal of
Experimental Child Psychology, 102(4), 392-407.
Thomas, A. K., Gordon, L. T., Cernasov, P. M., & Bulevich, J. B. (2017). The effect of
testing can increase or decrease misinformation susceptibility depending on the
retention interval. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications, 2(1), 45.
Thompson-Schill, S. L., D’Esposito, M., Aguirre, G. K., & Farah, M. J. (1997). Role of
left inferior prefrontal cortex in retrieval of semantic knowledge: A reevaluation.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 94(26), 14792-14797.
Tomes, J. L., & Katz, A. N. (1997). Habitual susceptibility to misinformation and
individual differences in eyewitness memory. Applied Cognitive Psychology,
11(3), 233-251.
Tousignant, J. P. (1984). Individual differences in response bias and recall : A
characterization of the effects of misleading post-event information. Unpublished
doctoral dissertation. University of Washington.
Tousignant, J. P., Hall, D., & Loftus, E. F. (1986). Discrepancy detection and
vulnerability to misleading postevent information. Memory & Cognition, 14(4),
329-338.
Tulving, E., Kapur, S., Markowitsch, H. J., Craik, F. I., Habib, R., & Houle, S. (1994).
Neuroanatomical correlates of retrieval in episodic memory: auditory sentence

186
recognition. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America, 91(6), 2012-2015.
Tun, P. A., Wingfield, A., Rosen, M. J., & Blanchard, L. (1998). Response latencies for
false memories: gist-based processes in normal aging. Psychology and Aging,
13(2), 230-241.
Uncapher, M. R., Otten, L. J., & Rugg, M. D. (2006). Episodic Encoding Is More than
the Sum of Its Parts: An fMRI Investigation of Multifeatural Contextual
Encoding. Neuron, 52(3), 547-556.
van Bergen, S., Horselenberg, R., Merckelbach, H., Jelicic, M., & Beckers, R. (2010).
Memory distrust and acceptance of misinformation. Applied Cognitive
Psychology, 24(6), 885-896.
Vandenbroucke, A. R. E., Sligte, I. G., de Vries, J. G., Cohen, M. X., & Lamme, V. A. F.
(2015). Neural Correlates of Visual Short-term Memory Dissociate between
Fragile and Working Memory Representations. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 27(12), 2477-2490.
Vanrumste, B., Hoey, G. V., Walle, R. V. d., Hese, P. V., Have, M. D., Boon, P., &
Lemahieu, I. (2001, 2001). The realistic versus the spherical head model in EEG
dipole source analysis in the presence of noise. Paper presented at the 2001
Conference Proceedings of the 23rd Annual International Conference of the IEEE
Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society.
Vanrumste, B., Van Hoey, G., Van de Walle, R., D'Have, M. R., Lemahieu, I. A., &
Boon, P. A. (2002). Comparison of performance of spherical and realistic head

187
models in dipole localization from noisy EEG. Medical Engineering & Physics,
24(6), 403-418.
Vatta, F., Meneghini, F., Esposito, F., Mininel, S., & Di Salle, F. (2010). Realistic and
Spherical Head Modeling for EEG Forward Problem Solution: A Comparative
Cortex-Based Analysis. Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience, 2010.
Vilberg, K. L., Moosavi, R. F., & Rugg, M. D. (2006). The relationship between
electrophysiological correlates of recollection and amount of information
retrieved. Brain Research, 1122(2), 161-170.
Virtue, S., Haberman, J., Clancy, Z., Parrish, T., & Jung Beeman, M. (2006). Neural
activity of inferences during story comprehension. Brain Research, 1084(1), 104114.
von Zerssen, G. C., Mecklinger, A., Opitz, B., & von Cramon, D. Y. (2001). Conscious
recollection and illusory recognition: an event-related fMRI study. European
Journal of Neuroscience, 13(11), 2148-2156.
Wais, P. E. (2008). fMRI signals associated with memory strength in the medial temporal
lobes: A meta-analysis. Neuropsychologia, 46(14), 3185-3196.
Wang, E., Paterson, H., & Kemp, R. (2014). The effects of immediate recall on
eyewitness accuracy and susceptibility to misinformation. Psychology, Crime &
Law, 20(7), 619-634.
Warren, R., & Good, G. (1979). The Verbalizer–Visualizer Questionnaire: Further
normative data. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 48(2), 372-372.
Weinberg, H. I., Wadsworth, J., & Baron, R. S. (1983). Demand and the impact of
leading questions on eyewitness testimony. Memory & Cognition, 11(1), 101-104.

188
Wilding, E. L. (2000). In what way does the parietal ERP old/new effect index
recollection? International Journal of Psychophysiology, 35(1), 81-87.
Wilding, E. L., Doyle, M. C., & Rugg, M. D. (1995). Recognition memory with and
without retrieval of context: An event-related potential study. Neuropsychologia,
33(6), 743-767.
Wilding, E. L., & Rugg, M. D. (1996). An event-related potential study of recognition
memory with and without retrieval of source. Brain: A Journal of Neurology,
119(3), 889-905.
Wilford, M. M., Chan, J. C., & Tuhn, S. J. (2014). Retrieval enhances eyewitness
suggestibility to misinformation in free and cued recall. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Applied, 20(1), 81-93.
Woodruff, C. C., Hayama, H. R., & Rugg, M. D. (2006). Electrophysiological
dissociation of the neural correlates of recollection and familiarity. Brain
Research, 1100(1), 125-135.
Woroch, B., & Gonsalves, B. D. (2010). Event-related potential correlates of item and
source memory strength. Brain Research, 1317, 180-191.
Wright, D. B. (1995). Misinformation methodologies: Explaining the effects of errant
information Psychology, law, and criminal justice: International developments in
research and practice. (pp. 39-45). Oxford, England: Walter De Gruyter.
Wright, D. B., Varley, S., & Belton, J. (1996). Accurate Second Guesses in
Misinformation Studies. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 10(1), 13-21.
Wylie, L. E., Patihis, L., McCuller, L. L., Davis, D., Brank, E. M., Loftus, E. F., &
Bornstein, B. H. (2014). Misinformation effect in older versus younger adults: A

189
meta-analysis and review. In M. P. Toglia, D. F. Ross, J. Pozzulo, E. Pica, M. P.
Toglia, D. F. Ross, J. Pozzulo & E. Pica (Eds.), The elderly eyewitness in court.
(pp. 38-66). New York, NY, US: Psychology Press.
Yun, K., Watanabe, K., & Shimojo, S. (2012). Interpersonal body and neural
synchronization as a marker of implicit social interaction. Scientific Reports, 2,
959.
Zajac, R., Dickson, J., Munn, R., & O'Neill, S. (2016). Trussht me, I know what I sshaw:
The acceptance of misinformation from an apparently unreliable co-witness.
Legal and Criminological Psychology, 21(1), 127-140.
Zalla, T., Phipps, M., & Grafman, J. (2002). Story processing in patients with damage to
the prefrontal cortex. Cortex, 38(2), 215-231.
Zaragoza, M. S., & Lane, S. M. (1994). Source misattributions and the suggestibility of
eyewitness memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 20(4), 934-945.
Zaragoza, M. S., McCloskey, M., & Jamis, M. (1987). Misleading postevent information
and recall of the original event: Further evidence against the memory impairment
hypothesis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 13(1), 36-44.
Zaragoza, M. S., & Mitchell, K. J. (1996). Repeated Exposure to Suggestion and the
Creation of False Memories. Psychological Science, 7(5), 294-300.
Zaragoza, M. S., Mitchell, K. J., Payment, K., & Drivdahl, S. (2011). False Memories for
Suggestions: The Impact of Conceptual Elaboration. Journal of Memory and
Language, 64(1), 18-31.

190
Zhang, S., & Li, C.-s. R. (2012). Functional connectivity mapping of the human
precuneus by resting state fMRI. Neuroimage, 59(4), 3548-3562.
Zhao, W., & Li, A. X. (2012). A Generalized Approach to Estimating Sample Sizes. Los
Angeles, CA: SAS Institute Inc.
Zhu, B., Chen, C., Loftus, E., Lin, C., & Dong, Q. (2013). The relationship between
DRM and misinformation false memories. Memory & Cognition, 41(6), 832-838.
Zhu, B., Chen, C., Loftus, E. F., Lin, C., He, Q., Chen, C., . . . Dong, Q. (2010).
Individual differences in false memory from misinformation: Personality
characteristics and their interactions with cognitive abilities. Personality &
Individual Differences, 48(8), 889-894.
Zhu, B., Chen, C., Loftus, E. F., Lin, C., He, Q., Chen, C., . . . Dong, Q. (2010).
Individual differences in false memory from misinformation: Cognitive factors.
Memory, 18(5), 543-555.

191
Appendix A

Ashtray
Axe
Balloon
Baseball
Battery
Belt
Bib
Bottle Cap
Brick
Button
Cane
CD
Chalk
Clock
Clothespin
Dice
Dropper
Dustpan
Envelope
Flyswatter
Hanger
Iron
Key
Lightbulb
Lipstick
Magnifying Glass
Match
Measuring Tape
Mousetrap
Nail Clipper
Nutcracker

Paint Brush
Piggy Bank
Pillow
Plate
Plunger
Q-Tip
Razor
Rolling Pin
Rope
Sandal
Scarf
Screw
Shoelace
Spatula
Speaker
Sponge
Strainer
Straw
Sunglasses
Teapot
Tile
Toaster
Toilet Paper
Tongs
Toothbrush
Toothpick
Tweezers
Violin
Water Bottle
Whisk
Wrench
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Misinformation Narrative 1
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

On a cloudy afternoon, a young man wearing a blue t-shirt and purple hat walked down a residential street.
He noticed a light purple car parked approximately 15 feet from a large tree across the street.
He crossed the street and walked towards the car.
He looked into the car, which had a Johns Hopkins University sticker on the rear window.
He tried to open the driver-side door.
He looked around suspiciously to see if anyone noticed him by the car.
He used a credit card (hanger) to open the car door.
The door opened.
The young man pulled the driver's seat back so he could get in.
He then opened the change compartment.
He saw several bills and a few pennies in the compartment.
He examined the bills, and saw that they were all $1.00 ($20.00) bills.
He put the money into his pocket.
He then looked into the back seat of the car.
He saw a purse and picked it up.
He found a purse and rummaged through it with his right hand.
Finding nothing in it, he threw down the purse in frustration.
Angry, the young man wondered what to do next.
The young man decided to look in the trunk and pulled the trunk lever to open it.
He got out of the car.
He headed towards the trunk closing the front door (leaving the front door open) behind him.
He approached the trunk to see if the lever had worked.
He saw that the trunk had opened.
He opened the trunk all the way.
The young man was pleased with what he saw in the trunk.
He suddenly heard a sound nearby.
He suspiciously looked across the street and saw nobody (a man walking his dog) there.
He turned his attention back to the trunk.
He pulled out a bag of cocaine (marijuana).
He also found a few necklaces (rings and a watch).
He put all of the items in his pocket, hoping nobody was in the Toyota vehicle that was parked behind him.
He then closed the trunk door.
He accidentally slammed the trunk door on his left (right) hand.
Furious and in pain, he hit (kicked) the car.
With a pained look on his face and holding his hands together, he walked towards the passenger-side door.
He approached the door.
He opened the door and got in.
He opened the glove compartment.
He rummaged through the compartment.
He found nothing (a cassette tape) in there.
He then pulled down the sunshade and found a key (paper slip).
Not interested in it, he closed the sunshade.
The young man then got out of the car.
He closed the door.
He noticed that his left (right) shoe was untied and bent down to tie it.
He stood up and wondered if there was anywhere else to look in the car.
Suddenly, he heard police sirens in the distance.
He looked around to see in which direction it was coming from.
He then began to run in the opposite direction.
As he ran away as quickly as he could, his hat fell off.
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A petite girl was walking down Main Street in Baltimore.
She was window shopping and continued walking.
She stopped to look at a video store after passing a hair salon.
She decided to go inside.
She bought something inside, and left the video store.
On her way up the stairs from the store, she saw a friend.
She waved hello, and he smiled.
The two friends hugged.
They chatted for a little while.
The girl indicated that she had bought something from the video store.
She showed her friend the new South Park (X-files) DVD.
Her friend did not approve (approved) of her selection.
They continued to talk.
They then hugged (waved) goodbye.
They walked in opposite directions.
The girl continued down Main Street, passing by another woman, and avoiding a paper plate on the ground.
A man was walking across the street towards the petite girl.
The man was headed directly towards the girl, who was oblivious to him as she walked by the cafe that
served organic coffee (tea).
The man bumped into the girl from behind (the front).
This bump caused her bag to fall to the ground.
Her new DVD, sunglasses, mirror and other things fell out of the bag.
The girl rubbed her arm (neck), bruised from him bumping into her.
The man apologized for running into her.
She was angry because all of her items were wet and on the ground.
Both of them stooped to the ground to pick up the items and the girl noticed his shoe laces were nicely tied
(untied).
He placed her mirror (sunglasses) back in the plastic bag, while she picked up her tape dispenser.
The girl stood up and turned around to make sure nothing else had fallen out.
While her back was turned, the man reached with his left (right) hand into her pocketbook.
He took her wallet and put it away in his jacket (pants) pocket.
He returned to helping her with her bag that had a yellow smiley face on it.
Both of them stood up, and wiped snow off of themselves, as a Bud Light truck honked at the intersection.
She shook his hand to thank him for helping her out.
The man headed back towards the street, first watching a man who was getting something out of his trunk.
The man crossed the street.
As the girl continued down the street, the woman talking on her cell phone was finishing her conversation.
The girl opened her pocketbook to get out her ringing cell phone to answer it (scarf. because the wind was
blowing and she was cold)
Suddenly she realized that her wallet was missing.
She searched frantically in her bag for her wallet.
The woman who had been on the cell phone called out to the petite girl.
Concerned, the woman explained to the girl what she had seen the man do.
She pointed towards the direction the man headed.
The girl looked across the street to see if he was there.
Unfortunately, the man had already disappeared.
She turned back to the girl with a disappointed look.
She shrugged her shoulders, realizing that she would not be able to catch up with him now.
The girl thanked the woman for trying to help her.
The two headed in opposite directions.
The petite girl turned a corner and disappeared.
The other side of the street still looked empty.
However, the man had been hiding behind a doorway (tree) the whole time, watching them.
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Misinformation Narrative 3
1. Setting up for a friendly game of poker, Dirk and Jenny divided 10 red, blue, and white colored chips for
themselves.
2. Jenny began to deal the cards.
3. Jenny dealt five cards to Dirk and herself.
4. After throwing in one white chip each, they both looked at the cards they were dealt.
5. Dirk decided to bet two white chips.
6. Jenny saw Dirk's two white chips and decided not to raise him.
7. Dirk placed two cards face down on the table to exchange.
8. Jenny placed one card face down on the table to exchange.
9. After examining his new hand, Dirk bet two blue chips.
10. Jenny lost the first round and was disappointed.
11. Jenny, thirsty, got up from the table.
12. She walked into the kitchen to get a drink for the two of them.
13. While Jenny was getting the bottle of tequila, Dirk stole three blue (white) chips from the extra stack of chips
on the table.
14. He blended the stolen chips into his pile of chips as Jenny got two glasses.
15. Jenny walked back towards the table with a full bottle of tequila and two glasses.
16. Jenny handed a glass to Dirk.
17. Dirk started to distribute the cards for a new round.
18. They looked at their cards.
19. Dirk saw that he had five diamonds (spades), a flush.
20. Feeling lucky with his set of cards, Dirk bet five blue (Red) chips.
21. Dirk was confident that he would win this round.
22. Jenny, knowing that he had beaten her, was very upset.
23. Many hours later, Dirk was clearly winning in the midst of an empty (full) bottle of tequila and glasses
strewn about the table.
24. Dirk again won another round and was very pleased.
25. Jenny, frustrated and having had enough, pointed at Dirk's growing pile of chips and accused him of cheating.
26. Extremely angry, she got up from the table.
27. With her arms raised, she approached Dirk.
28. Dirk stood up with his arms raised over his face, prepared to fight in defense (ready to fight).
29. Jenny grabbed Dirk by his shirt.
30. Jenny swung her right arm back.
31. She punched Dirk in the face.
32. Dirk fell over onto the ground, holding his face and knocking the chair over.
33. Jenny kicked Dirk in the stomach while he was lying on the ground.
34. Dirk, injured, was curled up on the ground.
35. Jenny stopped kicking but was still very angry and dissatisfied (and was surprised and scared at what she
had done).
36. She looked around the room.
37. She picked up her cell (the apartment) phone.
38. She dialed 911.
39. Muffling her voice, she called for help.
40. Jenny quickly headed towards the table.
41. She grabbed the two glasses.
42. She walked over to the sink.
43. She started washing to get rid of fingerprints, using the sink by a poster that said "Homer and 7 Little Duffs".
44. She washed her glass (the two glasses) and put it (them) back.
45. Jenny picked up her book bag first, then her coat. (coat … book bag)
46. She checked on Dirk one last time and he was unconscious (barely conscious).
47. She headed towards the door.
48. She opened the door quietly.
49. She carefully walked out the door, looking around, hoping no one would see her.
50. Leaving her hood down (up), she quickly walked down a set of stairs hidden by a brick building.
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The computer in the lab had just crashed and the research assistant was angry.
Frustrated, she smacked the top of the computer but it did not help.
She put her hands on her head, not knowing what to do.
The RA decided to call a repairman and got the paper with the number on it from the bulletin board.
She went over to a desk and picked up the phone.
She called the repairman to ask him to come fix the computer.
They agreed on 10am (3pm) and she wrote down the time so she would remember.
She sat down and glared at the computer again.
She decided to read the assigned article in Nature (Science) for class while she waited.
She made notes on the article.
The RA thought it might be a good idea to put away her wallet in the desk drawer.
She heard someone and looked up.
She was happy to see the repairman, who was wearing an orange jacket, at the door waving hello with his
left (right) hand.
They said hello and shook hands.
The repairman asked the RA which computer was broken, and still holding the magazine in her right hand, she
pointed to the computer by the white board.
The repairman opened his tool bag to start working.
The RA asked if she could leave him to fix the computer, and the repairman gave her an “OK” sign.
The RA smiled and waved goodbye.
The repairman sat down at the computer and typed something on the keyboard (tried to click on something
with the mouse).
That didn’t work, so using his right arm, he turned off the monitor.
He took out red pliers (a red wrench) from his tool bag.
He looked behind the CPU.
He examined the cords behind the computer.
Finding nothing wrong, he went back to the tool bag.
He took out a blue (yellow) screwdriver next to open up the computer.
Tired of working on the computer, he stood up.
He wiped his forehead with a white cloth (his hand).
He was frustrated with the computer.
He sat down in the chair.
He suspiciously looked back towards the door to see if anybody was nearby.
There was no one around, so he opened the top drawer of the desk.
He took a stack of CDs out of the drawer (put a stack of CDs into his toolbag)
He put a computer mouse in his tool bag (took a computer mouse out of the drawer).
The repairman cautiously looked back towards the door.
He heard the RA approaching and closed the top drawer.
The RA entered the lab with a coffee mug in her hand (nothing).
She pointed to the computer and asked if it was fixed.
He shook his head no and told her he couldn't find the problem.
She was very upset, so he told her he would try again.
The RA sat down at another computer in an adjoining room to the lab.
The repairman looked at the RA to make sure she was not looking at him.
He opened the top drawer again and saw the wallet.
He opened the wallet quietly
He decided to take a credit card (several bills).
He put the item\s in his tool bag (pocket).
He stood up with his tool bag.
He told the RA that he couldn't fix the computer and said goodbye.
He left the lab.
There was no sight of him in the hallway to the right side of the lab.
Nor was there anything in the hallway to the left side of the lab except for an empty blue carton.

Appendix C
Study 1 Full Misinformation Task Response Intercorrelations (Condition-Response-Source Attribution)
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** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Abbreviations: MIS = Misinformation, CTL= Control, S&R = Seen and Read, REJ = Rejection, END = Endorsement
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Appendix D
Study 2 Full Misinformation Task Response Intercorrelations (Condition-Response-Source Attribution)
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** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Abbreviations: MIS = Misinformation, CTL= Control, S&R = Seen and Read, REJ = Rejection, END = Endorsement
Footnote: Control item rejections = Foil response selection, Misinformation Rejection = Selection of original event item
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Appendix E
Study 3 Misinformation Task Response Intercorrelations (Condition-Response-Source Attribution)
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** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Abbreviations: MIS = Misinformation, CTL= Control, S&R = Seen and Read
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Appendix F
Study 4 Full Misinformation Task Response Intercorrelations (Condition-Response-Source Attribution)
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** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Abbreviations: MIS = Misinformation, CTL= Control, S&R = Seen and Read
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